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 ABSTRACT 
  
 
The theologically-inspired Jubilee 2000 campaign was highly successful but much 
theological reflection on the sovereign debt owed by the poorest nations has been 
overly polemical. Our study indicates that nonetheless a post-liberal, dialogical 
approach to the issue of international debt can be realised, and traces some of its 
key observations and themes. The origins and development of Jubilee 2000 are 
traced both in Britain and internationally, with particular reference to the campaign in 
Zambia. Key arguments and factors critical to the success of Jubilee 2000 are 
discussed and analysed. In performing this analysis we draw on the work of Atherton, 
whose approach offers criteria for establishing the adequacy of theological 
engagement in a plural and globalised context. Analysis of the themes of jubilee, 
grace and forgiveness, and usury reveal that despite their limitations, they offer 
valuable and distinctive contributions on issues of power and money, in their insights 
into the human condition, and into obligations across generations. Future theological 
engagement on debt will also require greater attention to the role that money 
performs, and a new synthesis of visionary and realistic elements. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
For centuries Christian theological reflection was dominated by considerations of 
debt. Regulations concerning the practice of usury in Medieval times were 
complex and weighty. In the closing years of the twentieth century this issue rose 
to prominence again, albeit in a different guise. Here the deliberations concerned 
not the interactions between private individuals but entire nations, and the sums 
were astronomical. The Jubilee 2000 campaign gave renewed expression to a 
strand of theological reflection hitherto overlooked for centuries, and galvanised 
millions of people worldwide to campaign for debts to be cancelled. The ‘credit 
crunch’ of 2008 also gave rise to a new awareness of the dangers of poorly 
regulated credit divorced from actual capital, and it may well be that the themes 
of credit and debt become, once again, pivotal aspects of the Church’s social 
engagement. 
 
The Jubilee 2000 campaign was remarkable in several ways. It was the ‘one of 
the biggest global campaigns ever’ (Bunting, 2000), holding the record for the 
greatest number of signatories to a petition. It was also a truly global campaign, 
beginning in the UK, but soon inspiring national campaigns in most countries of 
the world. It was hugely influential and successful in achieving its stated 
objectives - the cancellation of debts to the poorest nations - and led directly to 
the formation of the Make Poverty History campaign. Furthermore, the campaign 
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was rooted in Christian reflection and practice from the outset, choosing an 
overtly biblical symbol, and relying heavily on the contribution of Christian 
churches and Christian-based development agencies as the campaign gathered 
momentum. Indeed, its success can be attributed unequivocally to the churches, 
particularly those in Britain (Bunting, 2008). Not since the campaigns for the 
abolition of the slave trade and the ending of apartheid has the Church enjoyed 
such a prominent role in a mass political action. 
 
This study is concerned with the Jubilee 2000 campaign and the lessons that can 
be drawn from it for continued theological reflection on the subject of international 
debt. Accordingly the thesis is developed in two parts. The first part is concerned 
with the campaign itself: why did the campaign begin, and what were its origins? 
How and why did the campaign develop, and what were its objectives, guiding 
principles and motivations? What were the outcomes, successes and 
weaknesses of the campaign, and what were the factors contributing to these? 
What does a study of the campaign suggest about the Churches’ involvement in 
social, political and economic issues? We shall see that moral and theological 
themes played a significant part in the success of the campaign, and can be 
measured not only according to the campaign’s own objectives, but also more 
widely in terms of a paradigmatic shift in general attitudes to debt relief. 
  
The second part is devoted to theological issues. In performing an analysis of the 
way theological judgments are derived, we shall need to establish criteria for 
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establishing their adequacy or otherwise, for a critical issue at the heart of this 
thesis is concerned with questions of how theological reflection utilises economic 
insights, and how they may be correlated. Our discussion will show that a 
framework based on the work of John Atherton offers a valid and constructive 
means both of assessing the campaign and of critiquing the themes that emerge 
from it. This leads us into an investigation as to how ongoing theological 
reflection on debt might be pursued constructively. We shall be asking: what is 
the nature and dynamic of these themes, and where do they originate? To what 
extent can they be used satisfactorily for theological engagement in the future? 
What are their limitations, and how may they engage with secular disciplines 
such as economics with authenticity and lead to outcomes that will more closely 
resemble the character of the kingdom of God? We shall see that this 
investigation leads to conclusions not only concerning specific theological 
concepts but also on the processes of theological interaction and ways of 
navigating the tension between ideals and realities.        
 
The Jubilee 2000 campaign, formally the Jubilee 2000 Coalition, was a large 
umbrella organisation comprising hundreds of organisations and millions of 
supporters worldwide. A few definitions are necessary for clarity here: by 
‘campaign’ I mean the Jubilee 2000 campaign in a broad sense. My use of the 
term ‘campaigners’ refers not only to those formally part of the campaign’s 
organisation or involved in its publications, but also to those who in a general 
sense supported the campaign’s aims; the term ‘Coalition’ refers to the 
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partnership of Jubilee 2000 campaigns internationally. The campaign’s origins 
lay in Britain, where the campaign enjoyed considerable prominence and led to 
the establishment of campaigns in other countries, some of which still persist to 
this day. The campaign was notable for the leading role taken by church leaders 
and Christian activists. It called for the cancellation of the ‘unpayable’ debt owed 
by the least developed countries to the West and the international financial 
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. The campaign was highly 
successful and, although much debt has yet to be written off, many billions of 
dollars of debt were indeed cancelled, leading to tangible improvements in the 
quality of life for millions of people, especially in some sub-Saharan countries. 
The campaign began as awareness about the phenomenon becoming known as 
globalisation grew. The two are not coincidental but related, for the Jubilee 2000 
campaign was both a response to some of the deleterious effects of 
globalisation, but also dependent on the phenomenon of globalisation itself. The 
campaign spearheaded novel practices and methods of organisation that used 
the global media and the internet to portray Jubilee 2000 in effect as a kind of 
brand.  
 
We begin our investigation into the campaign by looking at how the debt 
cancellation issue arose: a developing sense of crisis grew during the 1980s as 
an increasing number of developing nations became unable to honour their loan 
commitments. International financial institutions, alarmed both at the effects this 
would have on the banking industry and at the plight of the poorest economies, 
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rescheduled many loans but on condition that governments pursued a more 
monetarist policy. These in turn gave rise to popular protest as commodity prices 
rose and welfare provision, education and health care were reduced. The 
consequent impoverishment of many in the poorest parts of the world prompted 
growing awareness of how the matter of international debt was a significant 
factor. One can perceive a process in which international debt moves from being 
considered a temporary, though urgent problem, to being viewed as a 
humanitarian and economic crisis that was endemic and systemic. Chapter 2 
therefore looks at this history over recent decades, and the ways in which the 
emerging debt crisis was understood, before turning to consider the genesis of 
the Jubilee 2000 campaign. Although much has been written about the 
campaign’s development from a sociological standpoint, relatively little has been 
devoted to the theological issues and insights that prompted it. Jubilee 2000 was 
a campaigning organisation rather than a theological or political thinktank. It was 
deliberately short-lived and extremely fast-paced; not surprisingly for a campaign 
that grew exponentially, the formal written records are incomplete. The campaign 
generally favoured the publication of succinct reports rather than lengthy 
documents, and a major feature of the campaign’s success was its pioneering 
use of media, and the internet in particular, where image and headlines were as 
important as content. In addition, Jubilee 2000 was a diverse movement 
embracing many groups and interests that would rarely be seen together in the 
same platform (for example, the Mothers’ Union and radical political groups). As 
an umbrella campaign, therefore, internal differences of opinion are not always 
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highlighted because the focus was on the common, broad cause of debt relief. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to discern a clear difference in perspective between 
campaigns in the North and South, and to come to a clear view as to the salient 
perspectives and key decisions that defined the movement as a whole. 
 
Having investigated the development of the campaign, and the reasons for its 
success, in chapter 3 our study examines more closely the arguments deployed 
by the campaign. Some of the arguments appeal to a sense of natural justice, 
others draw interesting parallels with other instances of bondage and coercion, 
such as the campaign to abolish slavery in the colonies. We see that the 
campaign was pursued not only through rational argument but also, though no 
less consistently, through a more emotional appeal: the image of the chains of 
slavery bringing home to people the limiting, oppressive nature of debt bondage.  
 
My investigation concentrates mainly on British theology, though with some 
American content. This reflects the fact that the Jubilee campaign originated in 
the UK, even though other organisations across the developing world had been 
campaigning on the debt issue. One significant feature of Jubilee 2000 was its 
global dimension, embracing campaigns in nearly 70 countries across every 
continent. In some countries such work had already been taking place before the 
campaign’s inception; in others it was new. It was important to undertake a case 
study of one severely indebted nation, in which there was a strong campaign, to 
understand better the dimensions of the debt situation and the impact it has. In 
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addition, it was necessary to understand a national campaign from the 
perspective of those in a very different place from the campaigners in the rich 
North. 
 
Zambia was chosen for several reasons: it represents a relatively straightforward 
case, uncomplicated by natural disasters or war; the campaign there has been, 
and continues to be, highly influential; Zambia has received total debt relief under 
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and the effects of this ought 
to be in evidence; some of the structural issues that were factors in Zambia’s 
original indebtedness remain and continue to be cause for concern. In effect, a 
study of Zambia presents a microcosm of the essential factors in the crisis of 
poor country indebtedness, and presents indications of both the success and the 
limitations of debt relief. Chapter 4 is therefore devoted to a study of the debt 
crisis in Zambia, which was visited in April 2008, long enough after the HIPC 
completion point for debt relief to have made an impact. This chapter will look at 
the background to Zambia’s debt crisis and the factors involved in it, the effects 
that structural adjustment policies made on living conditions and the wider 
economy. As will be seen, the effects were severe on welfare and quality of life, 
and crippling economically: Zambia experienced a sharp plunge through the 
index of human development to become one of the lowest ranked countries in 
the world. The Jubilee-Zambia campaign is then investigated, and the theological 
understanding of debt which has emerged. We shall see that the dimensions of 
the debt problem reach critically beyond the confines of economics into the 
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realms of politics and law. Theologically the issues go beyond those of natural 
justice and embrace questions of power relations in exchange, and of temptation. 
 
In some ways the Jubilee campaign can be considered to be quite exceptional, 
the like of which we may not see for another century. If so, one may question the 
validity of gleaning insights from it for other contemporary reflections upon 
political economy. Linden (2000, pp.22-23) suggests that the chief significance of 
the campaign was its ability to have common appeal to both evangelical 
Protestants through the jubilee references in Scripture, and to Catholics through 
Papal pronouncements on the same theme. The actual theological 
interpretations of Jubilee were relatively unimportant compared to this 
campaigning advantage. If this is the case, what does this have to say about the 
dimensions of theological engagement on social and political issues? Linden 
argues that there is a danger in seeing the Jubilee 2000 campaign as indicative 
of the wider Church’s engagement with the forces of globalisation, precisely 
because the campaign represented a fairly clear-cut moral argument; a similar 
point is made by Brown and Ballard (2006, p.429), who state that campaigns 
such as Jubilee 2000 can distort theological involvement away from areas of 
greater complexity or ambiguity. There is a tension between the campaign 
imperative to present simplified arguments, with the need for theological and 
moral integrity to avoid misconception. Not unrelated to this, we see a conflict 
between rights-based approaches and those which stress the complexity and 
ambiguity of such matters. By contrast, Atherton, whose own approach 
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deliberately embraces the contradictions and ambiguities of capitalism, argues 
that the Jubilee 2000 campaign is sacramental. He sees the campaign as a sign 
of the Church’s decisive option alongside the poor, and which provides evidence 
that a dialogical approach, rather than a confessional one, is capable of urging 
prophetic action: 
 
‘Jubilee 2000 is a symbol of the wider task of addressing 
global poverty… [it is a] true sacrament of Christian 
understanding of this global economy and world, and of an 
effective discipleship in it. It is a sacrament of true 
partnership and reconciliation.’ (Atherton, 1997, p.12)  
 
Is the Jubilee 2000 campaign incidental to the broad sweep of the Church’s 
engagement in social issues, or does it indeed suggest a profound development?  
Our investigation will answer the claims of both Linden and Atherton, and 
consider the way in which the different emphases and processes of a political 
campaign, and those of theological reflection, can pull in opposite directions. 
 
The development of the Jubilee 2000 campaign has presented a fascinating 
study to students of sociology, media and social anthropology, but this thesis is 
concerned with none of these; it is concerned with the Church’s response to the 
phenomenon of international debt in the late twentieth century, and encapsulated 
in the campaign which became the Jubilee 2000 Coalition. Of particular interest 
are the processes by which theological opinions were formed and expressed, for 
the 1980s and 1990s witnessed an upheaval in theological reflection on, and 
involvement in, politics and economics. Until the 1970s the dominant model in 
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the West for theological understanding of economics was that of classic social 
liberalism, as evinced by Ronald Preston in Britain and Philip Wogaman in the 
US. These stressed the autonomy of secular disciplines such as economics and 
the consequent role of theological ethics as a kind of mediation between different 
cultures. The rise of liberation theologies presented a serious challenge to this 
but did not overthrow its hegemony. Nonetheless among liberals and 
conservatives on both sides of the Atlantic there emerged a new emphasis on 
the experiences of the poor, and the gospel prioritisation in their favour. Yet such 
approaches were often held in tension with principles of consensus and the 
common good. However, emerging in the 1980s two new challenges suggested 
the demise of the classic liberal approach. One was pluralism, the widespread 
acknowledgment that many contrasting values and beliefs pertained in society; 
the other was globalisation, the phenomenon describing the processes of 
economic and commercial homogenisation across national and cultural 
boundaries. From these challenges a growing diversity of responses appeared, 
for example the neo-orthodoxy of Michael Banner, or the Radical Orthodoxy 
movement championed by John Milbank and others. The subordinate relation of 
secular disciplines to theology is a key aspect of these schools of thought, which 
has led to a growing confidence outside their confines and, among some, to call 
for a return to more Christian economics; the work of the conservative 
evangelical Jubilee Centre in Cambridge would be a good illustration. Another 
response to the demise of liberalism has been attempts to reformulate it, or to 
seek a post-liberal theology.  
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Many claim the success of Jubilee 2000 endorses their particular theological 
approach. Radical-orthodox and other confessional theologians view the 
campaign as evidence that it is possible to advance a distinctively Christian 
theme within wider public discourse; radicals will be convinced that it represents 
a qualified victory for causes espoused on behalf of the poor and oppressed. 
Those rooted in the liberal and post-liberal traditions see it as a sign that a 
dialogical approach is more fruitful, and that the campaign bears witness to the 
tension of practical measures rather than ultimately fanciful alternative 
economics. I will demonstrate that analysis of the Jubilee 2000 campaign, using 
an Athertonian framework, exposes the shortcomings of confessional-based 
approaches and offers validity to emerging post-liberal ones. 
 
My thesis therefore moves at this point to a discussion on the interaction of 
theology and secular disciplines, and the way in which satisfactory criteria may 
be discerned in order to analyse adequately the Jubilee 2000 campaign. 
Our next chapter traces the key features of the significant, but differing, 
developments in theological reflections upon political economy. This latter term is 
important here, for the study of the campaign reveals that it becomes impossible 
to separate economics from the wider context in which it rests, and indeed 
depends: issues of social context, of power relations, of nationhood and the 
legitimacy of authority. Chapter five introduces the classic theologically liberal 
approach to economic issues in the work of Ronald Preston, and a critique of 
this, not least in the light of globalisation and postmodernity’s emphasis on moral 
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pluralism. The attempts of Raymond Plant and Hans Küng to remodel the liberal 
approach are then analysed, before turning to more vocal critics of this approach. 
The more confessional approaches of Douglas Meeks and Timothy Gorringe, in 
addition to those of John Milbank and Stephen Long, are discussed, and 
particular attention is given to the way in which they assert that the needs of the 
poorest have primacy. Atherton has sought to develop Preston’s approach in the 
light of a changed, global context. In his work we see a gradual progression that 
reflects some of the changes in British social theology during the 1980s and 
1990s, from an antagonistic position vis à vis market capitalism to one which is 
now more sophisticated but no less radical. Throughout his work, Atherton has 
sought to understand, following Preston, the nature of economic forces and 
processes, and increasingly to reject confessional approaches. His more recent 
works attempt to embrace both the autonomy of market capitalism and offer 
means of leading to distinctive, authentic Christian responses through dialogue. 
The theme of dialogue is in turn developed further by Malcolm Brown, who 
believes that the only way in which theology can be seen to have anything to 
offer in a plural world is to look at its own self-identity, as one player among many 
others, but that through this more limited perspective new possibilities for 
genuine dialogue, and distinctive forms of Christian thought and action, emerge. 
From this discussion an Athertonian framework will be determined, which will 
satisfy the challenges posed by pluralism and globalisation, and will indicate the 
criteria for a dialogical approach consistent with biblical principles and able to 
offer suggestions for practical action. Such a framework helps us to determine 
13 
 
the strengths and weaknesses of the Jubilee campaign, and the validity and 
appropriateness of the arguments deployed and the themes that emerge. We 
need to ask whether it is possible, for instance, to identify key theological themes 
and principles which transcend the boundaries of context and culture and thus 
have a universal and authoritative claim, or is it rather the case that their outlines 
are more contingent?  
 
Having researched and analysed the campaign, and devised criteria for 
assessing its adequacy as a form of theological engagement, our attention turns 
in the second part of this study to the implications one can draw from the 
campaign and from associated theological works, for future theological reflection. 
Three themes are identified for further investigation in subsequent chapters: 
jubilee, grace, and usury. These in turn give rise to other themes for discussion, 
such as the role of utopian motifs, forgiveness, a revised conception of the nature 
and role of money, and the bonds of ethical responsibility that connect different 
generations. 
 
The theme of Jubilee was pivotal to the campaign from its inception, and it is no 
understatement to say that its use was instrumental in the campaign’s success, 
in particular its ability to act as a overarching banner, under which many diverse 
groups and interests, faith and unions could join together. Although much of our 
attention will be on its validity as a tool for theological reflection on debt, we need 
to bear in mind its high value at an emotional and imaginative level for political 
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ends. We therefore turn to an investigation of the jubilaic legislation in scripture: 
its content and the socio-economic context in which it is likely to have emerged. 
As we shall see, it is closely related to the legislation concerning the sabbatical 
year. Unlike this, however, there are grave doubts as to whether the jubilee was 
ever implemented, and thus we need to debate the issues this raises: was this 
due to the legislation being impractical, or was its main intention more prophetic 
than purposeful? The Athertonian perspective will then be employed in order to 
determine the advantages and limitations of jubilee as a theological resource, 
and our discussion thus concludes with a critique of the jubilee legislation for 
theological engagement with political economy.  
 
The jubilee may be the most prominent theological feature of the campaign’s 
advocacy on international debt, but there are other significant ones that are less 
easy to present in such a simple, imaginative way yet nonetheless offer rich food 
for thought. Although much material linked with the campaign is brief and highly 
topical, several theologians have given careful consideration to the matter. This 
is particularly significant given then ephemeral nature of much of the theological 
reflection issued during the campaign. One prominent development among 
theologians reflecting upon debt has been the introduction of the themes of grace 
and forgiveness. Chapter 7 examines the ways in which this has been attempted, 
and subjects them to a critique, again using Atherton’s framework , to discern the 
suitability of the methods employed in attempting this. We consider the theme of 
grace in the works of Michael Northcott, Peter Selby, and Kathryn Tanner. 
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Northcott offers an intriguing approach to the matter of debt cancellation through 
an imaginative combination of political theology and radical orthodoxy. He calls 
for a return for the explicit link between money and actual goods (gold), 
processes of exchange and human relationships, rather than its abstract 
commodification in recent decades. His bold, lucid counter to globalisation 
focuses particularly on the political issues, especially sovereignty and the state, 
that arise from discussions on debt and poverty.  
 
By contrast with Northcott’s acerbic, confrontational approach, we see how Selby 
offers a more thorough analysis of debt through both its domestic and 
international dimensions. Selby, the Bishop of Worcester, was a key figure in 
promoting the campaign within the Church of England, and its General Synod of 
1998 in particular. He stands in the classic liberal tradition of Christian social 
involvement yet, like Northcott, acknowledges the need to move from a position 
of mediation exemplified by that tradition, to one that pays greater attention to 
those most vulnerable and in solidarity identifies with them. Selby highlights the 
nature of the relations that debt produces, or exploits, and thus sees the issue of 
power as central for any approach to debt. Furthermore, like Northcott he 
advocates emphasis on the theology of gift rather than exchange, but unlike him, 
Selby develops this in a less confrontational way. Selby’s method is to identify 
points of intersection rather than the imposition of one discipline onto another. 
The result is powerful critique of capitalism through the introduction of a theology 
of grace. Tanner was not involved in the campaign yet her approach is innovative 
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in the way she seeks to develop a theological ethic within the world of 
economics. The chapter ends with a discussion on the theme of forgiveness and 
in particular the contributions of Simon Taylor and Daniel Bell who both, in very 
contrasting ways, suggest that forgiveness represents the most helpful means of 
introducing theological material into the matter of debt. 
 
One of the campaign’s criticisms of the interest payments required by heavily 
indebted poor countries, was that they were usurious. Our discussion reviews the 
development of usury theory, its dominance in the Middle Ages and subsequent 
demise, until very recently. The resurgence of interest in usury as a resource for 
advocating a greater mutuality of risk, power and gain through shared-interest 
schemes is particularly significant. This in turn leads into a critical discussion on 
the changing nature and role of money in the global economy today, considering 
the work of Catherine Cowley, who emphasises the wider role of money as a 
product of social networks and systems, rather than merely a token of 
commercial exchange. One further consideration the usury theory produces is 
the linkage between the present and the future, and issues of inter-generational 
responsibility will therefore be addressed. 
 
We conclude our study by reviewing our analysis of the Jubilee 2000 campaign 
and of the key issues for theological reflection upon debt - methodological and 
thematic - that emerge. These take us inevitably beyond the confines of 
economics into wider discussion of our understanding of the human being in 
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relation to others, both in the present and for the future. One key theological 
insight is derived from the concepts of freedom and constraint. We realise that 
perfect freedom is not found in complete autonomy and independence, but 
through adherence to some regulation (for example: the Torah, financial 
regulation, prohibitions on drugs). That is to say, we do not always know what is 
good for us, and even were this not the case, human beings are sometimes 
incapable of pursuing this without some forms of prohibition or sanction.  
 
A current refrain through this thesis is the question as to how a particular 
argument might lead to constructive steps toward the eradication of poverty and 
debt. An effective ethic of Christian engagement in any sphere of human activity 
needs not only to be consonant with the prophetic witness to truth, and the vision 
of that new order which God in Christ has initiated, but moreover must provide 
guidance as to how that new order might be realised. The best moralities are 
those which hold together in tension the ultimate and the contingent (Elford, 
2000, p.112), assuming the situation is not apocalyptic, but even in this situation 
a theological ethic needs to pay attention to means as well as ends. This 
balanced ethic does not so much imply a consideration of what might 
simplistically be termed ‘realistic’, a heavily loaded concept: clearly arguments 
about the practicality of various theories can be highly subjective and laden with 
vested interests. The Jubilee campaign itself is a profound illustration of a cause 
initially derided as utterly fanciful yet within a very short period had achieved an 
almost widespread acceptability. Yet at the same time, some problems, such as 
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moral hazard and corruption, remain significant features. An emphasis on means 
as well as ends does however suggest that Christian ethics should be able to 
suggest particular avenues to pursue in order that the ultimate ends might be 
more closely visualised. Hence our discussion also involves the usefulness and 
limitations of visions that portray the ideal, redeemed society. Much theological 
reflection on debt is overly optimistic about human nature and society. This thesis 
therefore concludes with reflection on the theological understanding of human 
nature, in relation to our interaction with a world that is both life-enhancing and 
life-denying.    
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Chapter 2 
 
 
The History of the Debt Campaign 
 
 
 
In this chapter I intend to sketch the recent history of the debt crisis and the emergence 
of Jubilee 2000 as a global movement. I will investigate the perceived causes of the debt 
crisis for, as we shall see, these have undergone considerable and frequent revision as 
new theories and data emerged. In particular, I wish to draw out the essentially 
provisional nature of the economic models available at the time, and thus how tentative 
is the nature of the discipline of international debt economics. As we outline the 
development of the movement that became Jubilee 2000, we shall explore the intentions 
and expectations of the early activists. Again, we shall see how their horizons changed 
rapidly as the movement gathered momentum and the goals of the campaign expanded; 
essentially it is a story of paradigm shift among both campaigners and the wider 
economic community. Finally, the international dimension of the campaign is analysed, 
with particular focus on the contrasting perspectives and demands made by national 
campaigns in the North and South. These differences exposed the tension between, 
broadly speaking, reformist and revolutionary approaches to the political and economic 
architecture of debt, differences which might well have caused the coalition to fragment 
had it continued much longer. 
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Debt Crises in Antiquity  
 
The prevalence and remission of collective debt is nothing new: Solon the Greek ruler is 
recorded as having declared a cancellation for all debts in the year 594 BCE (Dent and 
Peters, 1999: 21); there are also numerous incidents recorded in ancient Mesopotamia 
(Logan, 1999: 9; Ferguson, 2008b). There, declarations of debt-release or partial 
amnesties from debt were typically announced at the beginning of reigns as a device to 
attract popular support or legitimise the authority of the new ruler. This phenomenon is 
not confined to ancient history: it is interesting to note that in the 2004 campaign for 
Mayor of London the defeated Conservative candidate, Stephen Norris, pledged in his 
manifesto not only to abolish the London congestion charge but also to annul any 
outstanding fines (Congestion Charge London, 2009). We can see, therefore, that debt 
cancellations may be enacted as a means of maintaining the existing pattern of social 
and economic arrangements, rather than necessarily instigating a new socio-economic 
order. 
 
King Edward II of England defaulted on Edward I‟s debt in 1329.1 This was money 
borrowed to finance military expenditure, loaned from the Peruzzi and Bardi banking 
families in Florence. The refusal to honour this debt led to the collapse of Italian banking 
at large, followed by a not dissimilar event by caused Edward IV‟s default a century later 
(Kote-Nikoi, 1996:xx). Notwithstanding these instances, sovereign debt first arose as a 
consequence of borrowing by national banks rather than by the sovereign; one of the 
                                                 
1
 A good summary of this and other sovereign debts is found in Congdon (1988) chapter 4. 
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first was the Baring Bank in London, which in 1817 lent 100 million francs to France in 
the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars (Körner et al, 1986: 13). 
 
Debt crises have emerged periodically since the nineteenth century. In 1839 Mississippi 
and Louisiana defaulted on their debts, which were then owed mainly to Britain; in the 
1840s the USA defaulted to its European creditors. Egypt and the ailing Ottoman Empire 
were loaned money by British and French interests, with huge political repercussions for 
the former, an illustration of how outstanding loans sometimes led to foreign occupation. 
In Egypt itself, loans were taken out to finance modernisations (such as the Suez Canal) 
and remove foreign imperial influences (Magdoff, 1986). Ironically these resulted in 
bankruptcy and military intervention. In this instance particular note must be made of the 
part British financiers played in bribing corrupt Egyptian officials, with the result that the 
Egyptian debt soared twenty-fold between1862 and1876 (Körner et al, 1986: 14).  
 
In 1898 Spain surrendered the island of Cuba to the United States, following the end of 
hostilities between them. The United States refused to accept Cuba‟s debt, describing it 
as „odious‟, and stating that the debts had been „imposed upon the people of Cuba 
without their consent and by force of arms‟ (Jubilee 2000 Coalition, 1999: 31) and was 
contracted „for the precise purpose of crushing their attempts to revolt against Spanish 
domination‟ (Hoeflich, 1982: 53). The creditors, the argument went, had known the risk 
of such default when the loan was issued. At about the same time the British 
government broke with its previous policy of automatically honouring the debts of 
conquered nations. It did, however, make a payment to Boer bondholders, but only at a 
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tenth of their value (Hoeflich, 1982: 55). Another default occurred following the Bolshevik 
revolution in Russia, overturning the Provisional Government‟s original intention to repay 
the debts incurred by the Tsarist regime. The debt is still owed and until a few years ago 
was traded on the secondary debt market until court action forced its suspension 
(Adams, 1991: 166; Hoeflich, 1982: 61). Much of the outstanding debts and reparations 
from the First World War were annulled in 1931 (Ferguson, 2008b; Enlace 2, June 
2000). 
 
The Marshall Plan is often cited as an example of loans granted on favourable terms by 
contemporary standards; a not dissimilar loan arrangement was made with Indonesia in 
the 1970s, for instance (Greenhill, Pettifor, Northover et al, 2003: 6). The Plan was a 
programme for the financial rebuilding of Western Europe following the devastation of 
the Second World War, using money from the US government. Under this plan, for five 
years the US effectively gave away roughly 5% of its GNP: a substantial amount 
(Lombardi, 1985: 39-40). Among the terms of the loan to Britain was a cap on the level 
of future interest payments at 2%; at the time such terms were viewed as unfavourable 
in Britain. Much of the German debt was cancelled in order to keep German repayments 
below 5% of its export earnings to debt-service ratio (Moulds, 1989). Sovereign debt 
default and cancellation are therefore far from uncommon: 
 
„Historically, debt, including that of the US, has often gone unpaid. The precedent 
of twentieth century forgiveness under certain conditions was in any case set long 
ago, by the US itself‟. (George,1989: 245) 
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It has also been argued that foreign debt has been a contributory factor in the Malvinas / 
Falklands conflict and a possible cause of the first Gulf War (Körner et al, 1986: 2; 
Corbridge, 1993: 40; George, 1992: 40).2 Politics have clearly been a factor in debt 
cancellation agreements: Egyptian support for the United States during the first Gulf 
War, when it joined the international coalition against Iraq was rewarded. In 1990 it 
received massive debt cancellation, though the actual sum is the subject of considerable 
argument.3  
 
The history of sovereign debt and its consequences is a very lengthy, complex matter, 
open to much argument over causes and effects. This is particularly so in the case of 
arguments over the consequences of default. For instance, Russia‟s default in 1998 did 
not prevent fresh loans being taken out in 2001 (Rowbotham, 1998: 202), yet Peru‟s 
default of ten years earlier led to the international financial community avoiding it as a 
poor credit risk (George, 1992: 88). The interpretation of debt statistics presents 
significant problems,4 the variance arising from the different ways in which data is 
obtained, adjusted for inflation or exchange rates, and not the product of poor analysis. 
It is therefore clear that one cannot draw conclusions from selected instances of default; 
one needs the perspective that appreciates the different kinds of debt and the contexts 
in which they occur. What can be stated incontrovertibly is that debt default and debt 
cancellation are not uncommon, though circumstances vary widely. 
                                                 
2
 Sachs‟ scepticism is referred to in Corbridge (1993) p.142 
3
 Dent & Peters (1999) quoted $11 billion (1000 million). George (1989: 156) has $7bn, Hanlon (2000: 
880) states $10 billion, Oxfam International (1999) cites $7 billion. Northcott (1999a: 81) puts it at nearly 
$10 billion. 
4
 Corbridge (1993: 11) provides an example of two quite contrasting opinions of Latin American debt 
repayments. 
24 
 
The Origins of the Debt Crisis and Creditor Responses  
 
There are inevitably differing perspectives on the debt crisis, let alone on measures that 
might remedy the situation. One can perceive, nonetheless, a gradual pattern of change 
of view among the international financial institutions, national governments and the 
development agencies as to both the severity of the problem and the merits of large 
scale debt cancellation programmes. A major factor in the debt crisis has been the 
internationalisation of commercial financial operations, such as the enormous increase 
in US banking operations abroad during the late 1970s and the increasing readiness to 
lend to poor countries that were not members of OPEC (Reisner, 1982: 1). During the 
1980s much of Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa entered a severe debt crisis. Due 
to a combination of mainly external factors, such as high interest rates and low 
commodity prices, these countries faced a steep rise in unemployment, high inflation 
(sometimes over 1000%), net reductions in GDP and dwindling reserves. The 
deleterious effects have been well documented, for example in Susan George‟s A Fate 
Worse than Debt (1988). As the debt problem showed no signs of abating, increasing 
sums were spent by poor countries on debt service repayments, leading to reductions in 
spending on health services, education, infrastructure and technology. Far from relieving 
poverty, the loans taken out were now being seen by many NGOs as leading to it, and 
the cause of misery for millions of people for which no natural solution seemed likely. 
Increasing awareness of the depth of the problem, and moreover its inescapable nature, 
prompted calls by church and aid agencies in North and South to seek new ways of 
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reducing the debt burden of the poorest, and thereby present a new future for them. 
Jubilee 2000 was the culmination of this emerging movement. 
 
The modern debt crisis is widely held to have begun on 13th August 1982 when Mexico 
announced that it would no longer be able to continue servicing loan repayments on its 
$80 billion debts (Congdon, 1988: 130). A historical analysis would however indicate 
that many developing countries defaulted or needed rescheduling in the late 1970s 
(Corbridge, 1993: 40; Northcott, 1999a: 10).5 The Mexico default was therefore 
symptomatic of a more general malaise – though of a new order of magnitude and 
seriousness - and led to an avalanche of default warnings. The Mexico crisis became a 
problem for the international financial community and led to many new approaches to 
the emerging problem. In this particular instance, intensive negotiations followed and its 
resolution became the pattern for similar crises in subsequent years. This resolution 
comprised the rescheduling of the principal loan, which required a reduction in imports 
and increased efforts to boost exports (and services) from the indebted country 
concerned. 
 
Corbridge (1993: 41) chronicles how the international financial institutions modified their 
responses to the emerging debt problem in the light of new information. The first of these 
responses was a period of „containment, austerity and adjustment‟ until the mid-1980s, 
in which the prevailing ethos among the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) might 
be best typified by great reservation as to debt cancellation programmes. This was 
accompanied by criticism of regimes whose economic mismanagement had resulted in 
                                                 
5
 Zaire was the first defaulter during this period, in 1975. Poland defaulted in 1981. 
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a huge debt overhang. The crisis was seen primarily as a crisis of liquidity rather than 
solvency, caused by worldwide recession, and was viewed as a localised anomaly in an 
otherwise smoothly functioning global economic system. By promoting Mexico‟s debt as 
essentially a cash-flow problem, the potential for catastrophe was downplayed whereas, 
in fact, Mexico‟s default would have pushed some US banks to the edge of bankruptcy. 
  
The next period, from 1985 to 1988, was characterised by attempts to enable indebted 
countries to make modest debt reductions allied to specific measures to encourage 
economic growth, rather than austerity alone. A broader range of economic perspectives 
was engaged, and the need for a more international set of solutions to the crisis was 
beginning to emerge. The debtor countries‟ own profligacy became a major factor in this, 
witnessed in domestic mismanagement of the economy and poor fiscal policy, allied to 
„Pharoanism‟, the construction of grand, expensive prestige projects. According to this 
view the debt crisis was really a collection of separate national debt crises, not a global 
dilemma. As such, the responsibility for such debts rested solely with those involved, 
principally debtors who mismanaged their economies. Any loans to shore up the crisis 
ought to reward good economic policies, and any debt forgiveness should be conditional 
upon such behaviour, and should be negotiated individually and not part of some wider 
process. Debt forgiveness programmes ran the high risk of moral hazard – unfairly 
rewarding the corrupt and incompetent - and would actually damage the prosperity of 
those they sought to assist. Economic programmes of structural adjustment are 
therefore unavoidable, even if their impact on the poor is unfortunate. In the wider 
context, solutions lie in opening formerly protected domestic markets to the competitive 
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global economy. A more export-focussed economy will be key to longer-term economic 
growth.  
 
By 1985 the crisis had become one affecting many countries, particularly in Latin 
America, that became unable to meet their debt repayments easily. Private banks began 
to make provision for bad debts and this made it easier for governments to do the same. 
Several initiatives came from the United States, the first being the Baker Plan, which 
called for a massive increase in lending from the World Bank, IMF and commercial 
banks to debtor nations of over $30 billion, in return for strict austerity measures. In 
other words, the idea was to encourage firm economic reform which would, with new 
loans, be a spur to new economic growth. The plan failed to attract support within the 
donor community – who were reluctant to issue new loans; in any case the indebted 
governments were hesitant to pursue IMF adjustment policies (Vallely, 1990: 293). The 
significance of the Plan was that political measures were being employed; there was an 
emerging recognition that an approach that coordinated commercial and government-
controlled finance would be necessary. Indeed, the history of the debt crisis in recent 
decades reflects an increasing awareness that solutions cannot easily be confined to the 
technical matters of economics alone, and that political co-operation and pressure are 
major factors in resolving it. Part of the reluctance among bilateral creditors to 
countenance debt write-offs may have been due to the „preferred status‟ of the multi-
lateral institutions, meaning that they would be the first to have debts repaid. Hence the 
worry developed that if bilateral debts were reduced, effective proceeds would go to the 
IFIs rather than making an impact on the debtor nations‟ domestic economies (Van 
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Drimmelen, 1998: 61). In the mid-late 1980s several more solutions were advocated: by 
Democratic Senator Bill Bradley, President Mitterand of France, and the British 
Chancellor, Nigel Lawson. Debt-equity swaps, although criticised as „back-door 
colonialism‟ (Vallely, 1990: 300) proved initially popular, but produced inflationary 
pressures.  
 
The third period began with the Brady Plan of 1989 (named after US Treasury 
Secretary, Nicholas Brady), which represented a major breakthrough. Debtor nations 
would be considered individually, rather than according to a strict formula, though the 
general principle was that IMF and World Bank finance would be sought to enable a 
reduction in the debt total owed. Brady bonds were issued to replace high-value but 
insecure debt with safer, lower-value ones underwritten by the World Bank and IMF in 
return for compliance with certain austerity measures. The Brady Plan did lead to some 
significant debt reduction, but it had little impact upon sub-Saharan countries. Whereas 
the Latin American crisis was one mainly of private banking, in sub-Saharan Africa it 
represented a „crisis of development‟ which involved national governments, banks and 
multi-lateral agencies. To some extent this was also due to the difference between the 
problems of liquidity and solvency, referred to earlier. Brady bonds clearly provided a 
new opportunity for those economies with the resources to seize them, yet for much of 
Africa this was not the case. Total external debt among sub-Saharan countries rose 
from $84 billion in 1980 to $226 million in 1995, by which time total Third World debt 
reached $2 trillion (Christian Aid, 1997: 13). There, according to the World Bank report 
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of 1991 (cited in Corbridge, 1993: 82) debt service forgiveness has been relatively small 
because the original loans were already „highly concessional‟.  
 
During the late 1980s and the 1990s the Paris Club of creditors to low-income countries, 
which had overseen bilateral debt rescheduling since the 1950s, granted greater 
concessions under which the „London‟ terms of 1991 and the „Naples‟ terms of 1994 
agreed „in principle‟ levels of debt cancellation („forgiveness‟) of 50% and 67% 
respectively (Addison, Hansen and Tarp, 2004: 5; Van Drimmelen, 1998: 60). In 
addition, some creditors converted their loans into grants. In response to the growing 
sense that the debt crisis was intractable, the IMF, the World Bank and the Paris Club in 
1995/6 launched a new programme for debt cancellation. This was the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Country Initiative (HIPC), which proposed a significant debt reduction for selected 
nations, coupled to structural adjustments programmes (SAPs). By the end of 
September 2003, eight countries had reached the end of the HIPC process, and 
qualified for debt relief. HIPC was designed for countries whose debts were 
unsustainable. In practice, this was determined to be those whose debt service 
repayments exceeded annual exports by 200-250%, or exceeded national income by 
280%. Under these criteria, 41 countries were deemed eligible in principle to apply for 
debt relief under the Initiative. The driving force behind HIPC was the desire to lower 
debts to levels at which they became sustainable once again. However, it is clear that 
there has been a shift within the HIPC Initiative from the mere technical details of debt 
service repayments to the wider questions of development (Addison, Hansen and Tarp, 
2004: 8-9).  
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The Enhanced HIPC Initiative (HIPC II) of September 1999 lowered some of the criteria 
of its predecessor. The debt-export and debt-income targets were reduced to 150% and 
250% respectively, and the time-scale for eligibility was also cut. Instead of a three-year 
period between decision and completion points a more flexible system was introduced. 
Perhaps the most significant development has been the introduction of a requirement for 
the country to adopt a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) – effectively a more 
robust means of ensuring that debt relief would indeed alleviate poverty. In preparing a 
PRSP each government is obliged to consult with its citizens and civil organisations. 
Ironically, the introduction of the PRSP may make debt relief less likely, for the 
stringency of the PRSP conditions may mean that some nations may have greater 
difficulty in meeting the eligibility criteria (Morrissey, 2004: 279; Jubilee 2000 Coalition: 
34). To make matters more complex, the debt relief is not granted until at least one 
year‟s PRSP has been implemented – which itself requires capital investment from the 
outset in order to make it work. 
 
The Causes of the Debt Crisis 
 
We have traced the history of the debt crisis and seen how economic concerns gave 
way to increasingly political considerations. In this section we examine the causes of the 
crisis, which is commonly understood to be the product of imprudent loans issued to 
developing countries during the 1970s and early 1980s, combined with unexpectedly 
high interest rates in the 1980s and a fall in commodity prices. Beyond this, explanations 
differ – not so much in the elements involved, but in the weight that is attached to these 
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aspects. For Sub-Saharan Africa particularly, the debt crisis needs to be seen in the 
context of nation-states characterised by instability, internal strife between ethnic 
groups, elitist rulers and poor governance: the legacy, at least in part, of colonialism 
(Kote-Nokoi, 1996: 67ff.). 
 
The first matter to understand is why so many poor countries ever undertook such 
financial liabilities. The history of these loan undertakings is linked inextricably to the 
post-war concern for economic development and stability, encapsulated in the creation 
of the Bretton Woods Institutions: the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 6  
The ideology of modernisation theories dominated the 1950s and 1960s, with the belief 
that poorer nations could replicate the economic advances of their richer counterparts. 
This would happen only if they could be helped to make technological improvements, 
principally through capital investment. Allied to this was the belief that political 
democracy would be enhanced through this process. In other words, the reason for poor 
development was the lack of resources - financial, cultural, political – all of which could 
be ameliorated by the influx of capital.  
 
Commentators are widely agreed on the immediate cause of the debt crisis: the steep 
rise in interest rates during the 1970s and early 1980s. Two such periods of sharp 
increases occurred, in response to the decision of OPEC to raise oil prices. Soaring 
inflation resulted, which led to higher interest rates being set by the US Federal Reserve 
(in particular) and the Bank of England. The steep rise in revenue for oil-exporting 
                                                 
6
 The official title of the World Bank is the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It was 
established to provide loans for economic development; the IMF was set up to safeguard financial stability 
by offering loans to deal with problems such as currency crises. 
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countries produced a large surplus of money on the Eurodollar market, where many 
OPEC countries invested their newly found wealth. Indeed, so much money was 
deposited that financiers felt forced to seek new markets in which to invest. As many 
Western industrialised nations faced economic slowdown due to the rise in oil prices 
(which trebled during 1973-4), the developing world was viewed as a tremendous 
opportunity to deposit the spare money. It was a time of unprecedented lending to such 
nations; stories abound of loans granted for ill-conceived projects, of widespread 
corruption and inexperienced creditors.7 Interest rates were comparatively low when the 
loans were contracted, but the advent of monetarist policies in the late 1970s in the US 
and UK began to have deleterious effects. Economic monetarism regarded inflation as 
the principal enemy of economic growth, and whose cause was an excess quantity of 
money circulating in the economy: monetarist policies sought to reduce the money 
supply through the control of interest rates. While real interest rates remained low and 
export growth rates were relatively high, the issue of debt was of little concern, but with 
the advent of higher interest rates the situation changed drastically, and these difficulties 
were compounded by a number of other, unrelated matters such as the fall in the price 
of many primary commodities that indebted countries exported.8 
 
It is of great significance that lending did not cease during the second interest rate rise; 
on the contrary, there was a huge burst of new lending during 1980-81. In the two years 
following the rate rise, the commercial banks issued roughly the same number of loans 
to major debtors as they had done during 1973-79, a practice described by one eminent 
                                                 
7
 Specific examples are given in the following chapter. George (1989) provides many others.  
8
 This was partially due to the world-wide recession caused by higher oil prices, leading to less demand 
for raw materials. 
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economist as „hard to justify‟ (Sachs, 1989: 9). However, one cannot blame the US‟ 
economic policies and deregulation alone for the debt crisis, since there were also 
external factors in the global economy and poor economic decision-making in debtor 
countries (Corbridge, 1993: 141). The nature of the debt problem changed during the 
late 1970s in that maturity dates became shorter, and the interest rates and the 
„spreads‟9 were higher. In other words, poor, indebted countries now needed fresh 
capital through loans that were now both short-term and high-interest. In order to keep 
their economies on track, and with ever higher oil prices, many countries felt themselves 
to have little option, and hence the boom in such lending during this short period until 
1982. Such nations relied increasingly on export-driven strategies to fund debt 
repayments, yet after 1982 the availability of fresh credit dried up significantly. By the 
1980s economists were referring to the problem as one of debt „overhang‟, when 
repayments on the interest become unmanageable, deterring new credit and leading to 
financial stagnation. 
 
We may therefore conclude that the debt crisis was the product of many factors in 
combination, but the relative weights attached to these is a point of disagreement.   
We have seen that the view that the problem lay with liquidity gradually lost credibility as 
both the scale of the crisis and the need for ever greater debt rescheduling became 
apparent, as described in the section above. Conditionality had been the sine qua non, 
and even some debt campaigners had been sceptical of the idea of comprehensive but 
unconditional debt cancellation programmes. For example, Susan George, a 
campaigner who had expressed grave hesitations about the practicalities of huge debt 
                                                 
9
  A spread is defined as the difference between the rates at which the bank borrows and lends. 
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cancellation, became a patron of the Jubilee 2000 Coalition. In the 1980s she had 
argued that debt cancellation could actually be detrimental – not least by rewarding the 
profligate and propping up discredited élites (George, 1989: 238-243).  
 
A more reformist view emphasised that the overriding cause of the debt crisis was better 
understood as one of solvency, and hence a developmental, global problem in which a 
„common crisis demands a common set of solutions‟ (Corbridge, 1993: 126); that is, a 
shared responsibility among the whole global financial community. The work of Sachs 
was an example of such a perspective, but as early as 1983 the Brandt Commission had 
viewed the debt crisis as being common to the entire global economy. In this 
understanding, many factors and players were held to be responsible for the crisis, 
including the imprudence of Western creditors. Partial debt forgiveness was seen as a 
pragmatic solution, and the spectre of „moral hazard‟10 dismissed as irrelevant. The 
safeguarding of future debt service payments was best guaranteed by encouraging 
investment and growth, rather than a specifically export-led economy. A feature of this 
perspective was a moral concern for those who bore the burden of the crisis. An 
argument therefore emerged that some consequences of the debt crisis were sufficiently 
deleterious to the poorest to be deemed morally unacceptable.  
 
A more catastrophic view was that promulgated by many, but not all, NGOs and aid 
agencies. The writings of George (1989, 1992), Lombardi (1985) and the more 
apocalyptic opinion of Rowbotham (1998, 2000) typify this. They also bear the influence 
of economic dependency theory, in which developing countries are actually becoming 
                                                 
10
 The problem of moral hazard is described in more detail in chapter 3. 
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„underdeveloped‟ and increasingly dependent upon richer nations as capital flows 
gravitate inexorably from the poor South back to the rich North. According to this 
approach, the debt crisis is symptomatic of chronic instabilities within global capitalism, 
and reveals the weakness of the prevailing model of economic development (Corbridge, 
1993: 187; Warburton, 2000; Lombardi, 1985). The debt problem is thus viewed as 
principally a political one, for which solutions need to be characterised by a broad 
political-economy approach rather than by matters of economic detail. The prevailing 
development orthodoxy tends to view national economies in isolation from one another, 
and in particular from regional and international economic considerations that today are 
part of the phenomenon of globalisation. In addition, the focus of such standard theory is 
often reductionist in nature, narrowly concerned with economics and social engineering, 
but not the wider aspects that contribute to the conditions under which genuine 
development may flourish, such as culture and social relations (Woolcock, 2004).  
 
According to this perspective the origins of the debt crisis lie more in the 1960s than 
1970s, and with decisions made by the United States to finance its deficit due to the 
Vietnam war, such as the abandonment of the Gold Standard and measures to lift 
controls restricting access to foreign capital (Pettifor, 2004).11 The notion that the crisis 
was caused by the effects of the oil price rises of the 1970s alone is therefore rejected; 
greater emphasis is laid upon the measures that were taken to deregulate the 
international trading system and allow the proceeds from oil revenues to be deposited 
outside the control of national governments (Corbridge, 1993: 29). On this basis, the 
                                                 
11
 This view has been given added credence by the events of the global economic crisis that began in 
2008. 
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debt crisis can be resolved only by radical measures such as mass default or write-
downs under the auspices of a new governing process. The norm is that debt write-
downs are controlled by creditors, whose economic and legal power easily surpasses 
that of the debtor; here the emphasis is on processes that involve the participation of the 
relatively powerless.  
 
Clearly any categorisation can reduce complex matters to a simplicity that does not do 
justice to the arguments involved. The debt crisis would be one example, for one can 
see in this historical account significant changes of understanding as the crisis unfolded. 
In particular, it is possible to hold together aspects of the reformist and catastrophic 
positions, and advocate reformist action while nonetheless believing that the problems 
are more fundamental. In some respects, as we shall see, the Jubilee 2000 campaign 
epitomises this. It is worthy of note that Jubilee 2000 publications always portrayed the 
oil crisis as the major cause of the debt crisis, although Pettifor (2004; 2003 chapter 1) 
has argued strongly since that the deregulation of capital was the fundamental factor.12 
  
The Emergence of the Jubilee 2000 Debt Cancellation Campaign 
 
The genesis of the Jubilee 2000 campaign lies with earlier, fragmented campaigns of 
the 1980s and 1990s. Several development agencies, including the World Development 
Movement had been drawing attention to the growing problem and its consequences for 
the poorest. Popular books by authors such as Susan George alerted the wider public to 
                                                 
12
 Jubilee Debt Campaign (2008: 5) refers to the geopolitics of the cold war as the first „strike‟ toward the 
debt crisis. 
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both the nature and consequences of the debt crisis. In particular, her book The Debt 
Boomerang (1992) showed how environmental damage, unemployment, war and the 
international drugs trade were fuelled by circumstances in which the debt crisis was a 
major factor. The title itself was intended to alert Western audiences to the 
repercussions of financial policies in their own countries.  
 
During the 1980s many influential politicians and clergy drew attention to the plight of 
the poor in the face of the debt crisis, and advocated measures for debt cancellation. 
The Methodist Bishops of Latin America issued a statement in 1985 declaring that 
„foreign debt is the result of unjust economic relationships‟ and challenged the legitimacy 
of the outstanding debts (Van Drimmelen, 1998: 70). This was one of many statements 
from the churches and Christian organisations across the globe: the Vatican in 1987 
(Pontifical Commission on Justice and Peace, cited in Van Drimmelen, 1998: 71), the 
YMCA, bishops in Norway, the United Church of Christ in the US, and the WCC being 
among them (Van Drimmelen, 1998: 70-71). The CAFOD Education Campaign 1986-88 
„Proclaim Jubilee – Debt and Poverty‟, focussed on the effects of debt repayments in the 
poorest nations, and called for serious consideration for debt remission and a 
restructuring of the international financial institutions. The US Catholic Bishops in their 
1986 pastoral letter „Economic Justice for All‟ stated: 
 
„just as it is morally imperative to repay all illegitimate debts, it is also ethically 
legitimate and a proper exercise of national sovereignty for nations affected to 
revise, condemn and even refuse to pay, in whole or in part, any illegitimate 
debts, or debts in which such extortionate rates of interest are charged as to 
endanger the lives of their citizens and the stability of democratic governments. 
(Exodus 22:25, Ezekiel 22:12)‟ (Cited in Van Drimmelen, 1998: 70)  
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In 1988 Christian Aid published „Banking on the Poor‟, a booklet on the ethics of Third 
World debt. Citing Jesus‟ preferential option for the poor, it declared that it was wrong to 
expect the poorest people of the world to bear the burden of debt service repayments 
and IMF adjustment policies for the benefit of the richest nations. The report stated that 
the underlying problem was one of an imbalance of power, the power of the rich 
unchecked by any power among the poor. It called for the „forgiveness‟ of debt, though 
acknowledging that ethical judgments must relate to considerations of feasibility. The 
report also argued that commercial banks should write off at least some debts and 
should receive government assistance in doing so. Indebted countries were urged to 
press for remission of debts taken out on „grossly imprudent terms‟; adjustment policies 
should be more flexible and „designed to benefit the poorest‟. Western Christians were 
urged to use their influence, as shareholders, upon bank policy on Third World debt, and 
the Churches should declare their belief that the debt crisis is a symptom of an „unfair 
international order‟ which required fundamental change. 
 
In 1987 an initiative from the World Development Movement and War on Want led to the 
establishment of the Debt Crisis Network supported by Christian Aid, among others. In 
1990 the All Africa Council of Churches appealed for a „Jubilee year‟ of debt remission 
(NGO Steering Committee, 2010). Christian Aid and OXFAM launched campaigns in 
1994 and 1995 respectively, the former producing an information pack on debt and 
calling for pressure on commercial banks to cancel 50% - 90% of outstanding debts, 
according to the severity of the need (Gorringe, 1996: 7; Jubilee 2000 archive: box 11). 
Switzerland‟s 700th anniversary in 1991 became the occasion for a coalition of NGOs 
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(including churches) to propose a debt reduction facility of 700 million Swiss francs 
(about $350 million) (Vischer, 1997; Van Drimmelen, 1998: 60); a quarter of a million 
Swiss signed a petition in favour of this proposal, which was passed by the parliament in 
March 1991 (Gugler, 1994). In 1996 the Debt Crisis Network and Jubilee 2000 arranged 
a tour of Britain by distinguished African politicians, economists and clergy in order to 
draw attention to the need for debt cancellation. Through the auspices of CAFOD, the 
tour concluded with a conference hosted by Cardinal Hume, at which leaders from Latin 
America, Protestant clergy and financial experts were present (The Tablet, 16/5/98: 
611). Not least of these was Michel Camdessus, the former director of the IMF, who 
added weight to the clamour for some debt relief programme. The Jubilee 2000 
Coalition claimed that this gathering played a key role in the IMF‟s decision to join the 
World Bank‟s HIPC programme (Greenhill, Pettifor and Northover, et al, 2003: 27). In 
1999 the Catholic Bishops in England and Wales, jointly with those in Scotland, issued a 
statement on poverty elimination and debt remission (1999), calling for the relief of 
unpayable debt as a „practical necessity‟.  
 
The beginning of the Jubilee movement itself lies with politics lecturer, Martin Dent, who 
at Keele University in the early 1990s, became instrumental in leading a group of 
students concerned about world development, to monitor the debt situation (Dent, 
1998). Dent favoured a narrow campaign on one issue with realistic aims rather than a 
nebulous, less focussed one.13 At about the same time Bill Peters, a former diplomat in 
Malawi, was urging his contacts to address the debt crisis, on which he had been 
campaigning individually since 1983. Dent had „reached the idea of Jubilee through 
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 Dent began attending DCN meetings in 1991: Grenier (2003: 90)  
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reason‟ (Dent and Peters, 1999: 17) though it is clear that it already had a resonance for 
him: a forebear of Dent‟s had been a campaigner for the abolition of slavery – an 
achievement of which Dent remained proud; Dent had even written a hymn to 
commemorate the anniversary of the abolition in 1984, using the Jubilee metaphor (Dent 
and Peters, 1999: 19-20). This motif was then employed from the outset in guiding 
Dent‟s vision of a campaign for debt cancellation. The „2000‟ tag was the idea of Dent‟s 
friend, Michael Schluter, at the Jubilee Centre in Cambridge, who suggested that this 
label was reminiscent of the „acceptable year‟ (Dent, 1991: 10; Dent and Peters, 1999: 
17-18). The student group at Keele readily accepted the name „Jubilee 2000‟ rather than 
the rival suggestion „Millennium 2000‟ (Dent, 1998). 
 
Dent‟s initial proposals,14 aired in 1991, acknowledged that a multi-faceted approach 
was required to remove the scourge of absolute poverty from the developing world; this 
embraced changes in aid policy and the terms of trade as well as debt remission. Dent 
argued for a tiered approach to debt relief in favour of those countries which were 
poorest and had least ability to pay their debt service requirements. For the poorest 
countries with GNP per head of less than $500, full debt remission should occur without 
any conditionality. For those with incomes between $500-1000 a partial remission 
should take place, in which the percentage remission was set at a sliding scale rising 
to16.6% of GNP per head for those at the top end. For countries with $1000-2500 GNP 
per head, debt would be remitted down to a figure of either 16.6% of GNP, or 66.6% of 
annual exports of goods and services, whichever was the lowest. (Thus highly indebted 
countries faced less debt remission if they were economically successful producers.) 
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 A slightly earlier, but similar proposal is found in Dent (1990: 4)  
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Countries with GNP per head above $2,500 were deemed to be sufficiently wealthy to 
meet their debt service requirements.  
 
Amid such detail Dent allowed one significant caveat to this process: all debt remission 
would exclude the amounts estimated to be in the private possession of corrupt senior 
government politicians, presumed to be held in Western bank accounts, „for disciplinary 
reasons‟(1991: 13). Citing the example of President Mbutu, he called for the indebted 
country instead to obtain the money directly from these leaders, but crucially he gave no 
indication as to how this might be achieved. Dent was aware of the views of many 
commercial bankers, who maintained that while the principle of debt remission might be 
at least arguable, the burden of such action should not be borne by the commercial 
banks. Dent‟s response was to propose that the burden be shared, and that some 
compensation should be made (by national governments) to such companies. Noting 
that the value of debt was well below nominal values on the secondary debt market, 
sometimes as low as 5%, he suggested that compensation might be of the order of one 
quarter of the discount value of the debt. The Jubilee 2000 campaign never advocated 
this, and its revision, in 1996, of his tiered proposal (and subsequent withdrawal) reflects 
the fast-changing atmosphere on debt cancellation during that decade.15 As we shall 
see, when the campaign began in earnest it opted for a more dramatic strategy. 
In 1993 Bill Peters joined Dent in the Jubilee 2000 campaign. In the following year the 
Debt Crisis Network recruited Ann Pettifor, who became increasingly involved with 
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 Dent‟s tiered proposals were revised and incorporated into the Jubilee 2000 Charter, a copy of which 
may be found in Appendix II. 
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Jubilee 2000, becoming its co-ordinator in 1996. 16 In 1995 the campaign was further 
boosted by the participation of Isabel Carter of Tearfund, who, while flying over Africa, 
had experienced a vision of a continent saddled by crippling debt (Randle, 2004: 4). 
Indeed, Pettifor has acknowledged that the campaign would not have taken off without 
Carter‟s contribution (Grenier, 2003: 90). A small core group formed a management 
committee which, during 1995 and 1996, made the key organisational and policy 
decisions that were the foundations of its success. Their range of contacts was also 
impressive, which meant that they had connections to sources of funding, publicity and 
media advice; in regard to the latter, the advice of the then Bishop of Hull, Rt. Revd 
James Jones, was most useful (Greene, 2007).17 
 
The Jubilee 2000 campaign was officially launched in 1996 with the backing of Christian 
Aid, Tearfund, CAFOD and the World Development Movement – who perhaps had the 
longest track record in campaigning on this issue. From the outset the impetus for the 
campaign remained with the more openly evangelical organisations. Initial publicity 
(90,000 leaflets) was distributed by Tearfund, where Carter was able to locate some 
sources of funding. This first leaflet, featuring a baby named „Sauda‟, who at birth owed 
30 times more than her lifetime‟s earnings, introduced the idea of debt cancellation by 
2000 (Jubilee 2000, 1996). Christian Aid was initially reticent, but quickly became 
supportive; as an organisation with a broad theological base, this may have been due to 
the reluctance of some staff to embrace ideas coming from the more evangelical 
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 Pettifor had not been the original choice: Patrick Costello was offered the post but declined in March 
1996: Jubilee 2000 Management Committee (1995a). The DCN had initially wanted Pettifor to continue 
working for them on a half-time basis.  
17
 Tim Greene was one of the original members of the Jubilee 2000 Management Committee.  
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quarter. If so, it may indicate a hesitation among liberals concerning the process from 
theological reflection to specific courses of action. Certainly Jubilee 2000 was not 
immune to professional jealousy within the NGO community, partly due to its distinctive 
base of grassroots activities, but also because it sought to adopt a different approach 
from the traditional NGO community which it regarded as élitist, competitive and 
fragmented in their methods (Pettifor, 2000b: 25). In turn, the Jubilee 2000 campaigners 
were regarded as amateurs on debt relief and lacking in relevant experience (Grenier, 
2003: 93). 
 
The discussions within the campaign on their choice of its name is illuminating. The 
Jubilee 2000 Management Committee minutes reveal that this was a somewhat fraught 
matter. Its meeting on 11 July 1995 had already devoted some time to the discussion of 
a name, with the overriding concern that „the name must say exactly what we are 
standing for‟. Two months later, during the meeting of 18 September the decision was 
taken:  
„Heated debate continued regarding the name – settling on two proposed names 
– Debtfree 2000 and Jubilee 2000. Initially it was agreed that the name Jubilee 
2000 should be kept as the overall “umbrella” organization though the popular 
campaign could have a different name… Tensions ran high and eventually a vote 
was called for….. After such prolonged debate the strapline was selected 
immediately as “a debt free start for a billion people”.‟18 
 
An argument deployed in favour of „Jubilee‟ was the observation that although it was a 
Hebrew word it was a term commonly used in European languages. 
 
                                                 
18
 Isabel Carter (2008) recalls that Mark Greene changed his mind at the last moment. Other names for 
the campaign included CleanSlate 2000 and FreshStart 2000, with different straplines. 
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The election of a new Labour government in Britain in 1997 added vital impetus to the 
campaign, as many of its ministers supported – to varying degrees – the broad 
principles of the campaign. In July of that year the Debt Crisis Network merged with the 
Jubilee 2000 Campaign to form the Jubilee 2000 Coalition; its President, Michael Taylor, 
saw both the need and opportunity for a broad alliance between similar organisations. It 
is significant to note that the DCN was initially critical of Dent‟s proposals, and hesitant 
to become closely involved in a movement with a clear religious element; its position 
changed when it became evident that the Jubilee motif was a strong galvanising factor 
in favour of the campaign.19 As the Coalition was formed, Ann Pettifor became 
appointed as Director, Dent and Peters became Vice-Presidents and Ed Mayo (then at 
the New Economics Foundation) became its Chair. Interest in the campaign rose 
dramatically, and it was joined by a wide raft of organisations such as the Mothers‟ 
Union, the British Medical Association, Jewish organisations, aid organisations and 
trade unions, though some of these were little more than sleeping partners. There were 
setbacks: OXFAM and Save The Children both decided not to join the coalition but to 
campaign on the debt issue separately.20 
 
It is clear that within the Coalition‟s own management committee there were significant 
differences of opinion. One of these concerned its members‟ vision for the future: Dent 
(1997) objected to part of a draft which expressed the hope that people could „dare to 
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 There was both a tactical and personal dimension to such differences: Pettifor was frustrated by Dent 
and Peters, and felt they had no vision of such a campaign: Carter (2008). 
20
 Lord Judd at OXFAM was invited to become a patron of the Coalition, but he declined, as did 
Archbishop George Carey. James Jones also declined yet subsequently became a patron.: Jubilee 2000 
Management Committee (1995b). Judd declined due to „political implications‟; Carey‟s response may be 
found in is mentioned Jubilee 2000 Management Committee (1996). 
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envisage abolishing third world debt as we know it altogether.‟21  He realised that new 
investment would be necessary for indebted countries regarded as uncreditworthy, and 
that debt cancellation would allow them access to new credit. Thus his vision was not for 
a debt-free world, but for one „majestic stroke‟ to remove unpayable debt (rather than all 
debt) and the resumption of credit arrangements (Dent, 1994). Dent‟s emphasis on this 
single, corrective action suggests that his views were generally more reformist rather 
than radical. He did not, for instance, specifically advocate structural change in loan 
arrangements – even in his later writings. Dent (1997) was also concerned about how 
his intervention might be regarded, and so added a caution that the „Jubilee 2000 
Directors must not seek to control the coalition.‟ The day after Dent‟s response, the 
Coalition‟s Management Committee held a tense meeting. The draft paper referred to 
above, written by Tim Greene and Sam Clarke, was discussed. The precise outcome is 
not recorded, since the minutes for that day state that to allow „private discussion‟ the 
secretary was asked to leave the meeting (Minutes of Jubilee 2000 Management 
Committee, 9/5/97). What is known is that Ann Pettifor was unhappy with a 
recommendation that the work should be divided into separate departments concerned 
with policy, research, and education. 
 
A key strategic decision the Coalition faced concerned its view of the new HIPC 
Initiative. It is clear from both correspondence and minutes of meetings that the 
Management Committee quickly moved from initial interest in this programme to a 
position of opposition. Gus O‟Donnell, Executive Director at the World Bank, had taken 
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 This communication was in the form of a fax to the Coalition‟s Administrator and secretary to the 
Management Committee on 8/5/97, the day before a Management Committee meeting.  
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issue with the Committee‟s interpretations of how countries might fare after the HIPC 
process had been completed. He stated that debt relief would not solve balance of 
payments problems, that only debt rescheduling could achieve this, and he defended 
the conditionalities attached to the HIPC programme (O‟Donnell, 1997). Pettifor and 
others were already becoming disillusioned with the HIPC Initiative, but O‟Donnell‟s 
letter acted as a revelation that sparked a critical decision. In her reply as the new 
Jubilee 2000 Director, a few days before the July meeting referred to above, she stated 
with frankness that his comments „have given us cause to rethink our support for the 
HIPC Initiative‟ and that the Committee viewed them as a means of ensuring debt 
repayments rather than relieving the debt problem (Pettifor, 1997). At the July Board 
Meeting she then voiced her fears that HIPC relief would not be based upon an indebted 
nation‟s plight, but rather on „the old issue of burdensharing‟ in which creditor 
preferences dominated. It was a pivotal moment for the campaign. Pettifor concluded 
her report: 
 
„...should Jubilee 2000 continue to give support to the HIPC Initiative; or should 
we threaten, and then withdraw our support?‟ (Jubilee 2000 Board, 1997) 
 
The „Jubilee 2000 Coalition UK‟ was launched officially on 13th October 1997 (Grenier, 
2003: 91). The Coalition‟s steering committee included people with expertise in 
campaigning and on debt. For example, the committee included Tim Moulds from 
Christian Aid, who had spent 16 years as an investment banker and been involved with 
the Debt Crisis Network since 1990 (and written the pack for the Christian Aid campaign 
in 1994); Jessica Woodroffe had been the head of campaigns at Christian Aid before 
47 
 
taking a post at the World Development Movement, and had been a politics lecturer at 
Manchester University.  
 
The Aims of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign 
 
The campaign argued not just for a one-off debt cancellation but rather a wider 
appreciation of the intractable nature of debt and poverty. They did this by informing the 
public about the causes of the present situation; by calling attention to the irresponsibility 
of Western lenders (including the multilateral institutions) and the shortcomings of the 
HIPC Initiatives; by direct campaigning for debt cancellation; and through advocacy of a 
new system for dealing with debt repayment negotiations. The Jubilee Campaign 
echoed many debt campaigners in drawing attention to the history of the debt crisis, and 
in particular the role of Western banks and multilaterals in supporting foolish or corrupt 
enterprises.  
 
The principal demand of the Coalition‟s campaign was the cancellation of all the 
unpayable debt of the poorest countries by the end of the year 2000, estimated to cost 
$100 billion.22 „Unpayable‟ was defined as that requiring an unacceptable level of human 
suffering, thereby avoiding objections that debt cancellation would reward some nations 
that did not need it as critically as others (Christian Aid, undated: 3). The campaign 
identified 52 countries whose debts were judged to be of great urgency; their combined 
debt service repayments were, in 2000, equivalent to their combined health and 
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 This was variously described as costing $100 billion: Christian Aid (undated) p.3; Pettifor (1999b) cited 
a figure of $200-300 billion. 
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education budgets (Jubilee 2000, 2000). Of these 52 nations, 37 were in Africa, and only 
41 were eligible for debt relief under HIPC.23 Writing in 2000, Dent clearly favoured 
writing off the entire debt of indebted countries, but accepted that the campaign should 
be prepared to settle for near-complete remission (such as 90%) leaving some debt 
outstanding. The campaign goal was however for a clear, radical change that would 
remove inert debt in one stroke, permanently altering the face of Third World economics 
(though, as we have seen, not abolishing debt and credit in themselves). Reducing 
debts only to levels where repayments could again be „sustainable‟ was not considered 
acceptable, since without wider reform and deeper cancellation the situation might easily 
become unsustainable once again.  
 
There were exceptions to the remission of debts deemed „unpayable‟. Dent (1990: 
40,66) argued that Romania, which had pursued unpopular policies to pay off its debts 
in the late 1980s, should be given full debt remission for that incurred after the 
deposition of Ceaucescu, even though it was not one of the poorest countries. South 
Africa, a prosperous nation by African standards, with GNP above $2000 per head per 
year, was put forward as a special case meriting 50% remission due to the debts 
inherited from its former apartheid regime.24 Indeed, in 1997 South Africa had itself 
cancelled the debt owed to it by Namibia, the country it formerly colonised and occupied 
(Davies, 1999).25 Such debts were considered „odious‟ debts since they were contracted 
by a regime declared illegitimate – though Dent conceded that such judgments could 
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 A list of these countries may be found in Appendix I 
24
 For counter arguments, such as the relatively small debt from this period, and concern about the impact 
that financing debt relief by selling IMF gold reserves would have on the South African economy, see The 
Economist, 22/4/99.  
25
 The write-off totaled R1bn.  
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only be made on an individual basis. By contrast, Myanmar, a country included in the 
World Bank‟s list of 41 countries eligible for debt relief under HIPC, was not advocated 
by Dent as deserving remission since it was controlled by a military tyranny, though it 
later featured among the Jubilee 2000‟s list of countries for whom debt relief was 
advocated (Hanson and Travis, 1999: 42-43). 
 
The potential write-down under HIPC was as high as 80%, though countries had first to 
prove their economic credentials. Uganda was the first country to qualify, in 1997, 
though Jubilee 2000 claimed that by April 1998 the debt had become unsustainable 
once again. HIPC was only aimed at commercial and bilateral lending, not multilateral, 
and thus represented only a small fraction of the total money owed by heavily indebted 
nations to their creditors. A major thrust of the campaign was to ensure that the need for 
future debt cancellations of this kind would not be necessary. An entirely new approach 
was required to the way international debt was resolved: 
 
„Debt and financial crises will recur unless the system of international lending and 
borrowing is subject to the discipline of the law and the market. The reality is that 
there will never be an orderly and full workout of poor country debt, as long as 
creditors remain in the driving seat… We in Jubilee 2000 propose an independent 
framework for arbitration when debts become unpayable.‟ 
 
„A major achievement of the international Jubilee 2000 movement has been to 
expose the injustice, double standards, and hypocrisy of relationships between 
debtor nations and their creditors.‟ (Pettifor, 2000a: 140) 
 
Debtors were relatively powerless to negotiate debt service reductions (unless their 
countries were strategically important); the balance of power rested with creditors. The 
Jubilee 2000 Campaign therefore called for a process that was independent of vested 
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interests, transparent to civil society, and undertaken democratically. Such a process 
would aim to introduce justice into debt repayment negotiations, to ensure greater 
discipline in sovereign lending, and to minimise corruption (Pettifor, 2000a: 143).  An 
international Debt Review Body could be established under the auspices of the United 
Nations, for example. Its mandate would be to act as sole arbiter between creditor and 
debtor nations, and to prescribe the way in which the debt relief will go to relieve 
poverty. (The Coalition also called for a process of international bankruptcy – which the 
World Bank eventually agreed to consider.) Thus, campaign argument went, the 
institutions of civil society would be strengthened, opportunities for corruption 
diminished, creditors would face more guaranteed returns, and the poor empowered and 
enriched. 
 
Jubilee 2000 as a mass movement 
 
The campaign‟s first and most successful demonstration took place on Saturday 16 May 
1998, when 70,000 people gathered in the centre of Birmingham as the G8 Conference 
met nearby. They formed a huge human chain around the city centre, symbolising the 
bonds of debt repayment. Applications to meet with the Prime Minister were initially 
refused, but the closing rally was told that Tony Blair had agreed to meet a delegation 
from the Coalition; later that day three members of the Coalition met with him for 25 
minutes. There was much press coverage leading up to, and following, the 
demonstration. One national newspaper, The Guardian, had been urging its readers to 
join the campaign (The Guardian, 11/5/98); the rest of the national press were more 
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indifferent, even sceptical,26 apart from the press in the Birmingham area. The Church 
Times was critical of the event, and reported that the Archbishop of Canterbury, George 
Carey, had chosen to spend the day at the FA Cup Final rather than attend the 
demonstration, pointing out that there had been 9000 more people at Wembley than at 
the Jubilee 2000 rally. It concluded: „an unsuccessful protest is not large enough or, 
alternatively, not fierce enough….‟ while on the merits of debt cancellation, it said, „more 
figures about the effects of debt cancellation need to be produced.‟ (Church Times, 
22/5/98: 3,8).27 The Methodist Recorder was more supportive in its extensive and 
positive coverage of the event. 
 
The following G8 summit in June 1999, in Cologne, was matched by international 
demonstrations as well as in the city itself. Thirty thousand campaigners paraded 
through central London, urging the G8 leaders to change their policy on debt relief. At 
this meeting the HIPC programme was revised – now referred to as HIPCII. In what 
appeared to be an acknowledgment of some of the criticisms of the initial HIPC 
programme, HIPCII reduced key waiting periods and ratios. Debt relief of $25 billion was 
pledged at this summit, which when added to the $25 billion already committed through 
HIPC I totalled $50 billion. When this figure is supplemented by $30 of bilateral relief that 
preceded the HIPC process and a further $20 billion of bilateral aid cancellation urged at 
Cologne, the full total came to $100 billion.28 Increasingly, national governments began 
to declare their own programmes for debt remission – usually bilateral debt. In 1999 
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 For example: Wolf (1998)  
27
 Carey‟s absence was criticised by Bunting (2002)  
28
 This explains the discrepancies in reported figures for the Cologne Summit debt relief pledges. For 
instance, The Guardian 19/6/99 cited $100 billion, The Independent, 14/6/99 cited $50 billion. A full 
breakdown of the figures is found in Greenhill, Pettifor, Northover, et al (2003: 11) 
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Canada, the US and Britain either announced or pledged bilateral debt cancellations to 
the poorest indebted nations.29 The following year Italy, Germany, France and Japan 
followed suit. For many campaigners, such announcements appeared to show that debt 
cancellation was actually going to occur.30 
 
The Coalition was also highly successful in attracting the support of internationally 
known celebrities who, in turn, added credence to the movement: „winning support from 
people of influence is thus high on the Jubilee agenda.‟ (Peters et al, 1996: 52) 
Desmond Tutu became the first President of Jubilee 2000 in 1996 (Grenier, 2003: 90); 
other patrons included the BBC journalist John Simpson, Rabbi Tony Bayfield and Iqbal 
Sacranie, the Secretary General of the Muslim Council of Britain (Hanson and Travis, 
1999: inside cover). Muhammed Ali agreed to be Jubilee 2000‟s International 
Ambassador, and rock stars such as Bono toured Africa with politicians, frequently 
drawing attention to the cause, alongside such luminaries as Nelson Mandela and the 
Dalai Lama. The Brit Awards ceremony, broadcast on television in February 1999, 
featured Bono and Ali, both advocating the Jubilee 2000 campaign before millions of 
people worldwide. Comic Relief in 1999 was devoted to the theme of debt cancellation. 
In September 2000 Pope John Paul II, whose 1994 publication, ‘Tertio Millennio 
Adveniente’, had called for Jubilee debt relief, held an audience with key figures from 
the Coalition, including celebrities and economists, and urged creditor nations to end the 
debt crisis. The campaign became a genuine mass movement across the world. Jubilee 
2000 never had much financial support, but was adept and innovative in its use of the 
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 For example, the USA‟s writing off of $70bn: The Economist, 18/3/99; the UK‟s pledge to cancel all third 
world debt: The Guardian,18/12/99.  
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 A $34bn write-off was announced in December 2000: The Guardian, 23/12/00.  
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media and especially the internet. The Coalition published thirteen issues of ‘News and 
Action’, imaginatively beginning with issue 13 and counting down to issue 1 in 
December 2000. 
 
The decision to close the campaign at the end of 2000 and wind up the Coalition was 
controversial. Many local activists (and those in the South – see below) felt that the work 
should continue, although the intention had always been to have a focussed, short-term 
campaign. The Coalition set up a follow-up organisation, „Drop the Debt‟ which ran from 
January to July 2001, which was succeeded by the Jubilee Debt Campaign and Jubilee 
Plus (which became Jubilee Research in 2002). Among many of the Jubilee 2000 
Coalition‟s sponsor organisations, the focus moved to the Trade Justice Movement – 
with mixed fortunes. The Jubilee Debt Campaign estimated that by the end of the year 
2000, 15% of debt had been remitted (Randle, 2004: 9).  
 
The International Jubilee Campaign 
 
The Jubilee 2000 movement spread internationally through late 1997 and 1998 as 
national campaigns were established, eventually being represented in 69 countries 
(Grenier, 2003: 86).31 Some of the most successful were in Bolivia, Uganda, Zambia, 
Peru and Mozambique (Greenhill, Pettifor, Northover et al, 2003: 5). In effect, the 
campaign in Britain played a leading and resourcing role for the international dimension 
since it had the experience and the resources on hand (Grenier, 2003: 93). The British 
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 Individuals involved came from 166 countries. 
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section set the main policy direction and the campaigning strategy, but left it to individual 
national groups as to the extent of their involvement (Grenier, 2003: 96). 
 
The Coalition had to adopt a very different approach in the United States, where the 
campaign received an indifferent response from the public. Realising that the campaign 
lacked profile and had a short time-scale in which to become known, attention turned to 
recruiting sympathetic celebrities. Bono was the main one in this regard, chosen partly 
because of his known broad Christian sympathies for the poor and underprivileged, but 
also because, by chance, there was a personal link between one of the Coalition‟s staff 
and a key record producer in Ireland who knew how to reach Bono.32 Through Bono‟s 
political contacts in Washington, notably Eunice Shriver, the Coalition was able to make 
contact with Jeffrey Sachs and approach some of the key figures in the World Bank and 
US financial institutions. Also recruited to the campaign through Bono was Bob Geldof, 
who had pioneered Live Aid in 1984. Tension did break out within the Jubilee Coalition 
when Jubilee 2000 USA decided in favour of a bill in Congress proposed by Jim Leach, 
which advocated greater debt relief but did not remove all the adjustment programmes. 
Huge pressure was brought to bear on the US body from Jubilee groups worldwide, not 
just in the South, and – under great internal division – the US group withdrew its 
support. Nonetheless, the damage was done, and groups in the South became more 
suspicious of the ideals of campaigns in the North.33 
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 A fuller account of this episode may be found in Hertz (2005: 5ff.) Bono‟s own version of his 
involvement with US politicians, particularly those on the political right, may be found in The 
Guardian,18/3/02 and in Bono (2006: 33-35). A fuller account is in Busby (2007: 247-275).  
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 „North‟ is used here in a geo-political sense rather than a simply geographical one. It comprises the 
most prosperous nations, commonly thought of as the West – the USA, Canada and Europe, with the 
addition of Japan, Australia and New Zealand. „South‟ is a self-chosen term by those mainly in the 
southern hemisphere whose national economies are relatively undeveloped. 
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In addition to the many national campaigns, a number of important networks on debt 
were instigated. The network, „Jubilee South‟, which still persists, was inaugurated at a 
„South-South Summit‟ in November 1999, when delegates from 35 countries met at 
Gauteng, near Johannesburg, the location of the Jubilee South Africa conference eight 
months earlier. The most significant aspect of this international dimension was the 
different attitudes to the main policy that were discussed. Jubilee South was generally 
critical of the stance of the Northern campaigns for their essentially reformist position. 
The „South-South‟ summit criticised the campaign in the North for its limited vision: 
 
„Our brothers and sisters in the North have applied the Jubilee concept in a 
reductionist way, which limits it to what they have call [sic] “unpayable debt”. One 
tries to understand the meaning of “unpayable debt”, and one comes out with a 
confusion of defining which debt is unpayable and which one is payable. A 
question rises in my mind. Who decides/defines what is unpayable? The obvious 
answer will be the creditor and not the debtor. The North and not the South. And 
this being the case, we will never see the benefits in the South of debt relief.‟ 
(Jubilee South, 1999b: section 6) 
 
 
This criticism was inaccurate because the Jubilee campaign in the UK had always 
demanded that a fair system to arbitrate debt cancellation was necessary. However, this 
incident does indicate the tension felt among the campaigning community in the South. 
 
A conference for Coalition members from 38 countries that was held in Rome in 
November 1998 revealed the tensions between the different campaigns.34 The South 
preferred a more radical attitude, seeking the dismantling of the World Bank and the 
IMF, and the whole architecture of international loans. A series of declarations were 
made at several conferences of regional Jubilee 2000 campaigns, all recognising the 
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 Also present were Jeffrey Sachs and several celebrities, including Bono and Bob Geldof.  
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need for greater financial transparency in the debt cancellation process, for new 
systems of arbitration and the need for civil society to be involved. The Rome 
Conference Declaration called for the cancellation of all unpayable debt, specifying that 
this meant debt which could not be serviced without causing harm to the poor; debt 
which has already been paid „in real terms‟; debts taken out for improperly designed 
projects; and odious debts contracted by repressive regimes (World Council of 
Churches, 1999a). 
 
Declarations in the South were far more radical, and no less urgent in tone. The enemy 
was not merely the debt issue nor the IFIs but the entire system of neo-liberal, global 
capitalism. For example, on the occasion of the launch of the Jubilee 2000 Afrika [sic] 
Campaign in April 1998, the Accra Declaration stated bluntly: „the root-causes of these 
Debts lie in the History of Slavery and Colonialism‟ (World Council of Churches, 1998a) 
and called for the immediate and unconditional cancellation of Africa‟s external debts. In 
a similar tone the Dakar Declaration stated: 
 
„Third World debt to the North is at once fraudulent, odious, illegal, immoral, 
illegitimate, obscene and genocidal.‟ (Jubilee South, 2000b) 
 
 
The view that the debts were instruments of oppression was demonstrated in other 
conference statements, such as the South-South Summit which stated: 
 
„Debt is essentially an ideological and political instrument for the exploitation and 
control of our peoples, resources, and countries.‟ (Jubilee South, 1999c) 
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At the summit the „neoliberal‟ economic system was described as „destructive and 
genocidal‟ in its processes and consequences, and all IFI sponsored schemes were 
rejected outright, since only a completely new economic system could relieve the debt 
issue. The vision of Jubilee South, reflected at this summit and elsewhere, was of a 
transformed economic order devoid of debt, in contrast to the UK Coalition which, as we 
have seen, envisaged new regulatory mechanisms within the same essential economic 
system: 
„It is a vision not limited to debt cancellation, not to some countries, not to the 
year 2000, not the probable or viable as conventionally imagined. This is a vision  
springing from the sacred and moral responsibility to limit power and uphold life. 
We assume the jubilee call to conversion and reparation as essential elements 
for the ethical, social, and environmental survival of all creation.‟ (Jubilee South, 
2000a) 
 
In August 2001 a workshop convened in Durban between Jubilee South Africa and 
Jubilee South declared unequivocally: 
 
„In this period of neo-colonialism, debt is a central instrument used by the élites of 
the North in ensuring the continued subjugation of the countries of the South.‟ 
(Jubilee South, 2001) 
 
The Latin American and Caribbean Jubilee 2000 Platform issued the Tegucigalpa 
Declaration in January 1999 entitled „Yes to Life, No to Debt‟, (Jubilee South, 1999a) 
calling for the cancellation of the immoral and illegitimate debts of the „so-called Third 
World‟ but its wording did not make clear whether or not it regarded all debt as such. 
Furthermore, it made a call to the Northern campaigns „not to put forward resolutions or 
make laws which would include specific figures, nor any which would provide less than 
what we are currently proposing.‟ 
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The Gauteng Declaration in Johannesburg two months later re-affirmed the earlier 
declarations, and looked forward to a time of self-determination from „Northern 
domination‟. The Yaoundé Declaration re-affirmed the call for the total and immediate 
debt cancellation for all Southern indebted nations, and was unanimously agreed on 
developing the Jubilee campaign for the future, recognising it would be a „long struggle‟ 
(World Council of Churches, 2000).  
 
One issue featuring prominently in some Southern declarations was the question of 
reparations. The Gauteng Summit in March 1999 re-affirmed the call for reparations 
made in Abuja in 1993, in order to „regain control over our destiny and to ensure that the 
African holocaust will never occur again‟ (World Council of Churches, 1999b). The 
Lusaka Declaration (May 1999) clearly believed that economic reparations were due to 
indebted nations from Northern creditors, and urged further research into foreign loans 
in order that the legitimacy of such claims might be defended (World Council of 
Churches, 1999c). It also warned that, were debt cancellations not to be forthcoming by 
the end of 2000, their campaigns would urge for debt repudiation. This theme is present 
in the Zambia campaign, as we shall see in chapter 4; it also continued in the Jubilee 
South‟s call for reparations for the people of Iraq in the aftermath of the second Gulf 
War: 
 
„the only debt that really exists is the debt owed to the people of Iraq for, among 
others, the years of cruel sanctions and wars... the United States government is 
manipulating the odious debt issue for the simple purpose of lowering the cost of 
its occupation.‟ (Jubilee South, 2003) 
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However, at an international conference held in Birmingham to mark the tenth 
anniversary of the first mass demonstration, the question of reparations was never aired 
publicly. 
 
Jubilee South has been dismissed as a network of Southern intellectuals and socialist 
activists with little grassroots support (Clark, 2003: 20; Grenier, 2003: 98), yet there is no 
doubt that in some countries, such as Zambia, the campaign relied upon popular 
networks of support. Jubilee South sought to influence the global campaign, but did not 
agree with the idea of the 2000 deadline and felt betrayed by the closure of the 
campaign elsewhere. Although some national Jubilee campaigns are still active in the 
South, their profile is now largely confined to the national scene.  
 
Summary 
 
Our history of the debt crisis has revealed the way in which the understanding of the 
debt crisis and its solution changed rapidly among economists, politicians and debt 
campaigners. The most significant feature of this was the paradigm shift among 
campaigners from advocacy of partial debt cancellation to a much wider, comprehensive 
campaign. Another aspect of his history is the key factors in the campaign‟s success: its 
skilled campaign organisation, its base of Christian support, its use of the media and 
celebrity contacts, and the pivotal umbrella provided by the Jubilee image. The Church 
was involved not only at many local levels but also internationally, and the importance of 
this cannot be underestimated. As a global organisation, the Church was able both to 
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initiate and enhance campaigns in many countries unused to this type of popular 
campaigning. The tactics adopted in targeting politicians were highly successful, 
whether through petitions or celebrity influence. The campaign was fortunate in that 
many politicians welcomed the campaign as an opportunity to make political capital: 
significant acclaim at relatively small cost. Political leaders vied with each other to be 
seen to be taking the initiative at the various summits held during 1998-2000, and it was 
political rather than economic argument that held sway (Evans, 1999: 276).  
 
A further discovery from the historical survey has been the points of accord and tension 
between North and South. A major difference concerned the intended goals of the 
campaign: for the North these were principally the cancellation of debt, so that the 
poorest nations could once again have the opportunity to take part in the world 
economy. There were significant voices in the North calling for a more radical 
restructuring, but the campaigns in Britain and the US were more cautious than these. In 
the South the demands went much further and called for a new economic order in which 
debt would not recur and reparations would be made. An uneasy marriage existed 
between groups within the coalition, domestically in Britain and internationally, but the 
simplified, direct arguments showing how poor countries exported money to richer ones 
appealed successfully to a very broad audience worldwide. The tensions over the 
termination of the campaign at the end of 2000 were significant, and it is possible that 
the movement would have fragmented had the campaign continued much longer in the 
same vein. 
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The campaign owed its success, as we have seen, to grass-roots activists in local 
churches and aid organisations, but significantly also to its political and media 
connections. In general, despite the participation of many local supporters in Britain and 
the developing world, the campaign was a „top-down‟ movement, especially in the 
United States.  
 
One might draw the conclusion that Dent and Peters were less interested in structural 
changes to the world economy because their focus was on a one-off debt cancellation, 
but in fact they saw the cancellation as only one aspect of a wider process of righting 
economic wrongs that caused poverty. The Jubilee 2000 campaign did not, therefore, 
confine itself to the cancellation of the debt, though this was its principal aim. In arguing 
for a new regulatory system in which future arbitration could take place we see how it 
focussed on the continuing need for reform and practical steps to achieve this, rather 
than more radical, systematic change of the entire economic order to which, as we have 
seen, some voices in the South remained committed. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
The themes of the debt campaign 
 
 
 
 
The previous chapter traced the development of the debt crisis and the 
exponential rise of the campaign for debt cancellation. The campaign issued a 
mass petition on debt relief, encouraged its supporters to contact politicians, 
issued press releases and organised many publicity events to draw attention 
to the central theme of urgent, unconditional debt relief for the poorest 
nations. In this chapter our attention turns to the arguments used by the 
campaign and the principles that underpinned them. We shall see that the 
campaign deployed political arguments concerning justice and fairness, but 
that economic analysis was not pursued with the same rigour. The tendency 
to present simplified arguments for political and campaigning reasons will 
become apparent, but in so doing certain essential nuances were not 
discussed. Nevertheless, the campaign expressed critical concerns over 
power relations in debt arbitration and conditionality clauses attached to debt 
relief. 
 
The Jubilee 2000 Coalition‟s aims can be summarised as the call for 
„cancellation by the year 2000 of the unpayable debt owed by the world‟s 
poorest countries under a fair and transparent process‟ (Hanson and Travis, 
1999: 4). From the outset, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the 
Jubilee 2000 Coalition forged together both practical commitment and insights 
from a wide cross-section of the Christian community in the UK, though it also 
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included many representatives from other faiths and from secular 
organisations. The fact that the campaign was a coalition meant that there 
were inevitable differences of opinion on policy, emphasis and goals. The 
most significant differences were those between the campaigns in the North, 
such as Britain and the US, where the campaign discriminated between 
countries and levels of debt, arguing for a case by case basis, and the South, 
where Jubilee South argued for more radical, comprehensive debt reform. 
Other differences reflected different audiences addressed by the campaign. 
Over time, however, the coalition become more moderate, retreating from the 
more extreme rhetoric, and in effect calling for a much wider, faster, deeper 
version of the HIPC process (Allen and Weinhold, 2000; Evans, 1999: 275). 
 
In the introduction to Breaking The Chains, Williamson identified three 
arguments for debt cancellation: to make the debt burden sustainable in the 
face of the inadequate HIPC initiative; on the grounds of justice, that loans 
were extended to unrepresentative governments; and finally in order to 
achieve the elimination of poverty. Pettifor (2002: 13) argued often in a similar 
vein, though she also made explicit the campaign‟s „guiding principles‟ 
grounded in the Judeo-Christian scriptural ethics of „human rights, opposition 
to usury and the need for periodic correction of imbalances.‟1 The campaign 
advocated „sabbath economics‟ which called for limits upon consumption.  
The Jubilee campaign, although focussing almost exclusively on debt, always 
saw itself as the instigator of a wider campaign for the elimination of poverty 
achieved also through increased aid and fairer terms of trade, and using the 
                                                 
1
 A similar comment is also made by Harries, (1992, chapters 10,11) 
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millennium as a psychological target for the debt cancellation. Its first task was 
to tackle the debt problem and then go on to the wider amendment of 
international financial practices (Dent and Peters, 1999: 136). The campaign 
acknowledged that debt relief alone could not solve the problem of world 
poverty, but that it was an essential ingredient of the wider solution. However, 
the tactical decision to focus on one single issue in turn opened the campaign 
to the charge that it was promoting simplistic solutions, or least that it 
appeared to be (Church Times, 20/11/98).  
 
The first prong of the campaign was to expose the terrible effects the debt 
crisis was having among the poor in indebted nations. This began with the 
outline of the debt crisis, as we have already seen, arguing that the 
international financial institutions bore much responsibility for the situation – 
and hence a responsibility to ameliorate it. One of Jubilee 2000‟s major 
achievements was „to expose the injustice, double standards and hypocrisy of 
relationships between debtor nations and their creditors‟ (Pettifor 2000a: 142) 
A key aspect of the Jubilee 2000‟s campaign publicity was to raise awareness 
of the effect debt was having on the lives of the poor, where the most basic 
essentials of life were jeopardised by obligations of debt service. The 
campaign produced a mass of statistics to demonstrate that measures 
introduced to date (such as the HIPC Initiatives) were either insufficient, at 
best, or counterproductive, at worst, thus the need for radical debt 
cancellation was justified. These figures listed falling school rolls in Sub-
Saharan Africa, decline in real wages, and reductions in government 
expenditure on health. The critical nature of the plight was not in doubt: 
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„The debt crisis is a matter of life and death. African children, women 
and men are dying while old debts to wealthy lenders are being repaid. 
This is a human rights emergency!‟ (Ndungane, 2003: 53) 
 
 
Historical Precedents 
 
Debt cancellation is not new, and the Jubilee 2000 campaign often invoked 
previous cancellations, in particular the Marshall Plan, in order to show that 
debt cancellations could be feasible in principle. Under the Plan the debts 
Germany had accumulated from the 1920s and 1930s were to be reduced by 
75%, and the victorious (Western) allies agreed to open their markets to 
German products so that Germany could establish a trade surplus and thus 
pay off its remaining debts (Enlace, June 2000). A condition of the Plan was 
that Germany would not need to divert more than 5% of its exports into debt 
service repayments (Dent and Peters, 1999: 123). Jubilee 2000 stated that 
the original agreement was a figure of 10%, but after Germany claimed this 
was „unsustainable‟ it was reduced to 3.5% (Hanson and Travis, 1999: 40). 
The campaign made comparison between the Marshall Plan for Germany and 
the example of contemporary Mozambique (Pettifor, 1998: 90), which Britain 
and Germany insisted should divert 20%; and with Ethiopia (Moulds, 1998), 
where the ratio of export earnings to debt service payments was 14%. By 
contrast, the HIPC Initiative was intended to reduce debt-service-to-export 
ratios to an „acceptable‟ level of 20-25%. 
 
The Marshall Plan is an interesting example, motivated not by altruism but by 
mutual interest, devised not only to rebuild the economies of Britain and 
Germany but to prevent the rise of political extremism and ensure democracy 
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together with economic and political stability in Western Europe at a time 
when the United States was becomingly increasingly worried at the spread of 
communism in Europe. The economies benefiting from the Plan were, despite 
the war devastation, nonetheless technically advanced, with large pools of 
skilled workers and relatively good infrastructure. Thus the development of 
these countries was regarded as guaranteed, and simply a matter of investing 
sufficient capital in order for their economies to become strong once again. 
Furthermore, German productivity also boosted the international economy. 
The Jubilee campaign in Latin American complained bitterly that, whereas 
some past instances of debt relief had delivered to indebted nations a 
resolution of their financial crisis, and moreover enabled them to adopt more 
effective development policies, the contemporary reality was that such 
indebted nations were kept in servitude (Enlace, June 2000). The Tegucigalpa 
Declaration picked up on these precedents by insisting on a level of debt 
service repayments derived in part from the 1953 London Agreement which 
had agreed greatly reduced debt service payments by Germany (Jubilee 2000 
Coalition (1999:14). 
 
There is no doubt that the Marshall Plan was a clear success, but it also may 
have led some economists to believe that this model could be transplanted 
into very different socio-economic circumstances, such as Sub-Saharan 
Africa.2 However, calls for a „new‟ Marshall Plan tended to be invoked more 
for their political and psychological appeal (such the call by Gordon Brown 
(2001), when Chancellor of the Exchequer, for a new „Marshall Plan‟ for 
                                                 
2
 A more detailed discussion of this phenomenon is found is Randall and Theobald  (1985), 
chapter 1 
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Africa), rather than for the transplanting of the economic principles that first 
underpinned it. 
 
 
Parallels with the campaign against slavery 
 
Since the inception of the Jubilee 2000 movement there has been a 
continuous thread of argument comparing the suffering of the poor in indebted 
countries to a new kind of slavery. Indeed, it could be argued cogently that a 
key factor in the success of the campaign was the powerfulness of this 
imagery. The Jubilee campaign chose the chain to symbolise the relief from 
bondage, though it also stood for the solidarity of debt campaigners 
worldwide, and used this to great effect in many demonstrations and publicity 
events. Many parallels were drawn with the experiences of African and 
Caribbean slaves of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; further 
similarities were observed between the movement and processes that led to 
the abolition of slavery in the UK and the present campaign for debt 
cancellation. 
 
Germane to such parallels is the argument that the problem of international 
debt is, as slavery was, an outworking of Western capitalism (Spray, 1991: 
21). That is not to say that this was a direct consequence, but it shows how 
ingrained the institution of slavery was to the economics of the time. Slavery 
was a well integrated into the international economic system: many 
Europeans invested in it, bought its goods and did not consider it in any way 
morally reprehensible. A deeper connection has also been alleged that it is no 
coincidence that those countries that profited from the Atlantic slave trade are 
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now the creditors to the developing world and that their profits from slavery 
aided the investment that made the Industrial Revolution possible (Christian 
Aid, 1997: 2).3 
 
An early comparison between debt and slavery was made by Bishop 
Ndungane (1997), who in a sermon at Southwark Cathedral, quoted a 
Brazilian slogan from the early 1980s stated that „the external debt has 
become an eternal debt‟. Spray also established a link in speech in Edinburgh 
in November 1990, when he quoted the former Director of Christian Aid, 
Charles Elliott, who in 1987 had said that when the debtor has to work ever 
harder to repay debts, „his status changes from debtor to bondsman to slave‟ 
(Elliott, 1987b). This was followed by Pettifor, writing in 1996 while still at the 
Debt Crisis Network. She acknowledged her debt to Spray and to John 
Davies, the Bishop of Worcester, who in 1993 had written that „debt is the 
most potent form of slavery‟. The New Abolitionists report saw the Jubilee 
campaign as a natural successor to the campaign against slavery. 
 
The subjective experience of slavery was more intensely brutal, but debt 
slavery affected many times more people than the Atlantic slave trade ever 
did – despite the fact that in the eighteenth century alone, 6 million Africans 
were transported to the New World (Spray, 1991: 20). Three parallels with 
slavery were identified and then reflected in subsequent publications by debt 
campaigners. The first was the enormous human cost in both, and the same 
                                                 
3
 This quotes James Walvin, who in his history of British slavery wondered whether the 
Atlantic slave trade was merely the beginning of a continuous process in which resources are 
still drawn from Africa to the West, in return for privation. 
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consequent kinds of fundamental moral issues: the experience of bondage 
and lack of self-determination. Slaves had no freedoms whatsoever, and like 
the indebted poor, suffered an unmoveable burden and did not „own 
themselves‟ (Dent and Peters, 1999: 119). Indebted countries facing IMF 
Structural Adjustment Policies, or having to deploy scarce financial resources 
into IMF-imposed debt repayments as a priority also had little choice. Exports 
had to be increased, cash crops grown, domestic spending reduced; this was 
likened to the „forced unpaid labour‟ of the slave plantations.4 The debt trade 
removed choice:  
 
„Just as in the 1770‟s there existed a complex planter-controlled 
apparatus for containing slaves that extended across continents, so the 
IMF is at the nexus of an international creditor-controlled apparatus for 
containing the economies of developing countries.‟(Pettifor, 1996: 20) 
 
Debt campaigners began regularly to describe the plight of the indebted as 
one of economic „enslavement‟, in which the contemporary mechanism of 
enslavement was related to finance, not land ownership as with the original 
Jubilee (Williamson, 1998a: 12). For example: 
 
„More children could die unnecessary deaths before the year 2000 as a 
result of the debt crisis that enslaves poor countries today than were 
killed in passage during the infamous Atlantic slave trade... 
 
...Christian Aid believes the campaign to end the economic slavery of 
unpayable debt is creating a new generation of abolitionists fighting for 
economic as well as social justice.‟ (Christian Aid, 1997:2)  
 
„Debt bondage by the poorest countries to Western governments and 
creditors is today‟s new slavery.‟ (World Council of Churches, 1998)  
 
                                                 
4
 In a briefing paper written by Pettifor to Ndungane in January 1997, she acknowledges her 
debt to David Woodward of the DCN, for his insight that „producing more but receiving less in 
payment, amounts to nothing less than forced unpaid labour at the national level – directly 
analogous to slavery.‟ Jubilee 2000 archive, box 1 
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The absence of apparent solutions and the complete powerlessness of the 
debtor nations were reminiscent of slavery. The moral issues were the same: 
freedom and the right to self-determination, justice and restoration for those 
whose plight was not the consequence of their own actions.  
 
The second parallel concerns the way the abolition of slavery came about, 
due to massive public pressure resulting from a concerted campaign by 
abolitionists. It is interesting to note that the campaign to end slavery was both 
prolonged and involved much published research. Abolitionists investigated 
the conditions under which slaves lived, worked and were transported; they 
published data on death rates during sea crossings, for instance; and they 
endeavoured to bring shame and disrepute upon the whole system of slave 
trade and ownership. The anti-slavery movement began in the last third of the 
eighteenth century, when a few prominent individuals tried to raise public 
consciousness and change the law. Their repeated efforts were unsuccessful, 
but public attention had been won. In addition, the slaves themselves played a 
major part, either in rebellion or (once freed) publishing accounts of their 
experiences, which became popular in Britain. Legal measures were passed: 
in 1788 to improve conditions on slave ships, and the trade in human slavery 
was abolished in 1807. The movement gained impetus once again in the 
1820s when a society to promote abolition was launched, followed by a 
prolonged and massive campaign, in which 1.4 million people signed a 
petition. A failed, costly slave revolt took place in Jamaica in 1832, and 
slavery in Britain was outlawed by the Emancipation Act of 1833. This came 
into effect on 1 August 1834, and slavery was finally abolished in the colonies 
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in 1838. Many amendments were made as it passed through Parliament, and 
increasingly the abolitionists‟ position became victorious. Slavery was 
abolished in the United States in 1865.5  
 
As the debt campaign grew during the mid 1990s, the parallels became more 
apparent, not just on the issue of principles and rights, but particularly on the 
tactics that would be employed. As happened in the campaign to abolish 
slavery, there emerged an awareness of the need for a broad coalition across 
aid- and debt- agencies rather than for independent, small pressure groups.6  
The role of the churches was again recognised as crucial. The debt 
campaigners, also like the anti-slave campaigners, realised that progress 
could only come through the political expression of public opinion. When the 
anti-slavery campaigns began, abolitionists were told that their proposals were 
unworkable. The debt campaigners therefore saw themselves as pioneers 
challenging the prevailing ethos and the arguments of „moral hazard‟ (see 
below). They faced the same argument as did the original abolitionists: that 
although the system may be flawed, the best solution would be achieved not 
through abolition but via gradual improvement. With this in mind Dent, 
commenting on the way Thomas Buxton‟s uncompromising stance 
outmanoeuvred the government in 1832-3, concluded that „a simple, radical 
proposal providing a full answer is a far more effective mobilising agency than 
a complicated half-measure‟ (Dent and Peters, 1999: 126). Comparison was 
even made between the conditionalities imposed by the World Bank and the 
                                                 
5
 Spray (1991: 24) erroneously puts the date of abolition in Britain as August 1882. 
6
 Spray clearly did not think any mass public campaign on debt was immediately likely but 
recognised that it would be essential to mobilise public opinion: „The abolition of international 
debt is never likely to dominate public opinion as the abolition of slavery did two hundred 
years ago.‟ (Spray, 1991: 26) 
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IMF to the governments of indebted countries with that of opponents to 
abolition, who argued that slaves had to prove themselves „worthy‟ or of 
sufficiently good „character‟ to face the responsibilities of freedom (Dent and 
Peters, 19991: 126-7; Christian Aid, 1997, 10).  
 
In the third parallel, the abolition of slavery did not end poverty, but its 
departure lifted restraints and in so doing opened up some opportunities for 
the enhancement of life and conditions. The debt campaigners were clear that 
debt was only one aspect of the reasons why poorer nations remained poor, 
and that its relief would be beneficial – but other reforms in the areas of trade 
and aid would also be necessary. Slavery became less profitable in time as 
exports from slave plantations faced competition from elsewhere (such as 
Asia and Latin America); in a not dissimilar fashion the international 
community has realised – witness the HIPC programme – that debt 
repayments will not prove economic unless concessions are made to enable 
such countries to invest. By 1990 many commercial banks had already set 
aside considerable sums to cover defaults from their debtors. 
 
The analogy of the Atlantic slave trade and debt slavery was ingenious as a 
campaigning tool, for it is such an emotive issue; the mere suggestion of 
slavery implies a wretched condition and evokes disgust. But how accurate is 
the analogy? Certainly there are many parallels in terms of the history of each 
situation and the typology of their campaigns. To describe oneselves as the 
„new abolitionists‟ is certainly a claim to the moral high ground, and in using 
this terminology the debt campaign implied that debt cancellation was a clear-
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cut issue. Yet the reality of the campaign was that there were difficult 
compromises to make, such as the criteria by which countries should be 
entitled to receive debt relief. Sub-Saharan nations were supported, but more 
wealthy - yet more indebted - nations of South America were not, because 
their average income per person was considerably higher. 
 
The use of slavery as such a prominent campaigning tool is one illustration of 
how the arguments tended to be moral and politically strategic rather than 
economic.7 One needs to bear in mind, however, that the campaign‟s intention 
was to appeal to as wide a constituency as possible and at both logical and 
emotive levels. Rarely, however, was the debt-slavery parallel placed within 
the wider context of human obligations, though the main reason for this was 
less due to ignorance and more to do with the fruitful use of Atlantic slavery as 
a campaigning tool. Other, unrelated campaigns have also found it helpful to 
use the slavery analogy; factory workers in nineteenth century England and 
domestic workers with diplomatic families have also been likened to „slaves‟. It 
was ironic that the defenders of slavery (including clergy) relied upon the 
same scriptural text in Lev. 25 as the Jubilee 2000 campaign did, and indeed, 
a case from Scripture can even be made for it (Preston, 1987: 6; Lampard, 
2007; Michelman, 1994: 70-71). 
 
 
Legal and Moral Arguments in favour of debt cancellation 
 
The Jubilee campaigners appealed to a range of legal and moral arguments, 
though it was the latter that provided the greater force. We shall examine their 
                                                 
7
 This supports the assertion made by Allen and Weinhold (2000: 870) 
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arguments now in detail, beginning with the legal arguments in favour of debt 
cancellation. 
 
The Legal Argument for Debt Illegitimacy: (a) Odious Debts 
„Odious‟ debts are defined as those where the original loan contract was 
undertaken through an abuse of rights (Frankenburg and Knieper, 1984: 428). 
This doctrine has its origins in the conflict between Spain and the US at the 
end of the nineteenth century. In a brutal conflict, Cuban forces seeking 
independence from Spain were aided by the US, which was drawn into the 
hostilities, and the Spanish subsequently defeated. The United States gained 
Cuba, but refused to honour the island‟s debts to Spain, citing this doctrine for 
the first time. The US argued that the debts were legally and morally defunct, 
because they had been „imposed upon the people of Cuba without their 
consent and by force of arms‟ and that this burden „was one of the principal 
wrongs for the termination of which the struggles for Cuban independence 
were undertaken‟ (Adams, 1991: 163). Furthermore, the US argued, much of 
the debt had been contracted by Spanish Cuba in order to bolster Spanish 
rule, and could therefore not be defended as having been in the interests of 
the Cuban people. The Cuban debts were never paid. Prior to the nineteenth 
century international law generally considered it the responsibility of a 
successor government to inherit any liabilities of its predecessor (Hoeflich, 
1982: 42). From this incident it was demonstrated that certain state obligations 
could be deemed to belong exclusively to a particular regime, rather than to a 
territory or population. The American, Alexander Nahum Sack, formalised 
what became known as „the doctrine of odious debts‟, in which an exception is 
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made to the generally binding rule that sovereign or public liabilities should be 
honoured: this is the case where a „despotic power‟ borrows for self-interest, 
that is, to strengthen his or her hold on power, or to repress their own 
population (Adams, 1991: 164-5; Frankenburg and Knieper, 1984: 428-430). 
Such debts constitute a „hostile act‟ toward their own people; they are not an 
obligation on the nation concerned, rather they belong to the regime or ruler 
who contracted them. These debts are deemed „odious‟ and regarded as a 
deficient, legally flawed contract, and therefore one which cannot continue to 
be upheld.  
 
Another significant incident in regard to this doctrine occurred in 1923, when 
the Supreme Court‟s Chief Justice Taft arbitrated in a dispute between Costa 
Rica and the national banks of Great Britain and Canada; Costa Rica had 
reneged on a contract personally beneficial to its recently ousted President, 
claiming that these liabilities were „odious‟ (Adams, 1991: 167-8). Taft rejected 
claims for the contract to be upheld, on the grounds that the contract was 
most „irregular‟ and that the banks knew full well that some of the money was 
being siphoned to the President‟s family. 
 
Despite the above precedents little interest was shown in odious debts until 
the late twentieth century. A chief obstacle is the doctrine‟s lack of specific 
detail in guiding objective determination of what constitutes an odious debt. 
Many have argued that in order to prove a case of odious debt, the creditors 
must have been cognisant of fact that the loans were used in ways 
detrimental to the general population (Hoeflich, 1982: 55). The Jubilee 
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campaign, at least in the North, was aware that it would be very difficult to 
deem all loans to undemocratic regimes as odious, for the circumstances 
varied considerably (Dent and Peters, 1999: 68-71). Dent seemed sceptical 
about the chances of being able to argue this for Congo, for instance, though 
the Jubilee 2000 Coalition‟s Breaking the Chains (1999) dedicated much 
space to the matter of odious debts, and featured Congo exclusively (Hanson 
and Travis, 1999: 47). On occasion the concept of odious debt has been used 
to describe all debt owed by developing countries: as we have already seen, 
the Dakar Declaration of December 2000 stated that the debt was „fraudulent, 
odious, illegal, immoral, illegitimate, obscene and genocidal‟ (Jubilee South, 
2000b). Jubilee South (2002) suggested that the increasing attention given to 
the issue of odious debts was a clear indication that the logic in favour of debt 
cancellation was moving from questions of sustainability to ones of legitimacy. 
 
The doctrine experienced a surprising resurgence in 2004 when the US 
argued that the debts owed by Iraq should be cancelled, now that the despotic 
regime of Saddam Hussain had been overthrown and replaced by a 
democratic one. The debts were effectively regarded as morally unconnected 
with the present citizens of that country. Jubilee South (2003) argued in 
trenchant terms that the US call was a manipulation of the doctrine of odious 
debts in order to reduce the cost of its own occupation, and warned of the 
dangers of future debt entrapment for Iraq.8 Jubilee South‟s view was that the 
war on Iraq by the US and UK was unjust and illegal, and that substantial 
reparations were due to Iraq both for war damage and the economic effects of 
                                                 
8
 Hanlon (2006:.211- 226) makes a similar argument.  
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the sanctions that preceded it. In 2005 The Economist, noted for its hardline 
opposition to Jubilee 2000‟s call for debt cancellation, was resigned to the 
need for some write-downs. Significantly, one of the reasons it favoured debt 
relief for Nigeria, heavily indebted but with a high income and notoriously high 
corruption, was that much of the debt was odious. Referring to its history of 
military dictatorships, it commented: „Since Nigerians did not choose these 
regimes, it seems unfair that they should have to repay the loans that 
foreigners were foolish enough to make them‟ (Economist, 19/3/05). 
 
The assignment of debts as „odious‟ has been rare. However, there are 
indications of an increased and more general acknowledgement 
internationally that debts contracted by illegitimate regimes (however defined) 
should not necessarily be transferred to more democratic successors. This 
shift reflects not only a change in ethical opinion, but also a political one: 
many creditors and IFIs are willing to use their leverage in order to encourage 
democracy where formerly this had been a lower priority (compared, for 
example, to the Cold War priority of maintaining influence against the Soviet 
Union). Clearly there is much politics in the decision by creditors to annul 
debts owed to them. If there is one trend in the history of odious debt, it is that 
the term can be useful, yet „history, and self-interest, suggest that it will not be 
enough‟ (Foorman and Jehle, 1982: 70). The concept of odious debt is a 
helpful one to muster political support, but is not easily applicable in the 
intricacies of delineating precisely which debts to cancel (Birdsall and 
Williamson, 2002: 55). For this reason it is easier to argue for odious debt 
relief only to future situations rather than retrospectively, thus avoiding the 
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danger of using the term to cover other kinds of loans (Wolf, 2004: 303; 
Jayachandran and Kremer, 2002). 
 
The Legal Argument for Debt Illegitimacy:  (b) Waste and Corruption  
The Jubilee Campaign echoed earlier debt commentators in drawing attention 
to the history of the debt crisis, and in particular the role and responsibility of 
Western banks and multilaterals in supporting foolish or corrupt enterprises. 
The Jubilee movement in the South was particularly keen to draw attention to 
this aspect of the debt crisis: money had not gone to those intended to receive 
it, and had never been likely to do so. This represented another feature of the 
debt illegitimacy, of which a few examples may be illustrative here. 
 
The Nicaraguan government was loaned considerable sums following the 
earthquake damage to Managua in 1972; the money was stolen by Somoza, 
who continued to siphon money until the Sandinista revolution that deposed 
him in 1979. $3 billion was dollars of debt was taken out during his reign: at 
the revolution the government‟s assets stood at just $3 million (George, 1989: 
18). The Bataan nuclear power plant in the Philippines cost $2.1 billion; it was 
situated at the foot of a volcano in a zone of considerable seismic activity and 
the post-Marcos government resolved to abandon the project. The contract for 
the facility was awarded to the American manufacturers, Westinghouse, 
despite a much lower bid having been made by General Electric. President 
Marcos is alleged to have favoured the Westinghouse bid in the face of earlier 
decisions, because he received bribes totalling $80 million (George, 1989: 18-
19). The disastrous steel plant at Lomé in Togo was financed by a loan from 
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West Germany, yet there were no supplies of iron ore. To save face, a local 
pier was dismantled to enable the plant to function, and when the pier scrap 
had gone the plant closed (George, 1989: 32; Lombardi, 1985).  
 
The most extreme example was that of President Mobutu of Zaire, and 
certainly the most frequently cited by Jubilee 2000. Zaire, now the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, received $1 billion from the World Bank alone during 
Mobutu‟s reign. The Jubilee 2000 Coalition stated that Zaire had received 
£8.5 billion between 1970-94, and that outstanding debt in 1999 totalled $13 
billion (Pettifor, 2000a: 142).9 Mobutu used the money to purchase scores of 
chateaux in Europe and West Africa, private jet planes (including a Boeing 
747) and many ships for himself and his élite. He owned shares in every 
major foreign company operating in Zaire, and his Presidential office oversaw 
30% of the national budget in secrecy. At his death he was the richest man in 
the world, with assets estimated at $4 - $10 billion (Pettifor, 2000a: 142). 
During this period the country became increasingly impoverished, and there 
are many accounts of prestige projects, heavily influenced by foreign 
interests, which have proved disastrous; either they have not worked or have 
never operated efficiently (George, 1989, chapter 7). For example, the Maluku 
steel mill, which operated at 10% of its operating capacity, was exorbitantly 
expensive to run; and the Inga-Shaba electric powerline that could transport 
five times more electricity than demand (Kote-Nikoi, 1996: 106). A major 
factor in the nourishment of Mobutu‟s kleptocracy was the desire to keep Zaire 
under Western influence during the Cold War. The financial mismanagements 
                                                 
9
 In 1986 the estimated amount was $5 billion and in 1989, $6 billion, according to George, 
(1989: 107) 
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were known, but the pressures for political influence were dominant (Hanson 
and Travis, 1999:47; Pettifor, 1998: 91). 
 
Mobutu was not the only corrupt dictator to have left his country heavily 
indebted; one half of Haiti‟s foreign debt came from the reign of Duvalier 
(1957-1986). This is not in itself surprising, considering the longevity of the 
dictator‟s hold on Haitian power, though it is significant that some $900 million 
was removed from the public treasury for his personal purposes during this 
period (Enlace, March 2000). The campaign used such examples as cited 
above to show that responsibility for waste and corruption lay firmly with the 
creditors. 
 
A key difference between the debt campaigners and the IFIs was that the 
latter understood the issue as an economic and political one, but did not 
acknowledge its moral dimension (Dent and Peters, 1999: 194). The 
examples of effective collusion with corrupt officials appeared to campaigners 
to represent this moral aspect very clearly. They enquired why it was that the 
people who had not taken out the loans had to bear their consequences, such 
as lack of healthcare and schools (Taylor, 1998); they asserted bluntly that 
„democratically elected governments should not be expected to assume the 
debt burdens of dictatorial predecessors‟ (George, 1992: 170). 
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The Moral Argument for Debt Illegitimacy 
The main aspect of the moral charge against the legitimacy of debt 
repayments was that the cost in human life and suffering was unacceptably 
high. Methodist Bishops in Latin America declared: 
 
„just as it is morally imperative to repay all legitimate debts, it is also 
ethically legitimate and a proper exercise of national sovereignty for 
nations affected to revise, condemn and even refuse to pay, in whole or 
in part, carry illegitimate debts, or debts on which such extortionate 
rates of interest are charged as to endanger the lives of their citizens 
and the stability of democratic governments. (Exodus 22:25 & Ezekiel 
22:12)’ (van Drimmelen, 1998: 70. Italics mine.) 
 
The World Council of Churches (1998) at their Eighth Assembly in Harare 
stated that „the basic human needs and rights of individuals and communities 
and the protection of the environment should take precedence over debt 
repayment‟. The bishops of the Swedish Lutheran Church argued that when 
debt repayments exceed a certain limit, the moral debt passes to those 
blocking the redemption of the debt. Thus „mercy and grace‟ should take 
precedence over what was deemed legally „right‟ (Bishops‟ Conference, 
1993).  
 
These are critical arguments to which we shall return in later chapters. A 
significant element in such approaches came from liberation theology, in 
particular, its emphasis on the experiences of the poor as the basis for 
theological enquiry. The right to the basic essentials of life was considered 
paramount, and could act not only as a criterion for justice but also as the 
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cornerstone of a new economics. 10 We find that „the sacrifice of these basics 
[to life] cannot be part of any acceptable solution to the debt crisis‟ (Vallely, 
1990: 311) and the call for a transformation of the economic order „to place it 
at the service of human beings, based on international relationships… 
predicated on justice, equity and solidarity‟ (Jubilee South, 1999a). Or, as 
Ndungane (1998: 38,39) stated: 
 
„Ethics should precede politics, economics and the law because 
political action is concerned with values and choices...We need a 
fundamental reappraisal of economics, so that need and capacity, 
rather than supply and demand, provide our guidelines.‟ 
 
 
The debt campaigners referred frequently to the moral illegitimacy of the 
various Structural Adjustment Policies required as conditions for debt 
rescheduling or cancellation, and in particular those attached to the HIPC 
Initiatives. The ground for such criticism lay in the drastic consequences of 
these economic programmes, often resulting in making conditions worse for 
the poorest. Typically SAPs involved currency devaluation, the raising of 
domestic interest rates, new austerity measures with regard to public finances 
and services, and privatisation of state enterprises. Furthermore, through IFI 
insistence on such measures, the capacity of the government was restricted, 
democracy effectively diminished and national sovereignty undermined. Not 
infrequently unemployment soared and the poor were pushed into starvation; 
as one Jubilee Afrika commentator observed: „Debt is tearing down schools, 
clinics and hospitals and the effects are no less devastating than war‟ 
(Hanson and Travis, 1999: 44). 
                                                 
10
 For example: „The basic test of economic justice is what happens to the most vulnerable 
groups in society.‟ WCC Central Committee, 1985 quoted in van Drimmelen (1998: 69) 
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Practical Arguments 
 
Economic Effectiveness  
During the 1980s the principal focus of concern about debt was centred upon 
the inability of countries to meet their obligations, and the effects this might 
have on future economic performance and the international financial system. 
Much was written about the effects of debt overhang, not least by secular 
organisations and popular commentators such as George and Sachs, and the 
way in which this overhang impeded credit, deterred investment, and militated 
against prospects for economic growth. Some of the poorest nations simply 
could not afford to maintain the debts even at a serviceable level, and 
attempts at rescheduling debts had evidently failed. The campaign argued 
that such debts were unpayable from a practical point of view (Hanlon, 2006). 
Furthermore, many creditor nations were no longer expecting to receive 
repayments, nor even the multilateral agencies. By early 2005 the US had 
come to regard many of the World Bank‟s debts as „irretrievable‟ (Economist, 
12/2/05). 
 
The Jubilee 2000 campaign argued that not only was debt cancellation a good 
policy in theory, but also that it was effective in practice. As some debts were 
cancelled, it drew attention to the benefits wrought. Thus, in conjunction with 
CAFOD, the campaign highlighted several key benefits for those countries 
which had already reached „decision point‟ in the HIPC process. These 
included free primary schooling in Tanzania, Uganda, Malawi and Zambia; 
free immunisations for children in Mozambique; increased spending on 
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HIV/AIDS prevention and more generally on social spending; and in the cases 
of the first beneficiaries, Uganda and Mozambique, significant economic 
growth (Greenhill, Pettifor and Northover et al, 2003: 8). 
 
A number of economic objections were posited to the debt cancellation 
campaign, including the questioning of their statistical information. The 
campaign‟s claim that capital was transferred from South to North did not go 
undisputed, with the counter-claim that „most analysts‟ took the view that there 
were net transfers to the indebted nations rather than from them (Allen and 
Weinhold, 2000: 858). This did not detract from the moral force of the statistic, 
widely quoted by the campaign, that for every $1 in aid, $11 was repaid in 
debt servicing costs (Pettifor, 1999a; Ndungane, 2003: 53). The campaign‟s 
claim that the debt killed children was also disputed (Birdsall and Williamson, 
2002: 17, 10), and the extent to which debt repayments were responsible for 
poverty – and therefore the impact of debt relief – was also questioned: 
 
„contrary to the claims of the Jubilee 2000 campaign, it is not at all clear 
that debt forgiveness is necessary and sufficient for improving the lot of 
the poor in many or even most of these poorest countries.‟ (Smith, 
2000: 10) 
 
This latter point represented a relatively rare and extreme viewpoint, and 
reflected particular concerns about the effectiveness of financial assistance in 
such countries.  
 
In reality the issue of debt overhang applied far more to middle-income 
countries than to the low-income ones of sub-Saharan Africa, not least   
because the latter attracted so few private investors. It is also clear that there 
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were development economists such as Bird and Milne (2003: 56) who 
considered the arguments about the potential efficiency of debt relief to have 
been „overplayed‟ and that the effects of debt relief might not in all cases lead 
to greater social spending. Debt relief reduced the debt stock but would only 
have an impact on government spending if the government was already 
following good economic practices and making its debt service repayments, 
and creditors were willing to increase investment through deeper debt relief, 
more grants or new loans. The connection between debt relief and poverty 
reduction was not so linear as had been claimed: 
 
„it is illegitimate simply to assume that debt forgiveness or even full 
debt cancellation will automatically strengthen the budgetary position of 
recipients or their net resource position. The crucial issue is the impact 
of debt relief on other flows.‟ (Bird and Milne, 2003: 52. Italics mine.) 
 
Dent (1997) was clear in his own mind that it was desirable that debtor 
countries once again be enabled to receive „new productive loans‟, as has 
been witnessed in his fax to Celia Willoughby; he wanted debtor nations to be 
able to rejoin the international financial community, and saw the Jubilee 
campaign as having two main objectives – not only debt remission but also 
the impetus to boost „reforming energy‟ among both debtor and creditor 
nations. In general however, debt campaigners emphasised the moral 
grounds more than the practical argument that debt cancellation would be 
both effective and beneficial to creditor and debtor nations. 
 
Moral Hazard 
By far the greatest concern expressed by critics was that of moral hazard 
being created through unconditional debt relief: rewarding states with poor 
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economic practices, corrupt officials, and setting a bad precedent for future 
lending in which debtor governments might be encouraged toward profligacy, 
knowing their failings would be forgiven (Easterly, 2001a; Allen and Weinhold, 
2000: 862). In such a scenario new investors might be hard to find. Often the 
debate became quite polarised, with debt campaigners regarding their 
opponents as narrowly deterministic, shackled to a rigid economic dogma; 
campaign critics simply saw the campaigners as naive and idealistic.11 
 
The main criticism of the campaign came from the IFIs and conservative 
economists, led by William Easterly, a senior advisor at the World Bank and 
outspoken critic of much aid to developing nations. Easterly (2001a: 26) 
accepted that „partial and conditional debt forgiveness is a fait accompli‟ but 
argued that its extension to full, unconditional remission would simply 
redistribute limited financial aid from poor countries with good economic 
policies to poor countries with a far worse record. In other words, debt relief 
serves to reward the corrupt and wasteful at the expense of the relatively 
prudent and transparent. Rather, debt relief should be applied with heavy 
conditions requiring good economic policies and systems of accountability; if 
this proved hard to obtain, then debt relief should be offered selectively only to 
those nations who have already established a proven, satisfactory economic 
track record. 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 A few commentators offered a more nuanced approach, recognising the validity of both 
groups, for example Birdsall and Williamson (2002) 
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Conditionalities 
A major difference between the Jubilee campaign and the IFIs concerned their 
opposite approaches to conditionalities. The former believed that incentives 
would promote reform whereas the latter insisted in the implementation of 
reform as a precondition. In the eyes of Jubilee 2000, corruption would best 
be ameliorated through poverty reduction and civil pressure rather than 
political insistence from external agencies. Here we see an underlying 
difference too: the Jubilee campaign understood debt as a major contributor to 
poverty, where removal of repayments would lead to significant improvements 
for the poor. The Jubilee 2000 coalition objected to the conditions placed 
upon debtor nations by the IFIs in order to obtain debt relief, such as the 
demonstration of economic good behaviour: „it seems economic concerns 
take precedence over human life and welfare‟ (Christian Aid, 1997: 3). 
Instead, the campaign argued that relief should be merited on the basis of 
what was just, with the criteria for justice being the extent to which the 
suffering of the poor was alleviated by those with the capacity to do so (Dent 
and Peters, 1999: 15). 
 
The IFIs viewed debt more as a symptom of poverty than its cause: 
 
„Poor nations suffer poverty not because of high debt burdens but 
because spendthrift governments seek to redistribute the existing 
economic pie to privileged élites rather than try to make the pie grow 
larger through sound economic policies.‟ (Easterly, 2001a: 22) 
 
Both parties recognised that debt remission in itself would not transform the 
economies of low-income countries, but placed differing weight on the effects 
of debt cancellation. Initially, Jubilee 2000 proposed that debt remission for 
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each country should be decided on a „case by case‟ basis, taking into account 
its record of repayment and economic management (Hanson, 1996: 9,4). Yet 
in their revised manifesto, Breaking the Chains (1999), their argument had 
become one for debt remission „under a fair and transparent process‟ (Hanson 
and Travis, 1999: 4). This shift reflected a change in emphasis from the past 
on to the detail of debt cancellation. That past record had not been a criterion 
for debt remission, merely a factor in deciding the process for debt 
cancellation. Peters (1996: 44) was clear that the debt cancellation had to be 
seen to be fair to the indebted nations themselves, and that it was natural for 
a prudent country to expect more favourable terms than a more profligate one. 
However, by 1999 the focus was placed more heavily on the call for new 
systems of arbitration. 
 
In contrast with the HIPC Initiative, which required a stated length of time in 
which a country was required to demonstrate financial probity,12 the Jubilee 
campaign argued that such a probationary period would act as a disincentive 
and remove hope; a common criticism was that the waiting period was unduly 
stringent and lengthy. Campaigners claimed that the prospect of remission 
would act as a „powerful lever‟ to change economic and political practices for 
the better. Inefficiencies and corruption would take time to conquer, but could 
be achieved (Dent and Peters, 1999: 73). A clear difference of opinion was 
evident here between the relative optimism of the debt campaigners and the 
caution of the international financial community, but there were other, more 
practical issues. Faster debt relief might save many lives, it was argued, but 
                                                 
12
 Six years from the initial phase to „completion point‟, reduced under HIPC II 
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its consequences might cause more suffering if the social, economic and 
political programmes were not sufficiently comprehensive. There was thus a 
degree of trade-off between speed and quality in relation to debt relief that the 
campaign did not fully acknowledge (Alkire, 2001).  
 
The campaign argued that although corrupt states should not be dismissed 
arbitrarily, there should be the precondition of improved economic monitoring 
and financial management.  Some form of „ringfencing‟ was necessary: 
 
„It is essential to use the great opportunity of the negotiation of a near-
total remission to pursuade [sic] the debtor government to adopt certain 
essential reforms for the benefit of their own country.... the 
conditionalities on which we must insist should concern themselves 
less with free market dogma and reduction of essential government 
expenditure on social services, and more on proper audit and 
accountability, to prevent future waste of money.‟ (Dent and Peters, 
1999: 76-77)  
 
It is fair to state that attitudes to conditionality varied within the Coalition, 
although its members were united in opposition to the kinds of structural 
adjustment conditionalities that had been imposed by the IMF and to those 
attached to the HIPC process. Some, particularly those in developing 
countries, felt that no conditions whatsoever should be attached; at the other 
end of the spectrum were some moderates, particularly in the United States, 
who advocated a certain conditionality. The Jubilee 2000 Coalition, aware of 
the damage that accusations of corruption and waste could cause, called for a 
new kind of conditionality, one that was inherently biased towards the poor 
and good governance. This was the call for a poverty strategy not imposed by 
external agencies but designed by each country and „owned‟ to a certain 
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extent by its people.13 There would be a more tangible connection between 
debt relief and the improvements in education, health and other social 
services that were the intended consequences of debt relief. It is suggested 
that the main forces behind this policy were the local Jubilee campaigns in 
developing countries, who were afraid that without this policy, the debt relief 
proceeds might be squandered (Birdsall and Williamson, 2002: 51,27). 
Indeed, their advocacy of a new approach to aid may have been the most 
significant motivating factor of all for the Jubilee campaign, even more than 
the Jubilee symbol (Birdsall and Williamson, 2002: 51). The monitoring aspect 
would necessarily involve civil society in the debtor nation, and so enhance 
political pressure for transparency and accountability. In response to the 
question about rewarding corrupt dictators, a Christian Aid leaflet responded: 
The procedures and consultations relating to how the money will be 
used can begin before the money is released. When open and 
accountable mechanisms are already in place, with a strong sense of 
public ownership, it is difficult for a government to back-track on them.‟ 
(undated: 9) 
 
Certainly some Jubilee campaign information was rather vague in stressing 
the means by which debt reduction benefits would be assuredly going to the 
poor. For example: „Loans in future would need to be better monitored to 
make sure they are used for good development projects‟ (Hanson, 1996: 29). 
Yet it would be unfair to press this charge too far, for the campaign 
acknowledged the need for rigorous financial monitoring, but argued that the 
best kind of accountability would be to public pressure in the country 
concerned. The campaign was well aware that the impetus generated by a 
one-off debt remission gesture would provide little in the long term for the 
                                                 
13
 This will be discussed further in chapter 4 
91 
 
 
poorest unless some structural reforms took place in developing countries as 
well as in the creditor ones.14 Easterly (2001a) questioned the capability of 
many developing nations to effect adequate scrutiny of debt relief monies, 
arguing that debt relief would make little impact on the democratic processes 
in indebted countries because in many such cases the civil society is weak, 
and accountability is therefore hard to monitor adequately. There is an 
element of truth in this point, though there is also a powerful argument 
blaming the debt crisis and poverty for undermining civil institutions such as 
democratic processes and organisations.  
 
Theologically, a key issue that the debate on conditionality presents is that of 
the nature of forgiveness, and in particular whether it is understood to be 
conditional or unconditional: that is, whether some kind of „repentance‟ is 
required in order for forgiveness to be enacted and effective. In the history of 
the campaign the use of the term debt „forgiveness‟ was quickly replaced with 
the language of debt „cancellation‟, although some development economists 
continued to use the term. Dent referred to it in 1994 but by 1999 he referred 
only to debt „remission‟. The use of the term „forgiveness‟ implied that debtor 
nations were at fault; that they need to ask for mercy from supposedly 
blameless creditors. On the contrary, argued the campaigners, particularly 
those from the South, if any forgiveness was appropriate it should be the 
debtors forgiving the creditors for the way in which the loans were issued and 
the conditions applied to repayments and rescheduling (Selby, 2001a: 103). 
                                                 
14
 For instance, Jubilee 2000 (2000):  “… in the long term, a process controlled by creditors 
who have vested interests can never be fair and transparent. Jubilee 2000 calls for a new 
process for debt cancellation, and future borrowing and lending...”  
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Indeed, anger was expressed at the language of debt „forgiveness‟ for this 
reason, and the view that such terminology served to diminish the essential 
appeal to justice. There was a clear, consistent opinion that the debt 
cancellation was a campaign against injustice rather than a call for gracious 
behaviour from the financial institutions. 
 
Regulating Mechanisms 
A principal thrust of the Jubilee campaign was the advocacy of mediating 
systems to restrain the unfettered nature of international finance, that is, 
measures to prevent future debt crises occurring and remove the rather 
arbitrary nature of bilateral debt remissions. The motivation for this, as we 
have seen, was the exposure of the inequities in power relations between 
creditor and debtor. Two features emerged: calls for a fairer balance of power 
in such relationships, and proposals for new systems. The Jubilee 2000 
campaign saw a fundamental abrogation of natural justice in that the creditors 
could act as both „judge and jury‟ in negotiations concerning debt 
rescheduling. They therefore advocated practical measures that would effect 
the desired changes, such as more impartial processes for debt rescheduling 
and repayments negotiations.  
 
A good example of this is found in Breaking the Chains: the New Debt Cutter’s 
Handbook, one of most important resources issued by the Jubilee 2000 
Coalition. Here the world is understood to contain sufficient resources for the 
full needs of everyone, but the distribution and usage of these resources is 
described as inequitable, „imbalanced‟ (Hanson and Travis, 1999: 5). Hence 
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„correcting mechanisms‟ need to be implemented (the biblical jubilee is given 
as an example of this), and the campaign regarded itself as part of this 
process. Nowhere in the campaign literature do we find any acknowledgment 
that economic resources are finite and can become scarce. On the contrary, it 
was the task of the campaign to restore „popular sovereignty over the money 
supply‟ (Northcott, 1999b; 1999a chapter 6). Attention was also directed to the 
attitudes and values underpinning the world economy:  
 
„In seeking to deal with world debt it is not just economics with which 
we are dealing, but a spirit of greed and power that must be 
encountered in the spirit of selfishness and meekness if we would 
defeat this issue with subsequent financial actions. As sheep sent out 
among wolves we must come with the opposite spirit to that which we 
are engaging to defeat selfishness, pride and greed.‟ (Hanson, 1996: 
41)  
 
Moreover, the problem was not simply one of just or unjust relations. Logan 
(1998) makes a profound observation when he states that the central problem 
is not one of debt per se, but of debts contracted within unequal power 
relationships. Thus the campaign ought to attend not solely to the relatively 
superficial issue of debt but rather to the „deeper flaws in economic structures‟ 
(Logan, 1998: 61). 
 
Jubilee 2000 argued not only for debt cancellation but also a new way in 
which future debt problems could be resolved. It argued, along with some 
eminent economists, that the present system of debt resolution was unfair in 
that the creditor is the arbiter, and the debtor usually has little bargaining 
power. Although some debtor countries have been able to use some leverage 
on external creditors such as the IMF, this has usually occurred because their 
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debts were so large that default would be severely damaging to creditors.  
Argentina in 2003-4 is a case in point. However, HIPC debts were relatively 
smaller and hence their threat of default was less likely to draw concessions. 
Indebted countries were obliged to repay official creditors first; they had 
preferred creditor status („Paris Club‟ rules) and therefore had limited choice 
as to how repayments might be made from scarce financial resources. 
Structural adjustment policies meant that governments were instructed to 
pursue certain economic policies such as the level of interest rates, 
privatisation policies and exchange rate demands; sovereignty, in the sense of 
the capacity for national self-determination, was undermined.15 The HIPC 
programme was imposed upon the countries (technically countries had to 
apply to the Fund, but no other debt rescheduling would be offered instead); 
the IMF would decide which countries to include in the programme and would 
themselves assess the countries‟ progress. Creditors were therefore acting as 
both „judge and jury‟. 
 
For all these reasons, Jubilee 2000 urged the international community to 
establish an independent, legally binding body that could oversee the process 
of debt negotiations. In contrast to present arrangements, which were often 
seen as opaque, the new system would be transparent, just and „fair‟. This 
was argued particularly by debt campaigners in the South (Pettifor, 2000a: 
142). Often, international creditors had not had to carry the burden of financial 
risk associated with poor lending decisions, and there was a strong sense that 
those who take economic decisions should also carry the risks associated 
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 cf Pettifor, (2002: 13): „for some time now Argentina has effectively been managed by 
external creditors.‟ 
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with them.  For instance, multi-lateral institutions and national governments 
(through their export credit departments), had shown their incompetence in 
and complicity with the present debt crisis. Loans were made to corrupt 
governments in full awareness that the money was likely to be siphoned 
away; there were instances of loans to military dictatorships where there was 
a known likelihood that the money would be spent on arms in order to 
suppress the general population.  
 
Pettifor (2000a: 142) argued that debt cancellation should be conducted under 
the aegis of bodies that can display a „superior wisdom‟ than that shown 
hitherto: 
 
„We in Jubilee 2000 propose an independent framework for arbitration 
when debts become unpayable. We argue that modest alternations 
[sic] should be made to the international financial architecture, to put 
such an arbitration process in place, encourage public scrutiny, 
participation and accountability; and prevent high levels of debt and 
default occurring.‟ (2000a: 140)16 
 
The goals of the arbitration process would be the restoration of natural justice 
to debtors; transparency to civil society, thereby countering corruption; and 
the prevention of future debt crises by reducing capital flows and introducing 
„discipline‟ into relations between creditors and debtors. Jubilee 2000 
suggested that one way of achieving this would be the establishment of a 
Debt Review Body (DRB) by the UN or the International Court of Justice, 
which would appoint an arbitrator to run it, simultaneously announcing at least 
a partial suspension of debt repayments, which would be repaid instead into a 
special fund administered by the DRB. The DRB‟s establishment would be 
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 Pettifor, A. (2000a) p.140 
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linked to a legally binding agreement on how money released through debt 
cancellation was to be used. This „concordat‟ would be drawn up by the DRB 
in consultation not only with creditors and debtors but also representatives 
from the civil society of the indebted country.  
 
One aspect of this call for an independent arbitration of debt negotations was 
Jubilee 2000‟s campaign for the establishment of an international insolvency 
law. For centuries there have been laws governing private and corporate 
bankruptcy; when an individual or company cannot pay their debts, a court 
resolves the matter or appoints someone to act on its behalf. Many assets 
may be taken in order to pay the debts, and a person may be declared 
bankrupt. In this case he or she is often denied access to fresh credit for a 
specified period, but is allowed to retain sufficient property in order to sustain 
life, and perhaps to continue in employment. In Britain, some bankrupts are 
permitted to own a car to allow them to keep their jobs, for example. A new 
start is achieved for both debtor and creditor. In cases where companies are 
likely to be unable to meet their obligations, company directors in the US can 
file for „protection from creditors‟.17 It had been thought that countries „do not 
go bust‟, and therefore debts can, theoretically, be rescheduled continuously. 
In like manner the massive debts of Eurotunnel have been rescheduled, and 
its creditors have been concerned about the company‟s ability to repay its 
                                                 
17
 cf. Pettifor (1998: 89) and Jubilee 2000 Coalition (2002). This is known as „chapter 9‟ rather 
than the more widely known „chapter 11‟. 
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interest payments, let alone the capital; yet, it can be argued that on occasion 
creditors cannot afford not to reschedule debts (Selby, 1997: 3).18 
 
Unlimited liability contains dangers for the wider economy and society: 
companies would be extremely hesitant to take risks, and investors and 
shareholders would be wary. Limited liability was introduced to protect people 
from the consequences of indebtedness, which had often been a debtor‟s 
prison, or the starvation of the debtor‟s family (Hastings, 1997). It divided 
one‟s economic enterprise from one‟s ability to sustain life. Even if the debts 
were severe, limited liability would ensure that the debtor‟s personal survival 
was not jeopardised.  
  
The Jubilee campaign exerted sufficient pressure on the issue of international 
insolvency that the IMF was forced to consider introducing this; this would 
have been unthinkable prior to the campaign and the calamitous defaults of 
Russia and Argentina. Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director of the 
IMF, proposed a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism whereby debtor 
governments would be permitted to halt repayments while negotiations with 
creditors took place, in a not dissimilar fashion to the „chapter 11‟ bankruptcy 
procedures in the US (Stewart and Denny, 2001; Wolf, 2001; Thomas, 2002). 
However, this was aimed at private debt in middle-income countries, not 
bilateral or multilateral debt in the poorest, and required adjustment 
                                                 
18
 The case of Argentina 2003-4 and the IMF, mentioned above, is another example, as would 
be the bailouts of many financial institutions following the economic crash that began in 2008. 
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programmes of the kind already criticised by debt campaigners.19 Debt 
campaigners and private creditors opposed the programme, and it has in 
effect been replaced by the process of inserting clauses into new bond 
contracts giving the majority stakeholders the ability to negotiate with the 
debtor government. In so doing the interests of the major investors are 
safeguarded from the actions of smaller ones taking independent legal action 
to obtain preferred creditor status, such as „vulture funds‟ (Kairos Canada, 
2004: 77).  
 
Summary 
 
We have identified the grounds upon which the Jubilee 2000 campaigners, in 
general, argued in favour of debt cancellation. However, there is truth in the 
claim that the main thrust of the Jubilee 2000 campaign was not based 
primarily upon economic analysis but rather upon moral and political 
strategems (Allen and Weinhold, 2000: 870). The campaigners drew on 
inspirational resources from earlier centuries of Christian struggle with issues 
of economic engagement, freedom and wilfully created suffering. Thus the 
campaign embraced practical, moral and emotive arguments for debt relief.  
 
The arguments from history demonstrated to the public that debt cancellation 
had been performed many times in the past, and that at least the principle 
was shown to be practicable. The public relations effect of equating debt with 
bondage was highly effective. The extent to which the analogy holds is 
                                                 
19
 A detailed account of the SDRM may be found in Mshana (2004). A more sympathetic view 
is evident in Boorman (2007)   
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debatable: slavery was easily definable and not liable to questions of degree, 
for one was either slave or free. Debt bondage is subject to many shades of 
grey, but the emotional impact of the parallel is nevertheless powerful. The 
illegitimacy of the debts owed by the poorest nations is a well-trodden path, 
and establishes the case for cancellation. Yet it does not lead easily to a 
resolution of how the remission might be enacted. Hence the campaign 
devoted much attention to the detail of debt cancellation, arguing that its 
proposals were thoroughly realistic as well as just. 
 
Such arguments are inevitably speculative to some extent, since they make 
assumptions about how people and governments will react. It is hard to prove 
that financial institutions will be deterred from making new loans through the 
threat of moral hazard, for instance. The campaign recognised that it had to 
counter the accusation that debt relief money might be squandered, and their 
principled advocacy of poverty reduction strategies reflected this. As a 
Coalition the campaign encompassed significant variance in its views on 
conditions for debt relief, from the reservations of some in the West, 
particularly the United States, to the unequivocal call for unconditional relief in 
the South.  
 
The abandonment of the terminology of forgiveness was, with hindsight, 
unfortunate in two respects. In the first place it meant that the arguments over 
preconditions to debt remission were separated from a potentially distinctive 
theological contribution; secondly that wider, structural issues concerning 
forgiveness, going beyond simple identification of victims and perpetrators, 
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were lost altogether. The consequence of removing forgiveness from the 
vocabulary of debt cancellation meant that issues of conditionality were 
unconnected to any overt theological perspective, issues to which we shall 
return in a later discussion. We see the absence of this perspective in the way 
the campaign avoided the vagaries of how to deal with differing nations‟ 
records of economic „good behaviour‟ and located the issue of debt relief 
solely within a wider framework of global economic justice: 
 
„The challenge is nothing less than to search for an equitable global 
structure of institutions, which essentially requires a new development 
paradigm built on justice, participation and sustainability.‟ (van 
Drimmelen, 1998: 68) 
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Chapter Four 
 
 
The Jubilee Debt Campaign in Zambia 
 
 
 
We have seen how the Jubilee 2000 campaign developed and the issues it 
raised in the international community. We now turn to investigate the campaign in 
one particular country, Zambia, in order to understand the nature and dynamic of 
the debt as a national issue. Zambia is an apposite case study since it has been 
profoundly affected by both debt and debt cancellation and has witnessed a 
vigorous campaign spearheaded by the churches, which is still active. 
My purpose in looking at Zambia in this chapter is to outline the history to give an 
understanding of the forces and factors that contributed to Zambia‟s huge debt 
and to examine the issues of responsibility. I will reveal the multifaceted 
combination of underdevelopment, weak state apparatus and poverty in Zambia, 
and the ways in which political factors far outweigh economic ones with respect 
to debt relief. 
 
The historical background 
 
(a) Zambia prior to independence 
Zambia is a landlocked country situated in central southern Africa between the 
equator and the tropic of Capricorn. Most of the country lies at an altitude of 
approximately 1000m; much of it is relatively flat, consisting of plains. Rainfall 
occurs only in the months of December to March, and its quantity and longevity 
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decreases in a southerly direction. Formerly colonised by the British in the 
nineteenth century and called Northern Rhodesia, Zambia became an 
independent republic in 1964. It contains many diverse peoples and language 
groupings (73 are listed officially). Much of the country is suitable for agriculture, 
though the quality of the soil – as in much of Africa – contains poor nutrients due 
to the types of rock they lie upon. Following its „discovery‟ by explorers – mainly 
Portuguese, British and East African – Zambia‟s main export was its labour. This 
was either in the form of slaves or, more latterly, in labour employed in the mines 
of the British colonies further south.  
 
Zambia‟s chief natural resource has been its copper mines, although other 
metals, such as cobalt and nickel are also mined. (A proposal for uranium mining 
has recently been aired.) The development of the mines in the central northern 
region – known as the Copperbelt – was a mixed blessing for the indigenous 
Africans. Much wealth was generated for both whites and blacks as employment 
soared, and new mine complexes, together with accommodation blocks were 
established. However, the assumption was that the Africans were migrant, not 
settled labourers, and would therefore return to their rural villages at the end of 
their working careers. Hence the provision of ancillary facilities for Africans such 
as schools and hospitals was minimal at first. There was a vast dislocation of 
peoples from the rural areas, and the Copperbelt wealth did not necessarily 
make any impact in these places: indeed, it has been argued that rural poverty 
worsened (Roberts, 1976: 190-1). 
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In 1953 Northern Rhodesia joined with Nyasaland (now Malawi) and Southern 
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to form the Central African Federation. This was a short-
lived and unpopular exercise, which in the north was motivated by Europeans‟ 
desire to maintain white economic supremacy. Despite its title, political control of 
the Federation rested with the British Colonial Office. The establishment of the 
Federation galvanised an African independence movement, which led, after 
minor violence and industrial unrest, to independence for Zambia on 24th October 
1964. 
 
(b) Zambia after independence 
The Kaunda government became sceptical of multi-party democracy during the 
late 1960s as political conflict intensified. A one-party state was imposed in 1972, 
which came to an end in 1991 when multi-party elections were permitted. A new 
president, Frederick Chiluba, held office until 2001 when Levy Mwanawasa 
replaced him until his death in 2009. 
 
At independence Zambia appeared to be a country with tremendous economic 
prospects, due to its large copper industry and its potential for agricultural 
development. However, Zambia had few graduates1 and a workforce that was 
largely unskilled. In addition, the country inherited a debt of K50 million from the 
British government. Zambia‟s fortunes declined quickly and dramatically in 
subsequent years due to two main factors: the price of copper on the 
international markets and Zambia‟s difficulty with trade routes. For the first few 
                                            
1
 Fewer than 100 graduates: McIntyre (2004: 13) 
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years following independence, the price of copper rose steadily. In 1969 the 
mines were nationalised – partly to ensure continuing investment and further 
development of the mining industry. The anticipated expansion in the industry did 
not materialise substantially and the price of copper began to fall in the early 
1970s.  To make matters worse, the price was subject to volatile variation, which 
made planning particularly hazardous. Zambia‟s railway and main road lines 
passed through Rhodesia and South Africa. The port of Beira in Mozambique 
was key for the importation of oil and the exportation of copper, but this route 
passed through Rhodesia too. Thus, when economic sanctions were imposed on 
Rhodesia following its declaration of UDI, Zambia was poised to suffer most. 
Indeed, the then President, Kenneth Kaunda, advocated armed invasion of 
Rhodesia by the international community but his plea went unheeded. 
 
For the next ten years, Zambia pursued a dual policy of establishing alternative 
sources for necessary materials and of encouraging local production over 
importation or import substitution. Although the costs were considerable to the 
national economy, major difficulties were gradually overcome: when Rhodesia 
retaliated by refusing to allow oil through to Zambia, the latter was initially forced 
to import fuel by air, which proved a colossal expense (Times of Zambia, 
27/6/99). The government then re-routed the import of oil from Tanzania along 
1500 miles of dirt road, later improved to tarmac. Increasing Chinese investment 
began with an interest-free loan to Zambia and Tanzania for the construction of 
the TAZARA railway between Dar es Salaam and the Copperbelt, completed in 
1975 after five years‟ work. Half the loan was made in the form of railway 
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equipment, the remainder to be paid either through exports to China or a „hard‟ 
currency such as dollars (Roberts, 1976: 229).2 
 
Agriculture has not fared well since independence. Due to Zambia‟s geographical 
position and the lack of naturally occurring nutrients in the soil, much agriculture 
is marginal (McIntyre, 2004: 20).3 Successful farming is dependent on efficiency 
of operation (entailing the use of complex machinery, for instance) and the 
application of fertilisers. (One dairy farmer I met near Livingstone regarded his 
decision to invest in a new computerised milking facility as highly significant for 
the farm‟s continued profitability.) In addition, much of its success was driven by 
Europeans whose numbers declined in the years following independence. Much 
agriculture has been dependent on government subsidies which, when removed 
under the conditions of the adjustment programmes, exacted a negative effect on 
this sector (World Development Movement, 2004: 34ff.). 
 
In the years since Zambia‟s independence, the country has become more 
wealthy overall, but its distribution has been patchy. Some sectors and areas, 
such as the Copperbelt and the „railway corridor‟ through Lusaka to Livingstone 
have prospered, but rural areas have not been so fortunate. The economy is still 
heavily dependent on copper, which in 2004 comprised 63% of Zambia‟s foreign 
earnings (World Development Movement, 2004: 16).4 A summary published by 
                                            
2
 The railway is now bankrupt and a new loan from China has recently been negotiated. 
3
 Agriculture comprises 22% of GDP, but involves approximately 85% of the workforce – much is 
subsistence. 
4
 Zulu (2002: 7) puts the figure at over 85% 
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the World Bank in 1997 described Zambia‟s manufacturing as „plagued by low 
productivity and low-quality output‟ and the financial position of  copper mining 
was described as „precarious‟ (Bonnick, 1997: chapter 7).   
 
The debt crisis in Zambia 
 
During the 1970s not only did the price of copper fall, but the price of oil rose. 
This led Zambia to approach the World Bank for financial assistance; Zambia 
was at that time regarded as a middle-income country and not therefore eligible 
for „soft‟ loans from the World Bank‟s International Development Association 
(World Development Movement, 2004: 20). Zambia began to borrow heavily, 
increasing its total external debt from $800m to $3.2bn from 1970 to 1980 (World 
Development Movement, 2004: 21). The high burden of debt meant that Zambia 
became more dependent on the IMF and World Bank programmes in order to 
secure new loans, and therefore the 1980s and 1990s in Zambia saw the advent 
of Structural Adjustment Programmes. These measures followed the familiar line 
from the IFIs: encouragement of trade liberalisation and the private sector, 
privatisation, deregulation, removal of price controls, the pursuit of foreign 
exchange via export diversification.5 
 
These measures provoked a marked decline in living standards and led to public 
shows of discontent: student riots in 1984 and industrial strife the following year. 
In 1986 food subsidies were removed, which led to more widespread riots, 
                                            
5
 World Development Movement (2004: 24-5) lists these conditions post 1991. 
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centred on the Copperbelt.6 By this time Zambia was using 86% of its earnings 
from exports for debt service repayments, leaving a small percentage to be 
expended on areas such as health and education (Sitali, 2008b: 3). During the 
following year, in 1987, Zambia decided to break with the adjustment policies, 
instead capping debt service payment at 10% of net export earnings and 
imposing import controls. These measures led to economic growth and a more 
stable inflation rate. Many Zambian economists have since praised this move; 
however, one of the unknown questions about Zambia‟s economy is what would 
have happened had the government pursued this line for a more sustained 
period (Zulu, 2002: 1). However, Zambia was forced back into the former 
adjustment policies due to pressure from Paris Club creditors who threatened to 
withhold aid. Large financial penalties were imposed upon Zambia as a 
consequence, which increased the total debt owed (Zulu, 2002: 5).7 The 
following year Zambia applied to the IMF to be assigned the status of „least 
developed nation‟ in order to attract cheaper investment, but this proved 
unsuccessful. By the end of the decade the economy was in sharp decline. Later 
reflection has aided the realisation in the IFIs, already known in Zambia, that the 
austerity measures were poorly designed and implemented: „the Zambian 
Programme was administered in a very chaotic way, and the chaos resulted in 
part from the inadequacy of financing and unrealistic financing projections‟ (Sitali, 
2008b: 5). 
                                            
6
 Ironically a World Bank report stated that „A safety net to protect the very poor from the impact 
of maize pricing reform could have made pricing policy palatable to the poor and acceptable to 
the politicians. Unfortunately, the idea of a safety net came much later…‟ Bonnick (1997: 5) 
7
 The editorial in JCTR Bulletin (Fourth Quarter 2001) gives the figure as over $2 billion in 
arrears and penalties.  
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The Kaunda government had pursued a policy of „socialist humanism‟ which 
entailed considerable control over the economy. Accordingly, the education 
sector developed well during the 1970s and 1980s, but in retrospect the regime 
did not attend sufficiently to the mounting external debt, nor to diversifying the 
economy away from its heavy dependence upon copper. International donors 
have also been criticised for pursuing political rather than economic development 
strategies in offering aid; much aid during this period went into rural areas or non-
productive sectors such as welfare, but did not help to develop the economy on a 
broader scale (Bonnick, 1997: 116). Falling government revenue for the public 
sector, combined with an increased politicisation, encouraged systems of 
patronage, favouritism and corruption: 
„Persistent loss making supported by government largesse based on 
imprudent financial management became the order of the day.‟(Mpuku 
and Zyuulu, 1997: 2)  
 
On becoming Zambia‟s next elected President in 1991, Frederick Chiluba called 
on the international community to cancel the burden of debt Zambia faced, 
saying that there was no other way in which Zambia‟s economy could possibly 
grow (Zambia Daily Mail, 1/11/91). He observed that Zambia had inherited debts 
totalling $7 billion, and that the „new democracies‟ (those featuring multi-party 
voting) should not have to bear the burden of „mistakes‟ committed by „dictatorial 
regimes‟ (a reference to his predecessor) (Times of Zambia, 6/12/91). This 
theme was reiterated a few weeks later when he called for a new Marshall Plan 
for Africa, in which debts would be cancelled (Times of Zambia, 17/2/02). 
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During the 1990s there was mounting concern within the Zambian media over 
the level of its national debt. Sometimes the blame was put on the incompetence 
of Zambian officials, for example over the negotiations with the IFIs (Times of 
Zambia, 19/10/93). Alternatively, the fault was alleged to lie with the IFIs 
themselves. As Dr Caleb Fundanga, Permanent Secretary for Development 
Cooperation and Planning, put it: „these institutions do not want to be responsible 
for their own failings‟ (Times of Zambia, 15/8/94). Already the seeds of debt 
cancellation had been growing; in December 1992 the UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali had described the debt as a „millstone round the neck of 
Africa‟ (Times of Zambia, 30/12/92). Both the UN‟s Javier Perez de Cuellar and 
the Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation, Jan Prunk, had also advocated 
complete debt „forgiveness‟ for Sub-Saharan Africa (Times of Zambia, 15/8/94). 
 
Adjustment measures were more marked under the Chiluba regime than under 
Kaunda. The 1990s saw increasing privatisation of state-controlled organisations 
such as the state electricity company (ZESCO), ZANACO Bank (Zambia National 
Commercial Bank), Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines, Zambia Railways, 
Zambia Airways, Zambia State National Insurance Company and the 
telecommunications company (ZAMTEL).The privatisation programme was 
lauded by the World Bank, yet the effects have not been beneficial for Zambia‟s 
economy as a whole; indeed, the World Development Movement (2004: 12) 
described the adjustment programmes as „unsuccessful, undemocratic and 
unfair.‟ Many of the companies have gone bankrupt, employment numbers have 
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decreased, and some of the welfare provision originally supplied by the 
employers have ceased. A good example of this would be the mines, where 
educational and health facilities have been cut significantly since privatisation 
(World Development Movement, 2004: 23). 
 
Excluding debt interest payments, real government expenditure in the domestic 
economy fell by nearly 50% during the 1990s (World Development Movement, 
2004: 33). Fees were introduced for access to health care and many government 
services, and subsidies for water and sanitation were reduced, affecting the poor 
hardest (World Development Movement, 2004: 39; Sitali, 2008b: 5).8 During the 
1990s bilateral debt decreased, partly due to Paris Club reschedulings and write-
offs, yet multilateral debt increased (Bonnick, 1997: 9). Zambian newspapers 
during the 1990s contained many articles on Zambia‟s external debt, on new aid 
donations, loan write-offs and reschedulings.9 Trade liberalisation has had a 
detrimental effect on the economy, with the Zambian producers unable to 
compete easily with more sophisticated, imported goods. The textile business 
has suffered more than most: in 1991 there were 140 textile manufacturers, but 
only 8 by 2002 (World Development Movement, 2004: 32). The World 
Development Movement (2004: 36) described Zambia‟s economy as the worst in 
Africa for any country not affected by armed conflict. 
 
                                            
8
 A set of selected statistics on Zambia is provided in Appendix III. 
9
 For example: write-offs by the US (Times of Zambia 18/11/91); by the Dutch (Times of Zambia 
27/11/91); by Italy (Times of Zambia 14/12/91); the German rescheduling of 150m DM (Sunday 
Times of Zambia 18/10/92); the French write-off (Times of Zambia 20/11/92) and the Japanese 
write-off and rescheduling (Times of Zambia, 25/12/91). 
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As public pressure mounted and the necessity for debt cancellation intensified at 
the end of the 1990s,10 decisive steps were taken to alleviate Zambia‟s debt 
burden: in April 1999 Paris Club creditors agreed to write off $670m and agreed 
to restructure $330m. In July 2000 Zambia‟s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
was approved by the IMF and the World Bank, paving the way for its application 
for debt relief under the HIPC terms. Decision point was reached on 3rd 
December 2000, at which Zambia qualified for two-thirds reduction in debt 
service payments. Completion point was expected three years later but in 
December 2003 Zambia failed to attain this due to overspend on its budget. This 
overspend was caused by the government‟s decision to honour a prior 
agreement made with the unions on such matters as wages and housing 
allowances for public sector workers (AFRODAD, undated). Aid funding was 
suspended as a result and, following a tense period of industrial unrest, the 
government reneged on its promise to the unions, freezing wages and increasing 
taxes on the most wealthy in the 2004 budget; this incident illustrates how 
democratic processes are undermined in heavily indebted countries. The 
suspension of aid meant that the Zambian government reduced its funding for 
drought-relief measures in the south (World Development Movement, 2004: 47). 
The HIPC completion point was again missed in 2004, but all the criteria were 
finally reached in April 2005. Immediately Zambia received $3.8bn debt relief, 
                                            
10
 Among campaigners was Jeffrey Sachs: „I am no macro economic illiterate and I tell you that 
the budget conditions in the world‟s poorest countries are unconscionable, these countries need 
vastly more help.‟ (Times of Zambia,11/10/00). 
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followed by over $2bn under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI); annual 
debt service repayments then fell from $373m to $65m (Sitali, 2008b: 3).11 
 
Some of the effects of debt relief were readily apparent, since more money could 
be spent on welfare sectors. The Government promised to employ thousands 
more teachers and health care workers, erect over 30 schools and 1500 
classrooms. One Member of Parliament, who has campaigned on debt relief, 
stated that nearly $24m was being used for agricultural schemes, infrastructure 
development and the abolition of user fees for rural health care clinics for 
education – all the product of savings on debt relief (Sitali, 2008b: 2). One 
significant outcome of such substantial debt cancellation was that the value of 
the Zambian kwacha rose by around 30%. This was not completely unexpected, 
and was a reflection of international confidence in Zambia‟s economy post-debt 
cancellation, as well as Zambia no longer needing to sell kwacha for dollars to 
make debt service repayments. 
 
Since Zambia reached the completion point more anti-retroviral drugs have 
become available. However, these are due to donor initiatives rather than the 
action of the Zambian government. Indeed, donor fatigue is apparent in the 
frequently changing focus of aid efforts, malaria prevention being the current 
main target, which is significant because malaria kills more Zambians than any 
other disease. The weakness of a shifting focus means that health care becomes 
patchy and determined by external funding criteria, whereas the overarching 
                                            
11
 The debt service figures post-MRDI are for 2007, taken from the Budget Speech 
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need is for a comprehensive strategy to tackle the chief killers – AIDS, malaria, 
tuberculosis – which are interrelated as one may inflict weakness which makes 
other infections far more deadly. 
 
In 2008 Zambia was still in severe economic difficulties despite the debt relief. 
There was little infrastructure or incentive to invest in local enterprise; power cuts 
(a policy of rotating „load-shedding‟) were frequent in all areas and minor 
corruption common-place. The water supply in Lusaka is a good example of how 
necessary investment would ease a difficult situation. Most Lusakans obtain their 
water through bore holes drilled deep into the ground. The government 
discourages this practice, and urges residents to obtain their water from the city 
supplier, piped direct into people‟s homes. However, this supply is regarded as 
unreliable so people are reluctant to pay relatively high standing charges for 
water which may not be forthcoming. Investment in the water supply therefore 
remains low and the problem remains. 
 
The campaign for debt relief 
 
The history of the debt cancellation movement in Zambia is brief. Increasing 
awareness of the burden of Zambia‟s debt in the early 1990s led to the formation 
of a Debt Project by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace early in 
1998, co-ordinated by the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR) in 
Lusaka. Fr. Pete Henriot SJ, an American priest with the JCTR, had been 
concerned with the debt issue for many years, and his involvement in the Debt 
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Project led to a more explicit link being formed with the burgeoning Jubilee 
movement already becoming established in other countries. Fr. Henriot, a 
government chief economist and the deputy finance minister were guests at the 
pivotal US Bishops‟ Conference on International Debt at Seton Hall (New Jersey) 
in 1999 and provided case studies for the guests from the IFIs.12 Jubilee 2000-
Zambia was launched, though the name was later changed to simply „Jubilee-
Zambia‟ to give continuity to the campaign beyond the 2000 deadline. 
A Zambian Bishops‟ Conference was called, at which a pastoral letter to the 
Zambian Christians was devised and issued. On 7th August 1998 the leaders of 
the three main Christian organisations in Zambia - the Christian Council of 
Zambia, the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia and the Zambia Episcopal 
Conference - issued a joint statement on the steps of Lusaka‟s Anglican 
Cathedral, entitled „Jubilee 2000: Cancel Zambia‟s Debt!‟ A frequently quoted 
paragraph contained the kernel of the campaign: 
 
„Zambia‟s total debt is clearly unpayable. Zambia cannot pay back 
because the debt burden is economically exhausting. It blocks future 
development. Zambia will not pay because the debt burden is politically 
destabilising. It threatens social harmony. Zambia should not pay back 
because the debt burden is ethically unacceptable. It hurts the poorest in 
our midst. (Jubilee 2000 – Zambia, 1998) 
 
The letter argued in favour of the demands of justice rather than charity: debt 
„forgiveness‟ was an inappropriate term since the debt was not primarily 
Zambia‟s fault. It also called for debt relief monies to be used responsibly for the 
benefit of the Zambian economy and its people. As part of this, a „culture of 
                                            
12
 Details of the Conference and its participants may be found at 
www.usccb.org/sdwp/international/shusum500.shtml  
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responsibility and accountability‟ was called for in order to make the „jubilee‟ the 
actual experience of a new beginning for Zambia. The church leaders committed 
their churches to obtaining more information on the debt (and its effects), to 
advocacy with politicians and civil servants, and to seek 200,000 signatures on 
their petition by May 1999. In the event, by February that year 180,000 
signatures had been recorded, and the final total was 306,512 – the sixth highest 
of any country (Williams, 2008). This petition stated: 
 
“We, the undersigned citizens and residents of Zambia, believe that the 
heavy burden of external debt is presently causing great pain to our 
people and is crushing hopes of future development than [sic] will benefit 
everyone. 
 
We know that Zambia‟s debt has increased today to over US$7 billion 
because of mistakes in the past by our own leaders and because of 
policies practised by the international lenders. As we move towards the 
year 2000, it is time to be freed from the chains of this unbearable debt! 
We therefore join with millions of others around the world who call upon 
the leaders of the richest nations and lending institutions to cancel the 
unpayable debts of Zambia and other poor countries. Thus, we can break 
the chains of debt, and have a fresh start, a new beginning, to celebrate 
the new millennium.” 
 
 
The campaign was hosted by the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection and 
after the initial success in galvanising support for the petition, began to direct 
more attention to both the causes of the debt and the political steps necessary to 
monitor debt relief and new loan contractions.  Other organisations from civil 
society were quick to join the campaign. Much use was made of the media to 
promote the campaign, featuring a 13-part national radio programme „Breaking 
the Chains‟, radio interviews, newspaper articles, mass mobilisations, „economic 
literacy seminars‟ and theatrical performances (Kalima, 1999; Sitali, undated: 3-
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4). The need for further research on Zambia‟s debt was highlighted and a full-
time researcher was appointed. In the following years many press releases, 
reports, conference proceedings and policy briefs were published. Zambia was 
represented at the South Africa Johannesburg Summit at which Jubilee-Zambia 
was appointed the co-ordinating unit of all the debt and related issues for 
Southern Africa. 
 
Jubilee-Zambia drew attention to the disparity between government expenditure 
on health and education and that required for debt service payments. Between 
1990 and 2000 the average expenditure on health and education was 2% and 
3% respectively, whereas debt service payments averaged 20% (Zulu, 2002: 11). 
The fundamental argument in favour of debt cancellation was that otherwise its 
people would be denied prospects for human development. More than that, their 
rights to health, education, food and shelter (and thus life itself) would be 
jeopardised. So serious was the effect of debt service payments and the plight of 
the poor that Zambia-Jubilee likened the situation to that in the immediate 
aftermath of a war (Zulu, 2002: 5). 
 
„We have always argued that education is not a privilege for a few people 
but a basic human right. Therefore no one should be alienated from their 
rights on account of debt service payments.‟ (Zulu, 2002: 16) 
 
Despite the calls for debt cancellation there were simultaneous concerns, even 
among campaigning organisations such as Jubilee-Zambia, that debt relief - 
should it be granted - might not have the impact that was desired without 
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associated political developments to enhance popular involvement in monitoring 
(Times of Zambia, 15/6/99). Henriot (1999) warned that the rationale for debt 
relief was that it should serve the needs of the poor and that it would be only one 
part of the solution, but a necessary component. Nevertheless, increased aid and 
fairer terms of trade were also required for poverty to be reduced. He asserted 
that basis human needs should have priority over debt repayments, and that 
conditionalities imposed upon debt cancellation should not come „from above‟ – 
from the creditors, but rather „from below‟, set by local people. This critical point 
is the most significant of the Jubilee-Zambia campaign, advocating new 
democratic processes for Zambia in which civil society is able to hold its 
government to account. Henriot also called for the establishment of „mechanisms‟ 
for tripartite (government, Parliament, civil society) debt management, 
independent social credit and international debt arbitration. 
 
The Jubilee campaign in Zambia was founded on the faith-inspired perspective 
that slaves were to be set free periodically (Sitali, undated). The purpose of such 
legislation was the restoration of community that had been fractured, a 
restoration characterised by a greater sense of equality of persons. This equality 
was in turn derived from the essential dignity of all human beings as found in 
Genesis 1:27. The 1998 Pastoral Letter did not give detail of such legislation – it 
was after all a brief campaigning statement, though the paramountcy of 
community was clearly elucidated: 
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„This worldwide “Jubilee 2000” movement echoes the biblical demands of 
Deuteronomy 15 and Leviticus 23 [sic] for restoring the bonds of 
community by canceling [sic] debts.‟ (Henriot, 1998)13 
 
 
Jubilee-Zambia‟s view was that the economy is a system designed to serve 
people, rather than a mechanism for distributing scarce resources. Its purpose 
was the improvement of humankind, achieved through cooperation between 
people, and between them and the earth. Such improvement was understood as 
human development in its widest sense, meeting basic human needs that 
include, but are not limited to, social, and cultural needs as well as material ones. 
Theologically, this view of economics meant calling for a people-oriented 
economy rather than a profit-oriented one: „the human person is the priority for all 
economic activity and therefore the economy exists for the person, not the 
person for the economy‟(Henriot, 2003). Hence matters such as adjustment 
policies or privatisation programmes, for example, had to be judged not on 
economic indicators but on their effects on the poor. As such, the focus for the 
Church‟s thought and action was not economic matters but rather „economic 
justice‟. The Church was not unconcerned with objective economic indicators, but 
gave greater weight to the human indicators as to whether the hungry were being 
fed, and the sick given medical treatment (Matale, 2008b). This was not to say 
that there is necessarily a conflict in principle between HIPC and demands for 
debt cancellation, since both sought the same end. In contrast to HIPC‟s basis on 
economic and political arguments, the Jubilee movement was based on „biblical 
teaching about justice and community‟ (Henriot, 1998). 
                                            
13
 The reference to Leviticus 23 is also made in the Pastoral Letter, which Henriot is copying here. 
Lev.23 makes reference to the weekly Sabbath, not the Jubilee year.  
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The Pastoral Letter was explicit that what was being sought was debt 
cancellation rather than „forgiveness‟ as this term both implied guilt (and blame) 
on the part of the debtor, and furthermore, implied also the need for benevolence 
on the part of the creditor. The Zambian people had been faithful in discharging 
their obligations, in contrast to the creditor nations. Thus what was being called 
for was not some act of kindness or mercy but for that which justly belonged to 
the debtor: release from further payments. 
 
It had long been clear to campaigners that one could not consider the 
ramifications of debt without also looking at other factors impeding development, 
chief among these being trade.14 In November 2006, the leaders of the three 
main Christian groupings that had issued the 1998 Pastoral Letter issued a Joint 
Statement with the sub-title „From Debt Cancellation to Trade Justice‟ (Jubilee-
Zambia, 2006), which announced a new, broader direction for the campaign. Two 
new prongs were to be developed. In addition to the continued monitoring of debt 
relief, attention would now focus also on a legal campaign for greater 
transparency and accountability with regard to new loans, and a strong emphasis 
on justice in trading arrangements: „Trade justice demands that trade rules put 
people and the environment first and profits second‟ (2006: 10). In conclusion the 
church leaders commented that „in line with the demands of the Biblical jubilee 
mandate‟ in Deuteronomy 15 and Leviticus 25, the campaign for the „defence of 
human dignity‟ would be continued.15 
                                            
14
 An example of this can be found in Jubilee-Zambia (2002c: 9) 
15
 Here Leviticus 25 is mentioned rather than Lev. 23. 
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Further demands: (a) Reparations 
The Pastoral Letter made no reference to reparations, though this was an issue 
in subsequent discussions both within Jubilee-Zambia and Jubilee South and 
became a major feature of their campaigns. A common element in these 
discussions was the view that the North owed the South not only because the 
debts had been repaid many times over, but also due to the past injustices that 
had led to the underdevelopment of Africa.16 The issue has not been ignored, 
though one wonders whether the arguments have been aimed at galvanising 
support among a more domestic audience than at international level.17 One of 
the JCTR consultants, Zulu, has argued passionately in favour of reparations 
from North to South, chiefly due to the component of Zambia‟s debt caused by 
the struggle against apartheid (Jubilee-Zambia, 2002a; JCTR Bulletin 52, 2002). 
He offers three additional reasons: the first is a political one, that reparations are 
due because of the legacy of slavery; the second is that colonial powers stole 
economic resources from African countries; the third concerns ecological 
damage, in which the poorest are often disproportionately burdened by climate 
change. None of these arguments, however, are linked directly to the national 
debt. Jubilee-Zambia researched the effect that Zambia‟s opposition to apartheid 
(in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa) cost the country. Linking this clearly into 
the category of odious debt, JCTR estimated the cost at $5.3 billion (Zulu, 2002: 
8), or even $7 billion; larger than Zambia‟s debt stock prior to cancellation 
                                            
16
 A rather extreme, but not untypical view, is found in Kaluba (1998). See also the remarks by 
Pastor Choolwe Mwetwa at a Conference on Reparations: Jubilee-Zambia (2002a) 
17
 The issue was not, for instance, raised by any members of the Southern representatives to a 
conference at the University of Birmingham to mark the tenth anniversary of the Jubilee 2000 
demonstration there. 
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(Banda, 2000: 18). Earlier calculations gave a significantly lower figure. 
Nevertheless,  it is undisputable that the Zambian economy was impaired at 
many levels through its hosting of the ANC, cross-border raids, aerial bombing by 
South Africa of infrastructure targets, as well as the disruption to trade mentioned 
earlier. The point being made here is a moral one: Zambia stood up to the forces 
that denied justice and equality, and the international community – who called for 
such opposition - forced it to pay the price alone. According to this view much of 
the responsibility for the debt lies with the international community, and they are 
the ones who stand in need of forgiveness from the people of Zambia, not the 
other way round. 
 
Further demands (b) Monitoring of debt relief, corruption and the misuse of funds 
It was believed that debt relief would make a significant impact on the national 
economy and the provision of services in particular: „more resources will now be 
channeled [sic] towards vital social services and economic infrastructure, thereby 
benefiting the common Zambian‟ (Mali, 2005). It is clear that some tangible 
benefits have been observed since debt relief was granted. These include the 
increased provision of education and medical facilities, a programme to spread 
rural electrification in aid of agriculture and the improvement of feeder road 
management. However, the revenues freed up by debt cancellation do not 
provide for medicines (for which a fee is charged), nor for teachers‟ salaries 
(which come from the routine education budget). Thus the impact has not been 
as great as might have been hoped for. Some schools stand empty for want of 
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teachers, of whom there are many qualified but unemployed, and some health 
centres lack basic supplies. 
 
Another factor in this matter is the misuse of public money, examples of which 
may be found in the Auditor General‟s report of 2006 which revealed that over K1 
billion has been misapplied (Sitali, 2008a: 7). A specific illustration of this would 
be the Feeder Road Programme. This was intended as a means of assisting 
transportation from farms to nearby centres, one project spent K480 million 
improving the road to the President‟s Farm at Teka near Ndola. It became clear, 
however, that this road benefited no farms other than that designated for the 
President; the regional politician responsible for oversight of this project was 
subsequently promoted (Anon., 2008).18 Transparency International‟s Corruption 
Perceptions Index 2001 located Zambia in 75th place, out of 91 countries, in 
descending order of perceived corruption. This placed Zambia on a par with 
Vietnam and behind its neighbours Malawi (61), Zimbabwe (65), Botswana (26) 
and Namibia (30) (Hodess et al, 2001). Zambia‟s heavy borrowing was likened to 
the practice of „thieves‟ who steal resources from others for their own personal 
benefit, rather than for others (Jubilee-Zambia, 2003b). Money intended for the 
productive sector is now being allocated to the political arena – ostensibly still for 
production generation, but in fact distributed in ways to boost political allegiances 
among local chiefs (Anon., 2008). 
 
                                            
18
 At the time of my interview the politician in question was a government minister. 
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An important aspect of the improper use of funds in Zambia, as elsewhere in the 
developing world, is due to structural deficiencies in the political economy. For 
instance, the Zambian national budget is announced at the beginning of the year, 
but is then debated in Parliament before approval (which takes several months) 
usually until around April. In the intervening period the President issues warrants 
for government expenditure. The procurement process then takes place, which 
can last many months. Thus, by the time the contracts have been issued, there is 
little time left in the fiscal year, and money is often left unallocated due to delays 
or surpluses. In either event, the money will be spent so that no surplus remains 
by the end of the year. In Zambia „we do project monitoring but not project 
management‟ (Anon., 2008); furthermore, there is a collusive relationship 
between those who design the frameworks for projects and those who apply for 
them. By this, what is meant is that there is great emphasis on filling out the 
forms in the right way, in order to obtain funding, but not necessarily the 
oversight which gives a more comprehensive strategy (Anon., 2008). 
 
There has been some caution on the part of the Zambian government to the 
notion of external monitoring of debt relief (such as involvement on the HIPC 
debt relief monitoring team), and a reluctance to appoint monitors known to be 
critical of the government. Aware of the need for greater advocacy for 
accountability for the resources from debt relief, Jubilee-Zambia set up a Debt 
Resources Monitoring Manual for use by „community stakeholders‟. This helps 
groups to identify how the resources released through debt relief correspond to 
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national plans, but is in effect a political tool, rather than an economic one. One 
anticipated consequence is greater civil engagement with local politicians and 
officials on welfare and development matters. The actual monitoring is performed 
in a variety of ways: through interviews and surveys to gauge public perceptions 
of institutions and services, through organised group discussions and the use of 
„report cards‟ to obtain quantitative feedback on particular services. The intention 
is that such information will lead to the production of reports and media briefings 
which should provide greater impetus for achieving the intended goals, in 
addition to accountability and efficiency. 
 
Further demands: (c) Loan contraction: calls for a new legal framework 
A total of $7.2bn was written off under the HIPC and MDRI processes by the IMF 
during 2005. In addition, there were further write-offs by Paris Club creditors, 
including Russia, and by some other creditors on HIPC-type terms (Henriot, 
2008). The Zambian government announced that, assuming World Bank debt 
cancellation in July 2006, in addition to the IMF cancellation already agreed, 
Zambia‟s total external debt would be $502mn at that time.19 The World Bank did 
agree to the expected cancellation, but its press statement did not indicate the 
level of Zambia‟s current debt. However, a government statement at the end of 
that year – at which the 2007 budget was announced – gave a figure of $635mn, 
i.e. a 26% increase within six months. This caused alarm at the Debt and Trade 
Project. One perennial difficulty with Zambian debt is that different departments 
can give different figures, and it can be extremely difficult to establish with 
                                            
19
 This figure is also given by Sitali (undated: 5) 
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absolute certainty the accuracy of statistics supplied: „There are differing figures 
for Zambia‟s debt stock, due to a number of factors including reliability of data 
sources, definitions and data management problems‟ (AFRODAD, undated: 4).20 
 
The Ministry of Finance, authors of the Zambian National Economic Report, gave 
the figure for outstanding debt at the end of 2006 as being $1.5bn. The 
government response to questioning on this matter was to state that less debt 
was cancelled than had been anticipated, since Russia and Brazil had not 
honoured their debt cancellation promises. However, more specific detail on this 
has not been forthcoming. Zambia‟s debt is now thought to be of the order of 
$2bn and, if this is indeed so, it may be heading towards a new debt crisis. The 
danger is that Zambia‟s upsurge in creditworthiness, following the HIPC 
Completion Point, is that Zambia may borrow more easily again: 
 
“We would also like to call upon the donor community to reconsider the 
grading of Zambia‟s debt situation as sustainable at completion point and 
thus not qualifying for topping up.” (Mali, 2005) 
 
Jubilee-Zambia has called for a new loan contraction process so that proper 
public scrutiny can be made and accountability for new debts recognised (Mali, 
2005). Through this mechanism the legitimacy of new debts would be more firmly 
established, since loan contracts are in effect made between a creditor and the 
                                            
20
 The AFRODAD report also cites a Ministry of Finance and National Planning official who said 
that as an illustration of this, one loan in Italian lira was incorrectly recorded as being in US 
dollars, thus heavily adding to the apparent debt burden! 
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state, acting on behalf of its people. To date the Zambian Minister of Finance and 
National Planning can act under legislation passed in 1988, which permits him or 
her to borrow up to K20 trillion (approximately $5bn) from foreign sources 
(Matale, 2008a: 21; Jubilee-Zambia, 2008: 3).21 Under this arrangement „the 
recklessness of one man can cause much [sic] problems for the whole country by 
contracting new, foolish loans‟ (Anon., 2008).  
 
We have already seen that there was occasional criticism of the Zambian 
negotiators.22 Either the Zambians were ill-equipped for such negotiations or their 
few representatives were outnumbered and outmanoeuvred by teams of ever-
fresh delegates from other countries at the WTO:  
 
„Zambia has generally performed very badly with regard to loan 
negotiation. The initiation, negotiation and conclusion of loan agreements 
has tended to be carried out as though the lender is doing the country a 
favour and should not be asked too many questions lest the loan be 
withdrawn. The fact of the matter, however, is that the lender is keen to 
lend because that is their business. It is thus incumbent upon the Zambian 
Government to negotiate favourable loan conditions and preferably opt for 
grants, especially for social sectors such as health and education‟ 
(AFRODAD, undated: 14). 
                                            
21
 This is known as Statutory Instrument 53. The limit for domestic borrowing was set at K5 
trillion. 
22
 My interviews with several prominent Zambians featured similar comments. A public example 
would be „Nchanga, Nkana mines bids on‟ (Times of Zambia 12/6/98). 
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As one example of Zambian officials being manipulated, the report cites the case 
of a World Bank loan offered to the Ministry of Finance and National Planning in 
order to combat HIV/AIDS. There was concern at this proposal both within the 
Ministry and within civil society organisations, and the loan offer was declined. 
Soon afterwards the same offer was made, this time to the Ministry of Health; its 
officials accepted the loan (AFRODAD, undated: 15). The report also goes on to 
state that government ministries and parastatals fail to comply strictly with legal 
requirements as they stand, with the result that loans are not always in Zambia‟s 
best interests. The matter is plagued by poor record-keeping. In other words, it 
cannot be demonstrated that loans are taken out in a legally transparent, 
accountable, consultative manner, and therefore the whole debt contraction 
mechanism lacks moral legitimacy. In addition, there is concern at the level of 
Zambia‟s domestic debt, for it is thought by debt campaigners that some of the 
increase may reflect domestic borrowing to conceal new external debt 
repayments. In 2005 Zambia‟s domestic debt stood at K850bn ($175m), a figure 
whose servicing costs are larger than those of its external debt (Mali, 2005). 
 
Another key aspect of the Jubilee-Zambia campaign for a tighter legal framework 
for loan contraction is reflected in its concerted appeal for a new constitution. The 
existing constitution has been amended in a rather piecemeal fashion since 
independence, but an entirely new approach is now deemed necessary in order 
to enshrine fundamental rights (to education, health care, for example) and to 
clarify the distinctions (ie greater separation) between the judicial, executive and 
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legislative powers of the state. In particular, the President is given sweeping 
executive powers to delay legislation, effectively exercising a veto over 
Parliament. The National Constitution Commission was set up following the last 
election but appears to be making such slow progress that it is doubted whether 
a new document will be operative before the next Presidential Elections in 2011. 
The churches have objected strongly to both the process and the membership of 
the NCC, believing them to be flawed. Their objections include the power of the 
President to dissolve the NCC at any time; that the number of government 
representatives is far too high (perhaps two thirds) and that of civil society too 
low (the churches were offered 3 seats out of over five hundred); but most of all, 
that the process is determined by those already in power. By contrast, the 
churches have called for a „people-driven‟ constitution in which a public 
referendum would be able to influence the decision of the Zambian parliament. 
Accordingly the churches have decided to boycott the NCC. 
 
‘Vulture’ Funds 
 
Vulture Funds buy heavily discounted debt on the secondary markets in the hope 
of being able to recoup a larger percentage of the debt‟s value through legal 
action. The most notable of these was the case against Zambia by Donegal 
International, which in January 1999 bought a Zambian debt owed to Romania 
for the purchase of agricultural machinery. The debt comprised $15m principal 
and $15m in interest, and the price paid for the debt by Donegal was $3.28m, 
129 
 
 
representing a valuation at 11%.23  The sale was favourable to Romania as 
Donegal offered greater security of repayment than had Zambia – who had been 
negotiating on a possible buy-back. Indeed, the Zambian government had 
expected a satisfactory conclusion to their discussions, but just nineteen days 
before the HIPC agreement the Romanian government sold to Donegal. 
Although the force of criticism has been levelled at Donegal‟s profiteering, it 
seems clear that the Romanian government chose Donegal in the realisation that 
the HIPC process would have a highly deleterious effect on the debt stock. 
(Romania had itself witnessed the social cost of debt repayment: Ceaucescu‟s 
government had striven hard to clear their debt stock.) In subsequent 
negotiations Zambia agreed with Donegal in 2003 to repay some £16m in 
settlement of the debt, and paid $2.5m but then suspended further payment. 
 
Donegal is an American firm but took its legal claim to the High Court in London 
in June 2005 since it is incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. It argued that it 
had made many fruitless attempts to offer various debt-for-equity swaps with the 
Zambian government, which Donegal considered a „win-win‟ scenario. It claimed 
that the original agreement with Zambia had stated that if repayments ceased, 
the Zambian government would be liable for the full value of the debt – which 
with interest came to $55m. Donegal described their actions as having sought 
„amicable settlement‟. In April 2007 the High Court awarded the claim to Donegal 
but restricted its claim to £15.5m, and criticised the company owner and its 
witnesses, describing their testimonies as „deliberately evasive and even 
                                            
23
 Donegal‟s own view of the proceedings may be Donegal International (2008)  
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dishonest‟ (Royal Courts of Justice, 2007: 18; Guardian, 25/4/07). The Jubilee 
Debt Campaign was pleased that the claim had been reduced so significantly, 
and that much media attention was given to the issue. The British government 
called for such practices to be outlawed and the IMF warned that debt relief was 
threatened by them (Guardian, 22/10/07). In 2007, eleven countries qualifying for 
HIPC debt relief were facing legal action from vulture funds claiming $1.8bn, 
most of the process taking place in the UK (Guardian, 17/10/07). Jubilee-Zambia 
called for new international legal mechanisms to prevent such action occurring 
again, pointing out that the impact of the $15m award to Donegal would mean 
that some poverty reducing measures would be curtailed. 
 
Summary 
 
The discussion in this chapter has revealed two main features of the debt 
campaign in Zambia: the multifaceted nature of the issues surrounding debt 
relief, and the legal and moral issues it raises. As we have seen, the HIPC and 
MDRI agreements of 2005 cancelled the vast majority of Zambia‟s external debt, 
but a significant part remains. Indeed, a recent report by Weeks and Terry, cited 
in Jubilee USA Briefing Note 3 (2008), suggests that debt relief has freed up 
relatively small financial resources due to the IFI conditionalities, and that the 
effect on poverty reduction programme expenditure will be marginal. The fear 
among campaigners is of a wider public perception that sufficient debt relief has 
been achieved, and so Jubilee-Zambia has continued to push for unconditional 
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relief for the remainder. The failure of the debt cancellation to effect dramatic 
changes for the poorest in Zambia, plus the prospect of a rising debt burden 
once again, add support to the view that external debt is primarily a political 
matter rather than an economic one (Jubilee-Zambia, 2003b), and needs to be 
seen in the context of issues concerning democracy, civil participation, 
development and governance.  Many of the debt campaigners always regarded 
debt as merely one aspect of the struggle to relieve poverty, but the discussion 
here has provided good evidence that such a task embraces many political 
factors. The intractable nature of poverty in such a country is clearly evident. 
Good governance is a key issue for Zambia, and we have seen how the state 
apparatus has always been bereft of the necessary resources, human and 
material, that would enable its development. Massive investment is indeed 
necessary, but this will not have the desired effect without accompanying 
measures that can significantly enhance public accountability, transparency and 
consultation. Similarly, one cannot expect alterations in the legal framework, 
cultural attitudes to private enterprise, or reductions in commonplace corruption 
among minor officials without the financial resources to make such measures 
effective. Jubilee-Zambia has thus concentrated on the wider issues surrounding 
the monitoring of debt relief and legislation to improve loan accountability, and in 
doing so has ventured far from mere economic analysis. Rather than simply 
calling for the international financial community and the national government to 
act in a particular way, it has provided a means by which civil society can 
become more engaged in the political processes. We see here why debt relief is 
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regarded as a „catalytic‟ issue, for it leads to a critical examination of matters 
such as development, democracy, and governance (JCTR Bulletin 50, 2001). 
 
Theologically the arguments in Zambia appear simple: the debt is a manifest 
injustice, both in a legal and a moral sense. The approach of the campaign has 
been to highlight the injustice of the debt crisis and the responsibility – especially, 
but not exclusively - of the creditor. This is a crucial feature of any theological 
analysis of financial lending. In the case of Zambia we see the vulnerability of 
those who have sought loans, and the domestic political necessity that they 
faced to obtain credit. Not only were the Western lenders irresponsible, they 
acted aware of their advantage vis à vis the weaknesses of their negotiating 
partners. Thus Jubilee-Zambia also drew attention to the imbalance of power 
during debt negotiations. Standard economic theory assumes that in any act of 
trade the parties can reach equilibrium to determine the appropriate price and the 
conditions for trade to take place. We have seen examples where this has not 
the case, and hence not only the legality, but also the moral obligations for debt, 
can be questioned. Furthermore, we have seen that there is a related issue here 
concerning temptation – although the term is not used. The ability to obtain vast 
financial resources on loan with limited accountability continues to present a 
highly tempting avenue for Zambian officials, and there is evidence that 
government ministers tended to present over-optimistic assessments of debt 
rescheduling to the public. Such officials are vulnerable to exploitation, even 
unwittingly. 
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The Zambian campaign‟s view of economics, and poverty in particular, is that 
these are human constructs and as such can be manipulated according to the 
directives human beings set them. Therefore, fault lies with the regulations that 
govern international capital and trade rather than issues of scarcity, supply and 
demand. Economics should be directed to benefit the poorest, because one can 
achieve this through political will. The Zambian perspective is not so much 
concerned with macro-economic issues and theories but with the reality of 
human misery and survival. According to this view, Western economic policies 
based upon such concepts are not so much viewed as objective theories but 
more as blinkered tools for self-justification and, sometimes, exploitation. One 
can readily understand such a view given the context described in this chapter, 
but it is a polemical, rather than dialogical stance. Indeed, a dialogical approach 
would appear as ethically compromised for its assumptions concerning the 
objectivity of economics.  
 
In addition to these two main emphases concerning the complexity of factors 
contributing to Zambia‟s debt, and the political issues these raise, it is also 
noteworthy that the concept of Jubilee was helpful in that it symbolised the 
potential for a new beginning. It was therefore not simply about a mechanism 
corrective in economic life but also an ongoing new future.24 In this sense it is 
more than a metaphor for ending injustice but rather is forward-looking and 
inspirational, suggesting the possibilities of permanent change. 
                                            
24
 Cf. the Joint Pastoral Letter (Jubilee 2000-Zambia, 1998): „The experience of „jubilee‟ in the 
cancelling of debts can be for us a new start, a fresh beginning.‟  
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Chapter Five 
 
 
Theological Engagement with Political Economy 
 
 
The previous chapters have been concerned with the emergence and 
development of the Jubilee 2000 campaign. We have traced the key events, the 
arguments and themes deployed in both the North, principally in Britain, and in 
Zambia. We now need to perform a critique of the campaign from the perspective 
of theological methodology, specifically, the patterns of engagement between 
theology and matters of political economy. In our consideration of the theological 
strands and approaches of the late twentieth century in Britain, we need to look 
in particular for the ways in which the engagement between theology and 
economics has taken place, especially in the way that theological insights made 
contact with contemporary issues, such as debt. We shall see that there is a 
large disparity in the way that secular insights have been appraised; moreover, 
the hitherto established patterns of engagement have undergone considerable 
challenge in recent years, and signs of a new framework of ideas are emerging. 
This approach will help us to assess the extent to which the campaign‟s 
approach was adequate, and to identify its strengths and limitations; our 
examination will also discuss the theological and economic assumptions that 
underpinned the campaign, and also to assess the significance of the campaign 
for wider church and theological involvement on sovereign debt. We will be 
particularly concerned with the way in which theology interacts with political 
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economy, the way theological insights make their contribution within this 
interaction, and the weight given to political and economic argument. 
 
Our discussion will consider the different models of theological engagement, 
beginning with the model I refer to as the „liberal‟ model, exemplified by the work 
of Ronald Preston. This was the dominant model for much of the twentieth 
century, but in recent decades the advent of new challenges have witnessed its 
demise as new, and strikingly different, models from the liberal approach were 
advocated. Before we look at these, we consider the attempts to reformulate the 
liberal approach. Our attention then turns to the models which were formed as a 
critical response to the perceived inadequacies of the liberal approach, which I 
have termed „anti-liberal‟, before finally considering responses that define 
themselves as „post-liberal‟. 
 
A critique of the liberal model of engagement: Ronald Preston 
 
Ronald Preston is the acknowledged chief exponent in Britain of the dominant, 
liberal tradition that recognises the autonomy of secular disciplines such as 
economics. An Anglican priest and part-time lecturer in ethics for many years, 
Preston became Samuel Ferguson Professor of Social and Pastoral Theology at 
Manchester University in 1970, whereupon his most productive writing ensued.2  
Preston studied economics at the London School of Economics under R.H. 
                                            
2
 For a fuller account of Preston‟s career see Kamergrauzis (2001:.21-26), Atherton (1995: 22-32) 
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Tawney before learning theology, and although a socialist, retained a 
commitment to market economics. He saw no theological or moral problem with 
profits or competition, though his sympathies often lay with the political Left 
despite his frequent criticisms of many radical left-wing theologians. He believed 
in a regulated market and accepted the basic assumptions of economics (order 
in creation, relative scarcity). According to Preston, the market economy contains 
many ambiguities which defy resolution, such as those between enterprise and 
the just distribution of social goods. The global economy is neither right nor 
wrong in principle, although moral judgements may be made on particular 
outcomes and policies. Preston‟s eschatology is both realised as well as future 
oriented: Christians inhabit a world in which the kingdom of God has been 
inaugurated through Jesus Christ, but the final consummation of the kingdom of 
God has not yet occurred, and will not, this side of eternity. Thus the appropriate 
theological attitudes are those of hope and acceptance, a recognition that the 
ambiguities and conditionalities of life cannot be changed, for God has simply 
made the world in this way.3 
 
It is abundantly clear that Preston leans heavily on the insight of Reinhold 
Niebuhr, not least his view that justice was the best, public expression of love as 
revealed in Scripture. Preston‟s approach is founded strongly on Niebuhr‟s 
distillation of the central „myths‟ of the human condition found in Scripture rather 
than, for example, particular biblical passages (Markham, 2000). These broad 
                                            
3
 For Preston, scarcity - in the economists‟ sense of finitude, and in the theological sense of being 
an intrinsic aspect of the created order - was simply a fact of life: Brown, M. (2004b: 178) 
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truths are then brought to bear upon contemporary issues in the expectation that 
they will be able to provide general guidance as to how to proceed. Preston 
(1991: 102) argues that there are „certain insights of fundamental importance‟ 
emanating from doctrine. They include the doctrine of human beings as created 
free yet limited by sin and finitude, and renewed in Christ. These insights also 
include Christian hope: earthly because creation is „good‟, and heavenly because 
God‟s purposes transcend earthly bounds of time and space. There is finally the 
universalism that knows no prejudice and pays particular attention to the 
marginalised. In the narrower field of economics and politics Preston (1991: 146) 
hones these to four „criteria‟ that the Christian tradition possesses: equality of 
persons, hence universalism; a concern for the poor and otherwise marginalised; 
participation in the decision-making processes that affect people; and the state 
as a mechanism for constraining injustice and encouraging human flourishing. 
 
Preston understands the theological task as the reciprocal dialogue between the 
two disciplines of theology and economics, in which they are brought together in 
order to provide „mutual illumination‟. Thus neither can assume any kind of 
superior knowledge, for both disciplines are authoritative and distinct. Much 
attention is therefore devoted to how the two are brought together, and he is 
highly critical of approaches that assume one party has a higher claim to 
knowledge. For the same reason, he is also critical of theologians who 
commence their reflections with a priori deductions from either biblical material or 
an exclusive, socio-economic standpoint. For Preston biblical texts act as 
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„building-blocks‟ for ongoing reflection rather than a foundation from which to 
derive principles; scripture is „the regular nourishment of the spirit… not a source 
of detailed rules of conduct‟ (1991: 103). 
 
Like Niebuhr, Preston criticised much of contemporary Christian social teaching 
as being essentially utopian, particularly those theologians of the Left, although 
his sympathies lay more in this direction than with the Right.  His main objection 
is that they are insufficiently scientific, paying too little attention to the „facts‟ of 
economics. Sometimes they are labelled bluntly as intellectual frauds; frequently 
he cites the example of the Social Credit theory, popular in the 1920s, which 
advocated increasing the money supply in order to boost production and 
consumption. It was well supported in certain Christian circles, but if adopted 
would have led to massive inflation. Preston also condemned those who 
succumbed to a „zero-sum‟ view of capitalism, in which profits are necessarily 
gained at someone else‟s expense, and thus constitute theft. It is a view to which 
the debt cancellation campaign was not entirely immune. In a similar vein he was 
critical of the „hermeneutic‟ or „pastoral‟ circle of theological action and reflection 
characterised by theologies of liberation, because of the danger that the initial 
action could be erroneously informed by poor assumptions or analysis. He was 
well aware of the subjectivity behind much Western objective data; however, he 
maintained that the issue of whose interests were being supported was not 
ultimately decisive, though it was not unimportant. Preston also took issue with 
Barth, in whose approach the world was understood only through the lens of 
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divine revelation; he could easily have had Barth or his followers in mind when he 
stated: 
 
„Hope needs to discern real possibilities, which means acute analysis, 
rather than stressing expectations of new divine initiatives not arising out 
of the present of which we can know nothing, and which can therefore 
play no part in making our decisions.‟ (1987a: 218) 
 
 
Preston believed that there was a tendency for theological interdisciplinary 
engagement to make assumptions about the world it had no right to make, that it 
failed to appreciate the truth or complexity of other disciplines sufficiently, and 
thus propose solutions that were unduly particular and open to dispute. He saw 
middle axioms as a bulwark against this, reminding theology that it did not have 
all the answers; Markham (2000: 260) approvingly likens this to „humility‟. 
 
Preston eschewed the attempt by theologians to make detailed policy decisions, 
believing this should be left to technicians rather than theologians. He sought 
constantly to advocate a „middle level‟ between general principles and detailed 
policy prescriptions, which are often referred to as „middle axioms‟ – although 
Preston became increasingly reluctant to use the term – and have been subject 
to sustained criticism in recent decades. Devised by Oldham and „t Hooft at the 
1937 Oxford Conference on Church, Community and State, and endorsed by 
such figures as William Temple, they have been regarded as a characteristic of 
Preston‟s work. Middle axioms represent an interim stage in the formation of a 
specific ethical response to a particular situation; these maxims are then used as 
the basis for the rather technical decisions about the practical nature of the policy 
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response. They are formed by bringing together specific principles of faith and 
the empirical, scientific evidence. This process begins with reflection upon the 
gospel‟s underlying principles about humankind and human relationship 
(Preston, 1873: 148). The theological priorities among these principles are then 
discerned as the data about the nature of the issue is evaluated. As questions of 
practicality, relevance, trends and likely outcomes are posed alongside the 
theological material, middle axioms emerge through consensus from the process. 
Christians might often reach different conclusions as to courses of action, but this 
would result from different judgments on their efficacy (Preston, 1981: 41). Often 
misunderstood as some kind of universal ethical principle, or a staging post on 
the route from the derivation of a principle to its application, middle axioms were 
intended to be provisional, local and contextual. Preston was, therefore, reluctant 
to specify particular middle axioms, though as an example he did suggest the 
post-war consensus on the aim to achieve full employment (1983: 150). 
 
Two particular phenomena challenged the adequacy of the dominant liberal 
model for theological engagement: globalisation and pluralism. Globalisation 
embraces political, economic and cultural issues on an enormous scale, but also 
raises subjective issues of human identity.9 The phenomenon of globalisation 
comprises a two-fold change in the way people experience their being part of a 
wider world (Kurien, 2004): on the one hand, advances in technology, particularly 
                                            
9
 The literature on globalisation is vast. A useful, but varied, introduction may be found in: Wolf 
(2004); Legrain (2002); Gray (2002); Stiglitz (2002); Reed (2001); Atherton (2008: chapter 3); 
Küng (1997). The subjective issues are recognised by Sanks (1999: 651) and by Sedgwick 
(1999) 
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through the speed and ease of electronic communications, have made the world 
seem a smaller and more unified place; „global village‟ being one popular term to 
describe this. This has ramifications that in many sphere of human operations cut 
across national boundaries: multi-national companies, counter-terrorism, drugs, 
and internet fraud being a few examples (Held, 2004: 7). On the other hand, 
simultaneously there has been a flattening of local culture, a process of 
submerging local differences and replacing them with a new, more homogenous 
culture. McDonaldisation is one term used to describe this (Gerle, 2000: 159-
160), though Cirque du Soleil is perhaps a better example: whereas the former 
may be described as an instance of American culture, the latter – a novel 
contemporary circus troupe – contain no cultural resonances at all: no specific 
language is used, only meaningless gibberish. The advent of globalisation is 
variously dated to the advent of the Industrial Revolution, or the period following 
the end of the Second World War, yet there can be little doubt that the most 
significant change can be dated to the deregulation of capital which took place in 
the 1980s and 1990s, allowing much greater transfers of capital than hitherto, 
and at a significantly faster rate.10 In addition, relaxations on government controls 
concerning the movements of skilled people enhanced this process.  
 
The increasing sense in which our society is a plural one, devoid of any unifying 
or over-arching perspective, is the other chief factor.11 The expansion of faiths, 
cultures, and traditions in our societies, and the divergence in the lifestyles and 
                                            
10
 For a detailed history of globalisation, see Legrain (2002: chapter 3), also Kurien (2004) 
11
 „... the handling of plurality is a crucial issue in economic theory‟: Brown (1997: 295) 
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experiences of its inhabitants have all contributed to this significantly (Walker, 
1992: 53-4). It is a phenomenon witnessed in the erosion of unifying authoritative 
narratives or moralities in society, in the increasingly eclectic nature of society 
and the prominence of post-modernism (M. Brown, 2001: 103).12 The end of the 
Cold War in 1989 destroyed finally the notion of any Marxist hegemony, and its 
particular narrative came to an end, leading Fukuyama (1992) to claim, perhaps 
prematurely, that its demise represented the „end of history‟. The consequence of 
pluralism is that there no longer any means of making value judgments upon 
particular principles or ethics; one can only draw attention to their differences. 
Consensus is therefore rendered impossible because there is no universally-
regarded moral authority or narrative to fashion this (M. Brown, 2007: 295). 
Brown, borrowing from MacIntyre, criticises liberalism‟s assumption that concepts 
such as justice and community have a universally common meaning. By contrast, 
he asserts that liberalism‟s failure to transcend the particular, and hence to 
resolve the conflict between differing understandings and moralities, have made 
it quite impotent.  
 
Middle axioms have been criticised heavily because they place great weight on 
the role of the technical expert; they assume that the common good is both 
desirable and achievable. Linked with this, is their failure to cope with a pluralist 
society, and the charge that middle axioms are a sop to the prevailing culture – 
and so are incapable of leading to policies that are either prophetic or 
                                            
12
 The key text for a critical response to pluralism is of course MacIntyre (1981), and forms the 
inspiration for much of Milbank‟s work.  
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distinctively Christian. The empirical data, and particularly its interpretation, are 
not impartial, and contain assumptions and perspectives. Sources of authority in 
a particular field are rarely of the same opinion, and can also give credence to 
views outside their sphere of expertise, hence the need, as Preston 
acknowledges (1987a: 198), for lay people (non-experts) to be involved in the 
evaluation of experts‟ submissions. Experts do, of course, help to put particular 
experiences and perspectives into a wider context, and they do have a significant 
input into the analysis of events and processes. Yet the charge that Preston‟s 
reliance upon expertise is essentially élitist continues to carry weight, even 
though he saw middle axioms as contrary to the status quo. 
 
 
For those who share Barth‟s perspective, Preston‟s whole premise is at fault. The 
very attempt to make theology relevant and to bring its insights to bear on 
economics is seriously flawed, because it assumes that the world is not inimical 
to Christianity. This is itself predicated upon Reinhold Niebuhr‟s understanding of 
original sin, a doctrine of creation and an „anthropology of liberty‟ over against 
matters of ecclesiology and Christology (Long, 2000:12, chapters 3-4). From 
such a standpoint, Preston‟s whole emphasis on devoting such significance to 
the supposed „facts‟ of economic data is regarded as highly questionable. We 
shall explore more of this criticism below. 
 
Viewed from today‟s vantage point, Preston‟s approach has a rather quaint feel 
to it, for it seems to reflect an age where differences could gently be hammered 
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out, though in fact Preston was acutely aware of the prevalence of conflict in the 
ethical process. Despite this awareness, Preston‟s optimism about the 
possibilities of consensus between different disciplines, and his failure to 
acknowledge the plurality of opinion within those disciplines, not lest the Christian 
tradition, now seem naïve. He had little chance to respond to the phenomenon of 
globalisation, nor to the collapse of the communist economies of central and 
eastern Europe. The deregulation of international financial markets that has 
arguably transformed the nature of global capitalism went unremarked. Preston 
now appears to have been overly confident about the prospects for establishing a 
consensus or finding common ground with potential partners (M. Taylor, 2004b: 
202). He did not however see the emergence of plurality as a threat to his 
approach, and was not unduly concerned at the phenomenon of post-
modernism, which in turn helps to explain his lack of attention to the panoply of 
perspectives and solutions that emerge today. As such, Preston‟s work appears 
very much limited by the experiences of the middle of the twentieth century, 
rather than its end. His writing now seems very modernist, and hence the 
common question today – who are the „we‟? - is not addressed, though Preston 
seems to assume it equates to mainstream society (Northcott, 2004: 107).18 
 
A persistent question that issues from the above discussion concerns Preston‟s 
insistence on there being no direct path from biblical sources or doctrine to 
ethical conclusions, because „there is always the possibility of other Christians 
                                            
18
 The point is also made by Boyle (2003) Selby (1997) and M. Brown (2004a). 
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making the same incomprehensible leap from a particular text to a different 
conclusion‟ (1981: 44). He argued that exceptions to this were rare instances in 
history, amongst which were the abolition of slavery, opposition to Nazism and 
apartheid. Others, however, argue that the economic order is also a „confessional 
matter‟ as its values are inimical to those of Jesus. Preston‟s greatest legacy may 
be his high regard for the autonomy of the secular, and his reserve in moving 
simplistically from text or doctrine to ethics. Despite this, Preston‟s liberal 
approach of reconciling differing disciplines together is now inadequate. It does 
not question sufficiently the bias towards the powerful implicit in reliance upon 
experts, and it assumes a high level of consensus in society and in the Church 
that now appears untenable. However, the liberal approach has been developed 
by others in ways that seek to counter the threat of pluralism by invoking a theory 
of rights, as a means of demonstrating that a sufficient degree of consensus is 
possible. 
 
Modifications to liberalism: Raymond Plant & Hans Küng 
 
Plant is Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Philosophy at King‟s College, 
London, and a member of the House of Lords. He has long opposed the 
argument that ethical principles cannot be introduced into the field of economics 
on the grounds that markets are value-free and impersonal constructions. He has 
argued cogently that a rights-based approach to theological engagement is 
indeed realistic and philosophically defensible.  He accepts the reality of moral 
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pluralism, and the difficulties in making links between the realms of the universal 
and particular, concrete situations but, nonetheless, proposes that the disciplines 
of theology and ethics can make meaningful engagements with capitalism. Plant 
shares with Preston a deep regard for the contribution of secular disciplines, and 
rejects any imposition of theology on to economics. He too seeks a middle 
ground in which consensus may be found, but whereas Preston found this 
through middle axioms, Plant seeks the establishment of certain rights. 
 
One of Plant‟s major concerns is to affirm the introducing of rights into politics 
and economics, bearing in mind the reality of pluralism. One major aspect of this 
is the problem of reconciling the universal and the particular, or the „thin‟ and 
„thick‟ moralities respectively. Thin moralities are minimalist but common across 
cultures, traditions and generations; thick ones are contextually derived and 
constrained, local and temporary. Plant finds the impasse between the universal 
and the particular to be difficult, yet he does suggest a way of proceeding that 
does justice to both perspectives. Ethical intervention in the economic and 
political process will require, because of pluralism, the recognition that people 
have differing claims concerning virtues such as truth, and different perceptions 
of what is good and just. At the same time, however, such ethics will have to 
relate to the particular contexts in which people find themselves, and yet also 
provide a framework which allows different people to accept some kind of value 
framework which they can hold in common. 
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Narrative theologians dismiss the idea that theories based on the concept of 
rights can be used as the moral foundation in society because they are too 
abstract; a theory of human rights is too accommodating to secular culture. 
Rawls‟ theory of justice, established on the basis that something may be deemed 
to be just if it were the option chosen by a person ignorant of their own position in 
relation to it, is deemed to be flawed because it ignores the moral traditions and 
cultural factors that motivate people to act; it assumes that morality is free-
standing of context. Walzer (1994) advocates a more complex version of equality 
by considering the differing „spheres of influence‟ and arguing against the 
intrusive dominance of any one over others. (The way in which money has 
become the measure of value, and the commercialisation of culture would be 
examples.) Plant‟s critical observation on this is that, despite the difficulties and 
criticisms from many areas, some types of principle are needed to oversee the 
way in which these different „spheres‟ interact. He believes that it is invalid to 
argue that one can have the „right before the good‟ without invoking some notion 
of what the „good‟ is; the fact that plural, moral communities would have different 
views on this concept does not make it invalid. 
 
If universalist claims cannot be made, due to the difficulties associated with 
pluralism and postmodernism, Plant wonders whether it is nonetheless possible 
to contract a pattern for engagement which is based upon the particular context 
and tradition, but does not degenerate into abusive value judgements being 
made by these differing communities upon each other. He offers a way forward 
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which is based on the assumption that, even amid a plethora of different world-
views and cultural settings, it is possible for some minimal set of values to 
emerge which can be held in common. Upon such value sets a framework can 
be established which opens up avenues for collective action and common 
interests: 
 
„A common world of value can only be achieved, if indeed at all, by 
dialogue and deliberation. It is not a matter of establishing a priori 
metaphysical principles and making deductions from them.‟(Plant, 2001: 
358) 
 
 
Theologically Plant draws on two particular themes from the Christian tradition: 
the kingdom of God and the incarnation. Jesus‟ teaching on the kingdom 
indicates that it is fundamentally about human equality, and that it consists of a 
community of persons who enjoy relationship with God and each other.  The 
incarnational strand directs Christians to attend to the actual, concrete 
experiences of people (on matters such as freedom, for example, so that 
attention is placed on subjective feelings about whether one is free or not) rather 
than abstract or theoretical propositions. As an example of a concept based on 
the use of rights, he develops the idea of citizenship as a means of advocating a 
way of empowering the poor in a market economy. Plant argues for rights 
conveying entitlements but not absolute, full provision. Thus he argues for a 
fairer distribution of power and resources, but realises the impossibility of 
achieving perfect parity. Although he does not use the term, Plant‟s approach is 
reformist and concerned with the interim rather than general propositions. He 
149 
 
thus arrives at a defence for the use of markets but argues that they ought to be 
regulated carefully. 
 
 
A striking criticism Plant makes is that the theological response to the New Right 
has often been ignored because it has not taken sufficient account of their 
arguments about freedom and justice. The Church tends to use these as slogans 
but does not engage in the detail; he says that we need to go beyond using 
justice as a concept toward a debate as to which conceptions of justice ought to 
obtain (Plant, 2001: 219, 221). This was a major failing of the „Faith in the City‟ 
report; it made assumptions that people would have a common understanding of 
the meaning of terms such as freedom, community and justice, and did not 
explore either these or the criteria by which justice in resource distribution could 
be assessed (Plant et al, 1989: chapter 4). To economic neo-liberals the entire 
notion of social justice is illusory and consequently rejected. To them freedom is 
important because, understood as the absence of coercion, a free person is able 
to pursue his or her own interests and thus achieve fulfilment. For others, 
however, its importance lies in one‟s ability to achieve particular goals. There is 
therefore a link between freedom and ones‟ ability to have access to the 
provision of resources: 
 
„Freedom is defined and understood in terms of the lived, material 
experience of all – and particularly the poor. So poverty feels like 
unfreedom and is unfreedom; and in a rich society poverty feels like 
injustice – and is injustice….[it is] an understanding of freedom 
being defined in terms of the ability to make real choices; and for 
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these choices to be made, basic economic resources are essential.‟ 
(Plant, 1989: 93) 
 
 
Speaking of the New Right thinkers, Plant states: 
 
 
„If our theological resource cannot deal with arguments which go to 
the heart of human freedom, the nature of social processes like 
markets, and nature of community and indirect approaches to 
poverty, then we deserve not to be taken seriously by those people, 
many of whom are sincere Christians, who espouse these ideas at 
least implicitly.‟ (1989: 77-8) 
 
 
A common rebuttal to the proposition of rights in economics, such as the right to 
education, employment, shelter or health, is that these positive rights are hard to 
fulfil.  Where does one draw the line at how much medical care a dying person 
can receive, or how much education is sufficient for a student? Such rights can 
appear unlimited in scope, but actually this is not the case. On the other hand, 
negative rights – the right not to be killed, to be uncoerced and unmolested - are 
easier to effect. Plant points out that, firstly, negative rights can also be unlimited; 
the right to privacy, or to personal security from terrorism are examples where it 
is difficult to find universal, objective notions of what in practice this means, and 
the lengths to which measures must go in order to ensure the protection of these 
rights. They, too, can be costly and ultimately insufficient (Plant, 2001: 243). It is 
wrong to categorise positive rights as expensive and unbounded and negative 
ones as efficient and limited. Secondly, Plant shows that although these positive 
rights cannot easily be limited in a universal way, nevertheless political 
compromise is a perfectly possible means by which consensus can be obtained 
as to, for instance, the level of health provision that can be assured. In the case 
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of education, an example of such a consensual decision might be the adoption of 
the national curriculum as a minimum requirement. Naturally more could be 
provided, and some will argue that it indeed should, but this is one example of a 
possible scenario. In order to effect positive rights satisfactorily, one needs to 
recognise that they are discretionary; someone, somewhere, has to make a 
decision about priorities and limitations on that right. In addition, because of 
scarcity the positive right must be feasible if it is to be regarded as a right at all; in 
a sense, rights are competing with each other amid limited resources, so 
judgements need to be made as to which ones to pursue. This decision about the 
allocation of positive rights is not based primarily on anything intrinsic to the right 
itself, but reflects a matter of practical politics or ethics, such as utilitarianism or 
consequentialism in which the anticipated successfulness of the right will be a 
major factor. 
 
Hans Küng‟s approach bears many similarities to Plant‟s, for he also seeks a 
middle level in which dialogue may occur. In the face of social, economic and 
political changes wrought by globalisation, Küng (1997) reasons that a global 
ethic is required in response, one that is able to carry a wide consensus across 
different cultures, traditions and faiths. Such a consensus is inevitably a rather 
minimal one, confined to those aspects of morality Küng terms „elementary‟, 
rather analogous to Walzer‟s „thin‟ morality  - which is more universal and 
uncluttered by cultural differentiation.  
 
152 
 
Küng advocates a balance between ideals and realities, but one that is in 
constant flux. He accepts that certain disciplines have their own autonomy 
distinct from theology, and does not wish to see matters of politics or economics 
dictated by ethical considerations alone, which in the extreme case produces an 
inflexible dogmatism. On the other hand, neither should secular disciplines be the 
sole determinant of what is considered practical (the danger of „erosive 
relativism‟). Küng calls for ethical responsibility which is the product of 
engagement that is both constructive and yet critical. Ultimately the supreme 
criterion is not realism however, but rather what ought to prevail: human well-
being and the possibilities of human development. Indeed, when considering the 
possibilities for future human development and sustainability, Küng argues that 
there are severe deficiencies in relying upon rational thought, since not only is 
reason prone to the distorting perspective of vested interests, but also 
environmental sustainability requires prioritisation, demanding cultural 
considerations in addition to political and economic ones. Küng‟s ethic is wider 
than simply a matter of rationally weighing up possible options in a 
conseqentialist fashion. His global ethic is universal, reflecting a commitment to 
human well-being that embraces all peoples, perspectives and even generations. 
In assuming a consensus on such matters, however, Küng does not offer 
guidance on how one may weight competing types of priorities, and this is a 
major weakness. 
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In Plant we see a philosophical justification for the use of rights within political 
and theological discourse, which is faithful to the contextual and the particular. 
He advocates a pragmatic model for engagement in which the moral issues 
remain at the heart of the debate, but are not used as superior to or different from 
other issues that will be raised. Both he and Küng believe a minimal consensus 
around certain issues (the poor and well-being) is possible. The critical test is 
whether their approach can actually be translated into specific arenas of policy 
and practice. We see in Plant and Küng a reformation of Christian social 
liberalism that takes pluralism seriously, and a use of rights that emerges from 
within the dialogue rather than one which is used as a super-contextual principle. 
This is of great significance, for as we shall see, the extent to which rights can be 
introduced into theological-economic discourse is highly relevant to the Jubilee 
debt campaign. 
 
Radical voices of anti-liberalism: theology ‘above’ political economy 
 
We now turn to consider one group of theologians which I term „anti-liberal‟, 
which has defined itself by opposition to liberalism, rather than by the attempt to 
reform it. Here the work of Long (2000), Hauerwas (1981), Meeks (1989), 
Milbank (1990) and Gorringe (1994) are particularly significant, as they represent 
key components of a broader theological stance that often combines the desire 
for prophetic distinctiveness with a radical return to pre-Enlightenment theological 
insights. The central thrust of their criticism is that the liberal approach assumes 
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an unduly positive understanding of the world, and is evident in the credence 
placed on secular insights and the value of dialogue. This represents a 
theological failure to appraise both the world, but moreover, of the gospel of 
Jesus Christ who came to the world to bring redemption. The consequence of 
this failure is an indistinct theological engagement which, without realising it, 
merely reflects the values of the world in which it is set.    
 
This failure has two causal factors. The first is that its use of secular reasoning 
and knowledge is itself an integral part of the prevailing social and economic 
culture; it is not as objective and value-free as liberals often suppose. The 
second factor is that the liberal approach‟s tolerant disposition and acceptance of 
secular values have led it to afford other perspectives an uncritical and unmerited 
validity. This has led it to become reluctant to engender a response which is 
distinctively Christian, with little or no discernible difference that Christian belief 
makes to the outcome. Theology appears to be added as a kind of appendix 
rather than being fundamental to the entire process.  Another consequence of 
this uncritical attitude is that liberalism is too closely wedded to the influence of 
the wealthy and the powerful, and incapable of distancing itself. By entering into 
dialogue with specialists who often represent powerful interests, and because it 
relies overly on secular wisdom, such a theology is unable to maintain a critical 
attitude. The result is capitulation, and an inherently conservative attitude. Indeed 
Milbank, the most trenchant opponent of the liberal approach, argues that since 
there is no morally neutral „rationality‟, reason provides no basis for distinguishing 
155 
 
between the competing claims of the Christian faith and secular forms of 
knowledge, and that the touchstone for such judgments is instead found in the 
ability of each narrative to be persuasive (1997: chapter 10; Roberts, 1997: 709). 
The liberal approach is caught between the Scylla of idolatrous syncretism and 
the Charybdis of such rarified insight as to place itself beyond rational criticism. 
Its view of post-Enlightenment secular thought is far too optimistic, ignores its 
reliance on an underlying strata of Hobbesian conflict between persons, and 
naïvely believes that power – which is always coercive – can be accommodated 
in the pursuit of the good.28 
  
A different approach to political economy must therefore be found, one which 
does not make the same errors as the dialogical approach of liberalism. In doing 
so, theology must establish a different disposition in which theological insights 
take precedence. Thus for example, Hauerwas argues that the task of theological 
reflection is not so much to enter into dialogue with the world as to confront the 
world with truth; the task of the Christian community is not to understand the 
world but to display a distinctively different character that stands in opposition to 
contemporary culture. The distinctiveness of the Christian community forms the 
basis of Hauerwas‟ ethic. Scripture is not open to application precisely because it 
is not designed to help describe or understand the world; nor can one extrapolate 
principles concerning the kingdom of God, because this ignores the essential 
eschatological character of Scripture (Hauerwas, 1981: 44). The purpose of such 
                                            
28
 On the issue of power, see Milbank (1985; 1990: 2-5, 282) 
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texts is to declare the things of God, and to urge the transformation of the world 
through that confrontation. The Church‟s role is to set itself apart from society in 
order that it might be faithful in witness and demonstrate clearly the life of God‟s 
kingdom within its own interior life. Its task is not political involvement but the 
challenging of the moral values and assumptions of politics and society.  
 
“the way the church must always respond to the challenge of our polity is 
to be herself. This does not involve a rejection of the world, or a 
withdrawal from the world; rather it is a reminder that the church must 
serve the world on her own terms.” (Hauerwas, 1981: 85) 
 
Long similarly argues that the role of the Church is not to dispense instructions 
but to offer an alternative metric to the world‟s assumptions and values 
concerning global capitalism. A renewed emphasis on theological questions 
concerning issues of purpose and fidelity to Christ‟s mission thus replaces the 
narrower questions of economics, which is concerned solely about profits and 
usefulness: ecclesiology acts as the foundation for theological reflection. This 
ecclesiological perspective becomes the lens through which the world is 
interpreted, for it cannot truly be understood in isolation, separated from 
consideration of the things of God. This approach is self-referential, for notions of 
objectivity or disinterestedness are dismissed. Theology is afforded primacy in its 
engagement with other disciplines, for although economic data and theory can be 
useful, theologians cannot „meet economics on their methodological terms 
without sacrificing the content of theology, which is that the true end of creation is 
friendship with God‟ (Long, 2000: 3).  
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For Long, the key criteria for ethical judgement on economics are determined by 
how they contribute to the life of God. His reflection upon economics begins with 
consideration of the threefold „distinct transcendental predicate‟ of truth, 
goodness and beauty which features in creation and is prior to human decision-
making. He desires a return to the fusion of theology and ethics, in which a 
determinedly confessional approach advocates a foundation upon evangelical 
law, the recovery of the virtues, and a view of humanity‟s purpose as the 
enjoyment of „happiness in the vision of God‟ among others (2000: 69). 
Distinctions between fact and value and between the ethical „is‟ and „ought‟, so 
much a staple of the liberal approach, are rendered invalid. This is because they 
are based on the assumption that knowledge is derived from processes 
completely divorced from historical embodiment; in pursuing this assumption, 
liberal theology has lost its capacity to stand outside the prevailing culture, and 
ends up being little more than a critique of various data. As theological reflection, 
it has capitulated to culture and has nothing to offer. 
 
A common characteristic of all these anti-liberal approaches is that they question 
the assumptions of the discipline of economics, arguing that its premises are 
flawed and narrow in their understanding of the human person. They argue that 
the correct approach would be to re-order the entire theological approach and 
begin, not with economic insights of resource distribution, but with the theological 
truths concerning the good life, and how the biblical tradition envisages social 
relations and human flourishing. 
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Meeks‟ approach is based on the priority of theological truth over other insights, 
and he develops a strong argument for an ethic that is needs-based, derived 
from the biblical record of social, political and economic relations.  He posits a 
sharply contrasting economics to that of contemporary capitalism, based upon a 
Trinitarian understanding which, as „a community of diverse persons‟, exemplifies 
divine righteousness. The entry point for Meeks into the field of a theological 
economics is found through the concept of the oikos (the household, from which 
the term economics is derived). A household economy is based primarily on the 
needs of the people within that environment, not abstract theories. It is the 
household that provides access to livelihood, hence Meeks establishes the 
principle of inclusion for all into the means whereby life may be sustained and 
each may contribute to the wider community – the household in the era of market 
capitalism.  
 
With regard to capitalism, particularly its more global manifestations, the 
criticisms are acute. For Gorringe, the nature of the economy and the lack of any 
ethical consensus means that humanity faces two stark choices, life or death, as 
did the people of Israel (Deut. 30:15): this is a clear confessional issue of right 
and wrong. The way of death is manifest in the economic order, as shown by 
oppression, „concealed tyranny‟ and ecological disaster. By contrast, the only 
alternative is the way of life characterised by cooperation, equality and ecology; 
the Church is called to be a „resistance movement against death‟. 
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Global capitalism is a system that is self-centred, where profit equates to greed, 
and inequalities between people caused by the market economy are accepted as 
normative. Gorringe challenges the idolatry at the heart of mainstream 
economics that wealth creation is the panacea for all social and economic 
problems; he rejects the entire process by which money has become the means 
of establishing value, and is manufactured as credit by the banks. Gorringe also 
dismisses the notion that economics is in any way scientific, by which he means 
a discipline that it has predictive, investigative and evaluative qualities. He warns 
that the moral relativism that is permissive in matters of value but not in 
supposedly matters of fact in, for instance, science, represents an abdication of 
truth (1994: 5). Economics is far from value-free. Rather, the discipline of 
economics consists merely of theories; at the level of practice the financial 
system is abusive and corrupt. At the real heart of economics is the issue of 
power: the discipline that chooses to call itself „political economy‟ rather than 
„economics‟ has at least recognised this, in contrast to today‟s tendency – alleges 
Gorringe - to regard economics in narrow, reductionist terms. 
 
The basis of capitalism in economic growth, measured by financial instruments 
such as money, ignores other ways in which value is recognised: capitalism‟s 
reductionist pursuit of monetary value excludes the social and cultural aspects of 
individual and collective human endeavour and meaning. Its fascination with 
growth becomes idolatrous, and the damage it wreaks on the vulnerable and the 
earth‟s ecology is often masked by its own unscientific logic. In order to sustain 
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growth, much emphasis is placed on creating ever new markets for goods, 
thereby introducing artificial needs to fuel consumerism. In this sense capitalism 
is inherently false, for it does not attend to genuine human needs or desires, but 
self-deludedly offers the pretence of doing just that. 
 
Meeks identifies the psychological and spiritual emptiness at the heart of much 
consumerism, where the purchase of items is used vainly to substitute for the 
non-commodities of love and self-esteem. In this regard he is genuinely 
prophetic, uncovering the layers of illusion and artificiality that surround 
supposed „needs‟. He wishes to overturn the prevailing view of human beings as 
natural and insatiable desirers of commodities, for many of our so-called „needs‟ 
are in fact manufactured by the market (for example, through advertising) and 
distort the picture we have of ourselves. Meeks frequently uses the language of 
falsehood and illusion: much that is significant about global capitalism is „masked‟ 
from everyday sight:  
 
„... scarcity as a starting point will always produce an oikos in which some 
are excluded from the means of life.‟ (1989: 94) 
 
 
Meeks distinguishes between scarcity and insufficiency, for he acknowledges 
that some goods and resources are in short supply. However, scarcity is a 
product manufactured, almost always, of human injustice, where people‟s needs 
are deliberately manipulated to serve commercial ends; it is not a natural 
phenomenon. The most critical shortage is of opportunity to access goods and 
service – this is the real scarcity. Worst of all for Meeks, contemporary 
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economics assumes that our needs can never be met, because we will always 
be demanding (needing) more, and that this is an inevitable, irreducible fact of 
human life. By contrast, Meeks argues, classical economics believed that needs 
were limited and could be fulfilled. Indeed, Aristotle and the early Church 
believed that God‟s gracious provision was sufficient for everyone to enjoy life. 
Modern economics inevitably leads to the exclusion of some from the 
„household‟: 
„Life in the triune community of righteousness destroys false senses of 
scarcity...‟ 
 
„... in general, the biblical faith teaches that there is enough if the 
righteousness of God is present and acknowledged as the source of life.‟ 
(Meeks, 1989: 174)  
 
The fact of our creation by a loving God implies that humanity is provided with 
adequate resources for all to experience access to livelihood. Hence problems of 
scarcity are really issues of inadequate or unjust distribution of resources, often 
masquerading as genuine shortages. Meeks does acknowledge that there is not 
a plentiful supply of every resource, but he objects to the equation linking 
economic definitions of scarcity with actual shortages. His assumption about 
adequate resources leads him to argue that an economy geared openly along 
the lines of God‟s justice will be able to deliver resources to meet the needs of 
all. By „needs‟ are meant basic needs, rather than those artificially induced by the 
present economic system. He is highly critical of economic theories that are 
based upon the more effective distribution of scarce resources. He therefore 
questions this basis and its outworking in the form of such matters as property 
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rights and employment policies. Instead, Meeks advocates a needs-based 
approach that places the demands of livelihood first; these are not manufactured 
desires, but basic needs that can easily be identified and which transcend the 
particularities of time and place: food, shelter, security and work. Thus his 
approach is founded on ensuring provision to meet the needs of the poor, not 
only for physical survival, but also for their role of contributing to the wider 
community. In pursuit of this Meeks advocates reform of property rights that bars 
absolute, exclusive rights in favour of communal ones.  
 
Gorringe is indebted not only to MacIntyre‟s critique of the lack of moral virtue in 
contemporary society, but also to Levinas for a reformulated natural law 
theology. In the latter, ethics are derived from human experience and the sanctity 
of life, and then moulded through accumulated learning, communal life and 
prophecy. This has as its foundation, the „face of the Other‟ through the personal 
encounter with fellow human beings, and especially with the stranger, the one in 
need. The ways in which people relate to each other are the grounding for ethical 
judgments because in these encounters the divine is manifest. Human beings, he 
argues, are defined more by their ability to love than their capacity to create or for 
their rational characteristics.  
 
Knowledge gained from the discipline and practice of economics is subservient to 
the requirements of prophecy (Gorringe, 1994: 19). Prophecy functions both as 
an analytical tool and as messianic inspiration, so that it can both challenge the 
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status quo and offer new proposals, but critically it also opens up the imagination 
to more speculative scenarios. Hope is therefore the „critical principle of ethics‟ 
because it prevents the future being closed, and avenues being dismissed as 
seemingly unrealistic. Vision, in the form of „concrete utopias‟ is essential 
because the future bears on the present and shapes it (Gorringe, 1994: 127). 
The kingdom of God is ethical proclamation in that it describes how people ought 
to live. That „all are one in Christ‟ leads directly to egalitarianism and a revolution 
of grace, symbolised in the sharing of the Eucharist rather than to merit and 
deserving. Righteousness will not be achieved where sectors of the population 
are ignored, excluded, or made to bear the burden for others. Christian ethics is 
intimately bound up with the means by which the ends are accomplished, for as 
Gorringe states, „we cannot arrive at a truly human situation by treading on the 
generations on the way‟ (1994: 56). There is in Gorringe a strong reliance on 
human interdependence: we are created as a society, as a body and consequent 
on this interdependence is that one part is no more deserving than another.  
 
It follows from this that natural inequalities in wealth and wages should be 
opposed. Exchange needs to be based on gift rather than contract; interactions 
that deny or impair relationships, such as the confines of monetary transactions, 
serve only to cause alienation and commodification. The proper function of 
money, as a means of enabling people to transact business, needs to be 
restored, replacing its current usage as a kind of exchange of information, a 
mechanism for easing exchange of goods. According to this approach, the 
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disparities of power in structures of management and supervision should be 
changed, and the concept of property needs to become more communally 
focussed; yet few specific proposals are advocated or the means to establish 
these outlined. None of these general proposals, Gorringe argues, are utopian in 
the sense of being fanciful. Essentially he advocates a similar approach to 
Meeks, distilling the economic injunctions of scripture as equally valid today as 
then, and challenging the fundamental assumptions behind mainstream 
economics.  
 
Although there are inevitable differences of emphasis, we can characterise the 
anti-liberal approach by its opposition to the uncritical way the liberal approach 
has embraced secular knowledge, and by its claims that theology‟s privileged 
essence confers a position of dominance „above‟ other forms of knowledge. 
Theology issues a challenge to the world to embody the life of the divine 
kingdom, but addresses it as it should be, not as it really is. Although the anti-
liberal approach reveals the limitations of human knowledge and the way human 
systems can deceive its operatives, and although it is right to question the narrow 
equation of human well-being with economic growth, the chief failing of this 
approach is its lack of appreciation of the world in which theology and Christian 
social ethics are worked out.  
 
As we have seen, Meeks‟ perspective is that since God is Creator and since that 
creation is good in every sense, within God‟s creation there are all the resources 
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required for human livelihood to flourish and be enjoyed by all.41 It is one thing to 
state a theological principle, but quite another to deduce practical applications 
from this without reference to the realities of human affairs in the realms of 
economic and political.  Theologically, Meeks‟ chief error is to equate the 
goodness of creation with a perfect environment without reference to human 
finitude – the unavoidable limitations of knowledge, organisation, and resource 
distribution. His refusal to acknowledge the stark reality of the relative scarcity 
that follows from this, is based on the assumption that such obstacles can indeed 
be overcome, and that because they can be, they should be. In Meeks‟ view it is 
only human inefficiency and injustice that prevent full access to livelihood rather 
than anything more fundamental about the human condition and society. An 
appreciation of the importance of these limitations would seek measures and 
policies to minimise their damaging effects. Because he does not acknowledge 
that resources are actually scarce, he sees no reason for competitive behaviour 
or conflict. Brown advocates a stronger sense of the „not-yet‟ aspect of Gods 
kingdom would be a helpful counter-balance here. 
 
The anti-liberal understanding of the individual human being is also deficient. 
Meeks accurately focuses on basic needs as paramount for a sense of 
happiness and security. Yet nowhere in his work does he see human activity as 
devoted to anything but the provision of essential needs. He does not 
acknowledge the inquisitive aspect of human endeavour in exploring and using 
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 „God‟s gracious goodness gives enough, more than enough, for everyone in the household to 
live abundantly.‟ Meeks (1989: 94)  
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the resources (material, intellectual, social, cultural) of creation. Thus no mention 
is made of scientific exploration such as advancements in technology and 
medicine. In this sense, Meeks‟s concept of livelihood is deficient. There is often 
a focus on the fair distribution of economic resources, but the additional need for 
wealth creation is ignored. Meeks would appear to hold to a static view of 
economics and human flourishing, rather than a developmental one. (He asserts 
that in an egalitarian society, wealth is absent; this is a fundamental mistake, 
conflating wealth with money.) The concept of diminishing marginal utility is 
similarly left unacknowledged; this describes the phenomenon whereby the more 
resources one has, the lower will be the increment of satisfaction from obtaining 
progressively more of them.43 The absence of this insight suggests that Meeks‟ 
view of human flourishing does not relate to the empirical evidence about some, 
at least, of the ways in which human beings find satisfaction. In other words, the 
relationship between the provision of resources and consequent personal 
satisfaction is not as linear as Meeks supposes. We therefore conclude that 
Meeks‟ premise, based on the assumption of smooth delivery of resources 
without hindrance or diminishment, is utopian. A final weakness of the anti-liberal 
approach is the lack of specific proposals, and the absence of establishing 
intermediate steps toward the new economic order, other than a revolutionary re-
starting of entire economic and social processes.  
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 This phenomenon is described in Galbraith (1999a: 118); also Atherton (1992: 43) At its heart 
is the notion that value is determined not from the object‟s usefulness per se but from its marginal 
(last or least wanted) one. 
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Anti-liberals would reject these criticisms, for the crux of such a critique lies with 
opposing notions of theological argument. One either uses secular knowledge 
and reasoning, and thus become liable to the above charges from the anti-
liberals, or one adopts a contrary stance in which theology dictates the terms of 
its engagement with the world. In regard to the lack of specific proposals, this 
issue becomes a debate over what is actually possible. Liberals may find the 
anti-liberal approach utopian, but will face the counter-charge that notions of 
what is realistic are confined by prevailing cultural norms. Therefore, the 
argument goes, the more radical alternative is the only one capable of offering 
genuine change for the better. This takes us back to Gorringe‟s argument over 
the role of hope in Christian ethics. As we shall see in later chapters, the Jubilee 
debt campaign‟s work proves to be particularly relevant to this particular 
discussion.  
 
Post-liberal responses: John Atherton and theology ‘with’ political economy 
 
John Atherton is an honorary lecturer at Manchester University, secretary of the 
William Temple Foundation, and retired canon theologian of Manchester 
Cathedral. He has been concerned with the plight and experience of the poor 
throughout his research and ministry as an Anglican priest. In the years since he 
wrote The Scandal of Poverty (1983) his views have undergone considerable 
change, a transition he readily acknowledges. For him, the most important issue 
by far is now the matter of the interaction between the Christian faith and the 
global market economy. Atherton accepts that the advent of a plural world has 
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abolished the rationale for any grand narrative and introduces uncertainties about 
the precise nature of the truths that can be brought to the discussion; 
additionally, he recognises that globalisation has brought many new features into 
the nature and dynamics of market economics. The phenomenon of globalisation 
is, paradoxically, not a monolithic one but contradictory, and a creator of „plural 
modernities‟.  
 
Atherton was moulded in the social ethical tradition of Ronald Preston, but now 
sees the need for a completely new approach of open interaction, rather than a 
reformulation of the liberal approach from which he originates. Like Preston, 
Atherton asserts the autonomy of secular disciplines such as economics, though 
significantly, he asserts that it is always a relative autonomy. This relative aspect 
means that any one group or party has no monopoly on knowledge or truth; all 
human models and conceptions are limited and partial. Accordingly, Atherton is 
highly critical of approaches that place either economics or theology in any 
position of dominance. He is adamant that a new methodology is necessary, 
since the deductive process of moving from theological principles to social 
application is no longer valid. What is more, this approach fails to give proper 
attention to the issues raised by the market economy and the related plural 
nature of society, and consequently advocates solutions that seem to belong to a 
former age. In other words, anti-liberal approaches are unrealistic, and their 
ethics are based upon what „ought‟ to obtain while failing to address the „is‟ of 
present realities. Hence Atherton condemns the theological right and left and 
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regards both approaches as inadequate. Radical orthodoxy, which Atherton 
(2003b: 176) describes as promoting „late medieval neo-Thomist economics‟, 
and seeks a contribution that is distinctively Christian, represents the return to a 
new kind of Christendom that rejects any genuinely interactive conversation with 
economics. Radical theologies of liberation are also considered inadequate, their 
critical failing being the refusal to accept certain features autonomous to the 
discipline of economics, such as scarcity. Liberation theology prefers to make the 
foundational assumption of plenitude and in doing so, subordinates economics to 
theological principles that Atherton terms as simply „empirically inaccurate‟ 
(2003b: 112).  
 
Malcolm Brown‟s work (M. Brown, 2004a) also offers possible directions for a 
post-liberal approach to theological engagement with economics.56 In his model 
of „dialogic traditionalism‟ Brown advocates a view of liberalism as one tradition 
among others, within which lies the seeds of an approach that transcends the 
boundaries of its own tradition. As such, it is not exclusive but committed to the 
principle of dialogue. Following MacIntyre, in discerning certain virtues within this 
tradition, Brown is able to construct a model for engagement that addresses the 
concerns of plurality, yet manages to remain faithful to the basic instincts of 
classic, Christian social liberalism. Drawing partly on Markham (1994), Brown 
gives examples of such virtues: tolerance of difference; commitment to the 
pursuit of (objective) truth through dialogue; God‟s self-revelation as an ongoing 
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 Brown, formerly of the William Temple Foundation, is now Director of Mission and Public Affairs 
for the Church of England.  
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process; the incarnational premise that it is the world that is the locus of God‟s 
salvation; and the commitment to material improvement rather than waiting for 
some future divine irruption into history (2007: 59). All such virtues are, of course, 
contextually located and rooted in a particular tradition; they do not possess a 
para-tradition quality, but they do lead to conversation that is tradition-
transcending. Since Brown argues that the distinctiveness so essential to 
confessional theologians lies not in the uniqueness of a particular virtue but 
rather in its authentic derivation within Christian theology, his approach presumes 
that it is therefore possible, through such tradition-transcending conversation, to 
reach moral agreement on certain matters. In such cases, no tradition has 
imposed itself on any other, and the outcome cannot be deemed coercive of any 
party; therefore, the alleged dichotomy between free markets on the one hand 
and moral coercion on the other, is exposed as false. 
 
One can distinguish four features that comprise Atherton‟s approach to 
theological engagement with political economy. Not all the features need be 
present simultaneously, but together they are hallmarks of an engagement that is 
effective in both the particular and the universal, and also across the differences 
between local context and the wider economy. 
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(a) An inter-disciplinary approach 
 
Atherton‟s foundational attitude is the relative autonomy of disciplines and, as 
noted above, this leads to the acknowledgment that genuine truth resides with 
secular disciplines as with religious ones. In particular among these disciplines, 
Atherton emphasises what Sen terms the „engineering‟ aspect of economics: the 
scientifically-based, positive, technical corpus of information which is based upon 
objectivity and rationality of thought. Examples from economics would be the 
doctrines of relative scarcity and the law of diminishing marginal utility. The fact 
that this autonomy is relative means that all disciplines are not completely 
distinct, but that secular culture and religious traditions permeate them all. No 
discipline can therefore be described as value-free, although Atherton would 
nevertheless accept the autonomous truth of many technical aspects of 
economics. Despite this, Atherton is wary of allowing these aspects to dominate, 
for this would lead to dialogue becoming subsumed into a discussion of technical 
matters alone.  
 
A consequence of the ubiquitous nature of external influences within these 
different disciplines is that there are areas of overlap between the fields of 
influence that they contain. An example of these influences within other 
disciplines might be the way legal matters such as the rule of law, or property 
rights, impact on economics; or political issues such as sovereignty have a 
bearing on regional economics (such as the Eurozone); or philosophical insights 
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on objectivity raise questions for scientific methodology. Accordingly, Atherton 
seeks to identify the points of connection – the overlap of consensus – which 
forms the basis of his insistence on an inter-disciplinary approach. He wants to 
reconnect ethics and economics, and suggests ways of broadening the agenda 
in terms of how we view human beings, not as isolated individuals but as persons 
within networks (Atherton, 2003b: 149). 
   
Because the world is plural an interdisciplinary approach is vital, and Atherton 
views the arena for investigation as comprising political economy rather than 
mere economics, for the global market economy cannot be analysed or 
understood without reference to politics, ecology, democracy, and poverty. There 
is thus a huge interactive relationship between the market and challenges such 
as poverty and the environment; moreover the actual nature of this relationship 
deserves critical attention. The old way of bringing two disciplines together in 
order to generate some middle ground, in which the disciplines remain relatively 
unchallenged by each other, is redundant, and one needs to realise that 
theological and ethical matters impinge upon both market and challenges: 
 
„... an ethical dimension is inextricably part of all these aspects of the 
market economy, including the mechanisms. It can never be relegated to 
the function of the challenges.‟ (Atherton, 1992: 265-6)  
 
The nature of the market, the challenges, and their relationship with each other 
are all so varied and complex that they cannot be reduced to a simple dialectical 
model as witnessed in the classic liberal tradition, or indeed the more explicitly 
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faith-based models. In the wake of the liberal tradition‟s demise, what emerges is 
a process of „open interaction‟ between the market and the „challenges‟, the 
pressing issues.   
 
(b) Pragmatism 
 
One consequence of Atherton‟s acceptance of the plural nature of society is that 
he remains sceptical about the absolute certainty of all claims to truth. Because 
no one truth claim can be completely adequate, partly because he realises other 
perspectives also contain truth, Atherton takes a principled stand against 
ideologically-derived solutions. He rejects the attempt at any blueprint or grand 
solution as intrinsically flawed, and favours partial, unreconciled, interim 
outcomes. These may contain unresolved issues yet Atherton believes the 
creative tension within them is productive, enabling a broader perspective that 
takes account of differences. What emerges is both dynamic and provisional, a 
fragmented, incomplete collection of separated insights: 
„... the primary task is not about morality as traditionally pursued; it is 
rather about frameworks and dynamic, and the nature and contribution of 
morality within them.‟ (Atherton, 1992: 270) 
 
A clear expression of Atherton‟s stress on pragmatism is his endorsement of a 
multidimensional approach to engagement with political economy, which he 
terms „hybridity‟. This is Atherton‟s term for a composite of different styles 
represented on a continuum along which this theological engagement can be 
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described (Atherton, 2008: 247-250), hence we need to begin by describing this 
spectrum. At one end is ethical economics, where the method of engagement is 
typically the attempt to find overlapping consensuses and develop partnerships 
between faith organisations, theology and secular organisations such as 
government. In many ways the liberal model of engagement, predicated upon 
assumptions of commonality and neutrality, exemplifies this end of the spectrum. 
Although this end can be regarded as more secular in disposition, its very liberal 
emphasis on tolerance is based upon Christian values and traditions: it is as 
distinctively Christian, though not as overtly as is the case with theological 
economics (M. Brown, 2004a: chapter 3). At the other end of the spectrum we 
find theological economics, characterised by a more self-consciously, faith-
derived, critique of economics and proposals for alternatives to it. Liberation 
theology and radical orthodoxy are located here. The works of Northcott, Selby 
and Tanner are also found at this pole, though as we shall see in later chapters, 
there are significant differences between them in the ways they approach the 
inter-disciplinary task. 
 
The hybrid model is a constantly shifting blend of approaches on this continuum: 
a shifting oscillation rather than a fixed position. The interaction of „theology with 
economics‟ occurs right across this spectrum, though its character, style and 
dynamics will vary. First, it rejects the notion that either ethical economics or 
theological economics alone is satisfactory, for no model can contain sufficient 
truth in isolation from others. Thus some kind of fusion is required. In affirming 
175 
 
this stance Atherton is not thereby accepting the approaches of, for instance, 
radical orthodoxy; but he recognises that certain of its elements, such as the 
desire for Christian distinctiveness, are legitimate. Brown‟s development of a 
model of „dialogical traditionalism‟ covers much similar ground to Atherton in 
affirming the importance of a distinctively Christian contribution, but also in 
acknowledging the deficiencies and strengths in those models at both ends of the 
spectrum (Atherton, 2008: 258). These elements cannot, however, be 
determinant. Secondly, hybridity affirms the task of theological engagement 
which, in rejecting the notion of one all-encompassing model, instead seeks 
fragmented patterns of engagement that lead to interim solutions, not final ones.  
 
„The way of interaction is but a recognition that facing such changes in the 
contemporary context is always about transcendence to the limits of the 
interactive process. It is never about a transcendence into a blissful 
economic synthesis.‟ (Atherton, 1992: 224) 
 
 
Indeed, the only sense in which there is synthesis is in the actual process being 
undertaken. Atherton recognises that the results may be partial, but also multi-
faceted, subtle and complex. Such a process is therefore not the preserve of any 
one single strand of the Christian tradition, and it avoids the issue of seeking a 
response that is necessarily distinctively Christian. The difficulty, which he 
acknowledges, is that such hybrid patterns tend to be short-lived. If the inter-
disciplinary approach is visualised as representing a vertical integration across 
the horizontal spectra of interconnecting disciplines, the pragmatic, hybrid 
approach represents a horizontal movement across the faithful economics 
spectrum. 
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One aspect of Atherton‟s willingness to embrace interim solutions is his approval 
of Lebacqz‟s developmental approach to the concept of justice. Lebacqz (1987) 
understands justice not as a static condition that could be defined in an abstract 
way, rather as a continuous process of injustice reduction that constantly listens 
to the voices of those who suffer injustice in order to make evaluations. In such a 
way, what justice means becomes clear and specific within a particular context. 
Atherton maintains that this approach avoids the „posturing‟ of those who seek a 
static justice yet ignore the practicalities of development: „to ignore the 
possibilities and likelihood of economic growth is as imbalanced as ignoring 
structural inequalities‟(2003b: 117). Crucially, Atherton desires a theory of justice 
that is both global and yet simultaneously sensitive to local variations, and gives 
prime attention to the phenomenon of exclusion. Inequality can, he concludes, 
only be regarded as morally acceptable when such inequality actively serves to 
bring benefits to the poorest (2003b: 73).  
 
Brown, too, endorses the search for interim solutions rather than final ones: he 
emphasises the need for theological engagement to embrace the concept of 
God‟s kingdom as inaugurated but not completed. That is, sinfulness and error 
will continue to be a part of this world and hence no position, opinion or action 
can assume it will not have to be corrected in due course. The fact that there are 
practical limits to the production and distribution of economic goods (finitude) 
leads Brown to call for a „theology of the interim‟ that can lead to ways of social 
and physical amelioration in the immediate future, rather than being confined to 
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the realms of ultimate solutions. It is therefore highly contingent, but it is also, by 
the nature of its dialogic commitment, open to the possibility of theology being 
itself challenged through its engagement with economics. The latter point is a 
fascinating one, for it suggests that a hallmark of authentic theological 
engagement with political economy is a deeper insight into the nature of creation 
and the divine purpose for humankind.  
 
Two other features emerge which are not so easily located on the continuum of 
engagement mentioned above: these are the performative and the imaginative 
dimensions of theological discourse. In Atherton‟s approach they are given less 
importance than the first two we have considered, yet they are nevertheless 
significant. 
 
(c) Theology as a performative exercise 
 
Atherton believes that theological praxis also has validity in theological 
engagement with political economy: this is the process of theological reflection 
that combines thought and action, beginning with a stance that is committed to 
interpreting the world through the experiences of the poor, for this is where Truth 
is most clearly perceived. Reflection upon this prior commitment to the poor then 
guides theological understanding, and leads to further faithful action and 
subsequent reflection. Atherton does not affirm, as do many of liberation 
theology‟s adherents, that praxis is the sole determinant for theological 
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development; he does affirm its basis in critical reflection upon action on behalf of 
the poor.  Atherton‟s approval of Young‟s „differentiated solidarity‟ is important 
here, for he needs a basis for making choices about whom to engage with and 
what courses of action to take. Brown also advocates criteria for potential 
partners on the basis of their location rather than an assessment of how much 
common agreement each partner might provide. Thus, clear preference is given 
by both to those who are marginalised or who suffer as a result of economic 
decisions and processes. 
 
A particular concern for Atherton is that the performative aspect of theological 
engagement should lead to the production of indicators through which the truth of 
various policies and practices can be evaluated. These indicators need to take a 
holistic view of the human condition; Atherton borrows Sen‟s concept of 
„capability function‟, a view based on the understanding that what makes for 
flourishing is more than the quantity or quality of material resources that one 
possesses. It is more about the set of factors that either permit or enable one to 
fulfil one‟s potential as a complex being which is part of a set of networks and 
cultural patterns. People need to be viewed economically not as rational, self-
obsessed, isolated individuals, though such tendencies are not completely 
absent, but as persons integrated into complex networks and patterns of cultural 
behaviour and obligations, tradition-based loyalties and emotional ties: 
 
„At the heart of Christian belief are questions of what it now means to be 
human, of what is our understanding of social flourishing, of what is the 
179 
 
right and wrong way of promoting human living in and through its 
environments.‟ (Atherton, 2003b: 3) 
 
The work of Sen (2001) has been hugely influential, and can be evidenced by the 
work of the United Nations Development Programme, whose measurement of 
Human Development Index is a highly detailed analysis of factors encompassing 
such diverse statistics as levels of income, life expectancy and literacy. 
 
(d) The imaginative contribution 
 
Atherton is dismissive of many utopian schemes in economic history, by which 
he means highly idealised ones. They are often based upon one specific idea or 
theory: the social credit theory and liberation theology‟s dependence upon 
dependency theory are examples. However, whereas Preston was scathing in 
his condemnation, Atherton views these in a more nuanced way. Although highly 
sceptical from a rational perspective, nevertheless he values their questioning of 
the status quo, and their courage in positing radically different schemes against 
mainstream economics. 
 
In marked contrast to Preston, there is in Atherton‟s approach a role for the 
questioning of the „unquestionable‟ premises, which is, to advocate „heresy‟ in 
the eyes of mainstream economics and ethics. Atherton (2003b: 174-6) supplies 
a long list of examples, all of which advocate alternative economic scenarios: 
Robert Owen‟s experimental communities, the Social Credit Scheme, liberation 
theology, the work of David Jenkins, and radical orthodoxy. Atherton criticises 
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them for their simplicity, their lack of balance and their utopian flavour, yet he 
maintains they have a role within the wider process of a „multilayered‟ theological 
engagement. This is because even though their solutions are quite impractical, 
they all contain important observations; their comments on the use of land, on 
microcredit and interest-free lending, on employee participation, and critiques of 
oppression are still helpful. 
 
 
Critique of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign 
 
It is my contention that the post-liberal approach, particularly as exemplified in 
Atherton, offers the best model for theological engagement with political 
economy. Furthermore, the Athertonian features discussed above provide a most 
useful basis for performing a critique of the Jubilee 2000 campaign, so that we 
can understand its theological contours, limitations, and strengths against the 
context of an increasingly plural and globalised world. This will also enable us to 
draw out what our study of the campaign might indicate about wider trends in the 
Church‟s social, political and economic witness.  
 
(a) The inter-disciplinary approach 
 
We saw above that Atherton‟s approach is an openly interactive one, seeking to 
reconnect theology and economics through the acknowledgement of mutual 
insights, and by identifying points of consensus. In theological terms, Jubilee 
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2000 represented the application of biblical strictures and can be described as 
more „theology and‟ than „theology with‟. However, several areas of convergence 
are evident from the history of Jubilee 2000. One of these gathers together a 
consensus that large sovereign debt hinders economic growth and prosperity 
and deters new investment. Furthermore, the destabilisation that debt 
exacerbates has a direct link to the prevalence of illegal drug production and civil 
strife, which in turn cause social or economic damage in creditor countries. 
However, by dint of being a political campaign, Jubilee 2000 represented a 
challenge to the prevailing practice concerning debt relief. Its repetition of 
historical instances of debt cancellation was intended to convey the feasibility of 
debt relief in principle, and thus to refute accusations of impracticality.  
 
The illegitimacy of much of the debt, and the parallel with slavery, attempted to 
appeal to common ideas of natural justice and the right to self-determination. In 
exposing the injustices and inadequacies of debt and debt rescheduling the 
campaign achieved dramatic success, but this needs to be distinguished from 
practical arguments in favour of debt cancellation. In general, the campaign was 
more effective at exposing what was wrong than being able to argue for specific 
debt relief. This was because the detail of debt relief, which included the issues 
of eligibility, conditionality and moral hazard, was inevitably more complicated 
than a set of clear-cut proposals could address. Jubilee 2000‟s call for an 
independent means of establishing sovereign bankruptcy reflected a strategic 
attempt to develop common ground with more mainstream economics, since the 
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practice of corporate bankruptcy is well established. However, as we have seen, 
the idea of independent arbitration did not find favour among the IFI community. 
 
(b) Pragmatism 
 
Atherton‟s emphasis on practical and eclectic, albeit piecemeal, solutions rather 
than ultimate ones is certainly borne out by the campaign. The very diversity of 
the Coalition would seem to bear witness to a certain hybridity, since the Jubilee 
campaign embraced radicals and liberals, North and South, economic 
technicians and lay people, faith-based organisations and secular ones. That 
coalition was a fragile one, particularly in respect to Jubilee South, whose very 
existence is suggestive of a certain fracture within the overall structure. The 
consensus around debt relief was a broad one, but it was not very deep. 
 
In the main the campaign reflected a distinctively theological economics, and was 
a single-issue, time-limited organisation. As such it was not able to locate itself 
easily into the context of the credit industry, nor the debates about development, 
nor the wider theological issues concerning money, forgiveness and temptation. 
This may appear a harsh criticism, and one recognises that the Jubilee 2000 was 
devised as a tightly focussed political campaign rather than permanent 
engagement, but the primary intention here is to indicate the direction which 
future reflection on debt must pursue. While Jubilee South continues to campaign 
for debt relief, and although the Jubilee Debt Campaign in the UK is still 
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operative, much of the focus, funding and personnel have moved onto other 
issues, such as Make Poverty History or environmental campaigns.  
  
(c) A performative exercise 
 
Atherton‟s approach highlights the significance of practical indicators, inspired by 
theological principles, which assist in the critical assessment of particular policies 
and programmes. One of the keys to the Jubilee 2000‟s highly successful 
campaign was the use of simple statistics that revealed the human 
consequences of debt repayments; it was the kind of statistics the campaign 
distributed that made an impact. In doing this the campaign relied heavily on 
campaigns in the South to provide illustrations and information. In publishing this 
data, the campaign not only raised awareness but challenged the doctrine that 
SAPs were appropriate conditions to impose on indebted nations involved in 
rescheduling. It was the campaign‟s emphasis on the human consequences that 
were significant, such as the correlation between debt repayments and 
decreasing levels of life expectancy, literacy and well-being more generally. 
Jubilee-Zambia‟s publication of the cost of a monthly basket of basic provisions 
provided political ammunition for the relief of poverty, as it exposed the effects of 
government and IFI policies on the poor, and it serves as a fine example of 
Atherton‟s „indicators‟ that emanate from a performative theology. The 
involvement of the churches in Zambia in the scrutiny process also demonstrate 
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that the campaign there was highly performative, seeking to indicate practical 
steps the IFIs, and in particular the Zambian government, should take. 
 
Jubilee 2000 did not campaign for debt relief for all heavily indebted countries. It 
campaigned selectively on behalf of those nations where debt repayments 
exacted the most damaging consequences for the poor: accordingly, most of the 
countries selected were from sub-Saharan Africa. On this matter it is interesting 
to observe the campaign moved from advocating debt relief on a „case by case‟ 
basis to the call for an independent framework to accomplish this. 
 
Jubilee 2000 rooted its campaign in the experience of those who suffered the 
worst consequences of the debt. This was done both at the level of the 
international coalition and within national campaigns such as Jubilee-Zambia. 
The theological justification for debt relief often began with stories of the 
experiences of the poor, and in this we see the influence of praxis. However, not 
all the perspectives of the poor were taken up, as witnessed by the cool 
response of the Coalition to the issue of reparations, and the discrimination used 
in selecting countries for debt relief advocacy.    
 
(d) The ‘imaginative’ contribution 
 
The final feature acknowledges the role of speculative, highly imaginative 
proposals that, in Atherton‟s multi-faceted approach, retain a certain significance. 
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One might argue that the concept of jubilee itself might lie in this category. Its 
value as a source of inspiration and hope defied strict rationality, yet was highly 
significant for the campaign‟s success. The psychological and spiritual appeal of 
a new start for the world‟s poorest was compelling, not least since the campaign 
set a target date at the end of the millennial year. In this way it formed a 
resonance with millions of people who yearned for a better future, and helped to 
articulate this vague sense in a highly specific way. 
 
In chapter 1 we were introduced to the commentaries of Linden and Atherton on 
the campaign, and we can see now that they both have a qualified validity. 
Linden‟s remark that Jubilee 2000 was peripheral to the wider issues of 
development and poverty relief is accurate to the extent that Jubilee 2000 was an 
exceptional instance of a short-lived campaign on a narrow issue. On the other 
hand, the wider work that the campaign has triggered - such as Make Poverty 
History - may yet lead to more sustained, deeper work in due course; at this point 
in time it is perhaps too early to make a definitive judgment. Atherton‟s comment 
that Jubilee 2000 represented a sacramental partnership suggests a clearly 
distinctive faith component in dialogue with others. Whilst this is undoubtedly true 
of the campaign‟s aspirations, the effectiveness of that dialogue is less clear.  
Atherton was a patron of the Jubilee 2000 campaign and he views Jubilee 2000 
as a prime example of how faith-based organisations can offer a more distinctive, 
theological economics: 
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“... the movement against international debt embodies the theological 
principle of a bias for inclusivity and is explicitly rooted in Old and New 
Testament teaching. It therefore reflects the concern for a distinctively 
Christian contribution to economic life which radical orthodoxy and others 
argue for so strongly.” (Atherton, 2003b: 167)57 
 
  
 
Summary 
 
We have outlined the demise of the once dominant liberal mode of theological 
reflection upon economic matters, and some of the more salient developments 
that have been provoked by it. There is a great disparity of views between these 
responses to liberalism‟s demise; indeed often they are mutually incompatible. 
Some offer a comprehensive theological ethics, whereas others eschew this in 
favour of more limited, fragmented ethics. Nevertheless, all possess significant 
insights despite their differing perspectives. The liberal approach is dialogical, 
open to secular insights, yet its premise of consensus is now revealed as 
inadequate in a globalised and plural society. Attempts to reform it require a 
consensus based upon rights, whose general acceptability is a disputed area. 
Both the new Christendom approach of Milbank and Long and the radical left 
pursue methodologies based upon the primacy of theological convictions: divine 
revelation as recorded in Scripture or the establishment of absolutist rights 
(justice, peace, equality) to protect the poor. Such approaches enable the clear 
exposition of a clear contrast between the fallen-ness of the world and the 
promises of the fulfilment of God‟s kingdom. This juxtaposition is helpful 
                                            
57
 This is not dissimilar to Michael Taylor‟s advocacy of „radical participation seeking consensus‟ 
M. Taylor (2004b: 213) 
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inasmuch as it aids the exposure of the illusory nature of capitalism and its 
associated diminished view of human beings. Anti-liberal approaches offer an 
important critique of the way economics is promoted as value-free, asking 
questions about the nature and distribution of power, and calling for a re-
alignment in accordance with Christian principles. The capitulations of liberalism 
are replaced by an approach that leads to an ethic whose confessional stance 
can clearly be evidenced in the approach which represents „the invitation to 
conversion rather than through the mutuality of dialogue‟ (M. Brown, 2001: 105).  
However, as we have seen, the arguments of the anti-liberals are a priori and 
foundationally unsound from both a theological and an economic standpoint. 
Dialogue becomes reduced to mutual counter-claims as to what is truly real and 
authoritative. Theologically, the critique that is levelled is of a failure to realise 
that theology is not a discipline separate from the secular world (though it is 
distinctive), and is thus not immune, along with hermeneutics, from contextual 
influences. The possibilities of rapprochement are by no means impossible, but 
they would need to be issue-specific. The issue of how one identifies practical 
steps towards objectives remains a key difficulty. 
 
The emerging post-liberal tradition, like the liberal approach it replaced, rejects a 
deductive methodology in favour of dialogue, but one that is nevertheless critical 
of both its conversation partners and also its own tradition. It attempts to restore 
the virtues of openness and contingency of the liberal approach, but recognises 
that any consensus will be partial and temporary. Here the dialogical process is a 
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more complex matter of „theology with‟, requiring a set of Christian perspectives 
together with a set of criteria for weighting the validity of others‟ insights and 
experiences. I find the criticisms of the post-liberals such as Atherton to be 
compelling,61 but realise that the grounds for arguing thus are consonant with an 
acknowledgment of the secular which is strongly denied by the radicals. The two 
approaches are not easy to reconcile. Yet this debate has moved a long way 
from the rather sterile dichotomy between the days of Niebuhr‟s social realism 
and the utopianism he so trenchantly opposed. The continued emphasis on the 
necessities of economic realism, which assumes the relative autonomy of the 
secular and dismisses prescriptively, fashioned ethics, lies open to the criticism 
that such an approach is defeatist, fatalistic and lacking in hope. Here realism 
becomes synonymous with the replacement of theological principles by 
ungrounded pragmatism. However, it is possible that there is more to this issue 
than such a rigid divide, for in addition to the rational dimension of theological 
engagement, we also need to bear in mind the imaginative role theology can help 
provide: a concept for which Atherton (unlike Preston) offers critical support. The 
role of utopian elements is an important aspect of this, but to what extent is it a 
powerful resource for theological engagement, or a fanciful, perhaps dangerous 
distraction? 
 
A key methodological question is the way in which such material is utilised: as 
the foundation of a prescriptive ethics; as resources for a different kind of 
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 as also does Sedgwick (1999: 7 – 10) 
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reflection; or as tools for imaginative reflection? Eschatology becomes significant 
in such considerations too, for a fundamental tension exists over the way in 
which the kingdom of God is used in ethical reflection. For radicals there is an 
overwhelming eschatological imperative for the life of the kingdom to be realised 
in the present; for liberals and post-liberals the impetus is to learn to live in the 
interim, the „not yet‟ of the kingdom, whilst not becoming fatalistic about the 
possibilities of change. For the radicals, hope is located in the advent of the 
kingdom, breaking decisively into the world; for liberals and post-liberals, hope is 
sustained through the practical possibilities of incremental amelioration in the 
human condition. This suggests that if the approach of the post-liberals is correct, 
in the long term, any consensus will eventually break down under the weight of 
competing perspectives.  
 
With the demise of an all-encompassing, over-arching morality, is any form of 
consensus possible? Plant strives to defend the concept of rights which is linked 
to issues of feasibility rather than absolute principle. He and Küng maintain that a 
minimal consensus around certain themes is possible despite the claims of post-
modern scholars, because their understanding of plurality is „thin‟. The principal 
issue is whether or not such a consensus is indeed possible; Brown‟s criticism of 
Plant is that, in his seeking to find some cross-level agreement on basic material 
needs, any consensus that does succeed is inevitably diluted and its value 
diminished. Effectively, Brown sees him as an unreformed liberal because he 
does not justify the reason for seeking a consensus in the first place, even 
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though Brown shares many of the goals underpinning Plant‟s work. For liberals, 
the „we‟ can be universal, for post-liberals the „we‟ cannot, and is merely one 
party among others. As we shall see, the concept of rights as a resource for 
theological engagement within the Jubilee 2000 campaign is a powerful and 
prevalent one, and we shall examine the extent to which this has been helpful 
and appropriate, as well as the issues raised by trying to gain consensus. 
Questions that arise concern the choice of partners involved in such a process, 
and the criteria which are used to establish their participation. Indeed, what 
weight can be placed on their perspectives? Where there is consensus, is it 
derived from agreement on some minimalist universal values – as Küng and 
Plant maintain – or does it emerge from the process of choosing partners on a 
much more pragmatic basis? For instance, Taylor advocates the process of 
„radical participation seeking consensus‟; that is, the consensus which is founded 
around praxis rather than perspective or ideology. 
 
One might also enquire whether Atherton‟s bias within a differentiated solidarity 
means that talk of consensus is essentially redundant. In each case the view 
about participation will lead into expectation of a particular kind of solution. Those 
who maintain the possibility of universal values are more likely to strive for 
comprehensive solutions; those who dismiss this possibility will have their 
horizons more limited to the immediate, to the temporary and the partial. 
Fundamentally, the understanding of the „we‟ needs to be biased critically 
towards those who are victims of economic processes, but not to the extent that 
191 
 
such a stance becomes exclusive, or a dictatorship. At the same time there 
needs to be critical engagement with dissonant views, rather than their dismissal 
simply because their approach is flawed, or represents interests inimical to those 
found elsewhere. For our discussion, we shall want to investigate the significance 
that is given to the experiences of the most vulnerable, that is, those who suffer 
from the worst effects of the debt crisis. For those who favour a confessional 
approach, at what point does the weight of experience become a determining 
factor? 
 
Another area for consideration concerns the consequences of theological 
engagement. If the process is to be genuinely dialogic, as Atherton and Brown 
would urge, one might expect to see signs that both parties are changed as a 
result. That is, theology itself evolves and learns more about the things of God 
through its encounter with the world; „theology with‟ rather than „theology and‟, in 
which neither theology not political economy remains static. A reasonable line of 
enquiry, therefore, would be to see the extent to which this change might have 
begun to occur. 
 
Atherton‟s description of the spectrum of faithful economics embodies the 
concerns of an approach that would seek to be dialogical. It assumes the 
complex interaction between the secular and the religious perspectives with 
varying emphases, and urges a hybrid model in which both ethical and 
theological economics are vital components. Using the framework derived from 
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Atherton‟s approach, therefore, we have been able to illustrate the way in which 
the campaign was inter-disciplinary, albeit in a limited fashion; that its focus was 
too narrow to embrace the relation of debt to wider issues of economics; that its 
use of statistics was highly provocative and searching; and that it cleverly 
connected with the public imagination. Indeed, one could argue with some 
cogency that the success of the campaign it itself an indication that Atherton‟s 
approach is a valid one, addressing all the various elements of biblical principle 
and inspiration, economic and political complexity, and of a campaign that 
exploited the global aspects of religious pluralism and worldwide Christianity. 
Using this framework, therefore, we are not only able to perform a critical 
appraisal of the campaign, but are provided with a key set of perspectives with 
which to interrogate the themes and issues that emerge from a study of it, and 
thus ascertain ways in which further reflection might be developed.   
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Chapter 6 
 
 
The Theme of Jubilee 
 
 
„The Jubilee has become the rallying cry for oppressed peoples today, as 
was the exodus theme for their counterparts in previous decades.‟ 
(Milgrom, 2004: 311) 
 
 
 
 
One of the key arguments in favour of debt cancellation was the use of the 
jubilee theme and, allied to it, advocacy of sabbath economics. Indeed, the 
Jubilee 2000 campaign to cancel the unpayable debts of the third world drew 
much strength as well as inspiration from the high profile it gave to the jubilee 
theme (Hutton, 1999). Jubilee was critical to the success of their campaign. One 
of its strengths was that it conveyed slightly different meanings, and was 
therefore able to unite a diverse coalition of churches and theological viewpoints. 
The Jubilee 2000 campaigners understood the jubilee theme rarely in a literal 
sense, but most commonly as a metaphor, an image, a principle or vision to 
provoke, guide, inspire and give hope. The campaign acknowledged the 
historical uncertainty over the practice of the jubilee, but emphasised the 
principles underpinning the legislation, such as release from bondage; this was 
then developed in the teaching and ministry of Jesus, and hence jubilaic values 
and imagery were invoked as authentic Christian responses.   
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The revised edition (Christian Aid version) of The Debt Cutter’s Handbook (1999) 
contained a theological section as an insert between the centre pages. In this, 
Green (1999) portrays the sabbath and jubilee legislation as having fallen into 
disrepute by the time of Jesus, thus implying that the jubilee had been enacted in 
the past. Indeed, he gives no indication that it may never have been 
implemented.  He takes Jesus‟ proclamation of „the Year of the Lord‟s Favour‟ as 
jubilaic, and the Kingdom of God embodying the practice of jubilee release; 
jubilee is understood not as fifty-year legislation but as a continuing attitude and 
way of life in which the divine will becomes a reality. Green is not explicit about 
the application of jubilee principles, but the clear inference is that Christians 
should engage in jubilee practice as Jesus did.  
 
The jubilee image also functions as a means of fostering inspiration, hope and 
encouragement, linked with the notion of a new beginning. The heraldic way in 
which the jubilee was announced with the ram‟s horn („yobel‟, possibly a 
synonym for dĕrōr )1 has been most important in generating popular enthusiasm, 
whether for the freedom of the slaves during the American Civil War, or recently 
during the Jubilee 2000 campaign. Dent (1994: 35) makes a connection between 
jubilee and jubilation, but although the link is mistaken linguistically, he makes 
the point that a legitimate feature of jubilee is celebration of divine redemptive 
activity, and thus „joy is not mere froth... but is itself both a fruit of the spirit and a 
dynamic force which enables things to be done which otherwise could not be.‟  
 
                                                 
1
 The word for the ram‟s horn trumpet is shofar, but see the discussion later in this chapter. 
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Dent and Peters were aware of the jubilee year, but saw it simply as a metaphor 
for liberation and a new start; they drew a strong parallel between the „jubilee‟ 
call for the abolition of slavery and the cancellation of unpayable debts. They and 
the other early Jubilee 2000 campaigners were inspired by the imagery of jubilee 
rather than any of the detail of the Levitical legislation, of which they were largely 
ignorant (Greene, 2007). They saw the period of the 1990s as a critical one for 
debt relief, a „kairos‟ moment. Linked with the notion of the year 2000 as a 
special time, the metaphor of a new beginning was the most powerful instrument 
of the campaign, establishing a resonance between the biblical tradition of 
release with the nascent yearning among millions of people that the new 
millennium would mark the advent of a new era of prosperity for the world‟s 
poorest.  
 
Nevertheless, unresolved questions concerning the jubilee‟s historicity and 
application remain today, even though its meaning is considered to be primarily 
symbolic. In this chapter I will therefore investigate the validity of jubilaic themes 
and imagery for contemporary theological reflection on debt, and to analyse the 
different methods by which these may be employed in theological engagement 
with political economy. How can a tradition designed for an ancient, agrarian 
society be employed with integrity in today‟s global market? Writings on jubilee 
are commonly introduced with warnings as to the dangers of the direct 
application of jubilee principles without careful exegetical analysis,2 yet I intend to 
                                                 
2
 Examples of this would be Duchrow (2002: 35); Opiyo (1987: 3); Fager (1993: 13)  
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show that despite the hermeneutical difficulties the tradition presents, jubilee 
imagery and the way the tradition has been formed offer continued potency for 
contemporary theological engagement. To do this we begin with an introduction 
to the jubilee and sabbatical year legislations, and a discussion of the context in 
which these rules were generated. We then proceed to consider the limitations 
and potential of the jubilee for debt relief advocacy, and to draw out the merits of 
a non-deductive, symbolic approach which, as we shall see, is not free from 
criticism.  
 
The content of the jubilee legislation 
 
The regulations concerning the institution of the jubilee year are found in Lev. 25: 
8-55 and are closely linked to those for the sabbatical year (Lev.25:1–7; Deut. 
15:1-11; Exod.23:10-11). Aspects of the jubilee are often discerned by scholars 
in Is. 61 and in the teaching of Jesus, in particular his sermon in the synagogue 
at Nazareth (Lk.4:16–21), a passage which in recent times has experienced a 
prominence not seen hitherto, particularly in parts of the developing world (Arias, 
1984: 35). 
 
The weekly sabbath is well known, has been practised continuously since 
ancient times and its influence upon Christianity is evident. The sabbatical year 
was a seven-yearly rest period for the land, during which no ploughing, sowing or 
reaping was permitted. The population would either trust in the providence of 
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God for a particularly bountiful sixth-year harvest, or would rely on foreign 
produce.  With regard to fellow-Israelites, in the seventh year debts were 
cancelled and slaves were encouraged to claim their freedom. Since slaves 
might have opted for a lifetime of servitude under a benevolent owner rather than 
penniless freedom, freed slaves were to be given generous produce as an 
incentive to become independent (Deut. 15: 13-14). The justification for this was 
that Israelites were not redeemed from Egypt in order to become slaves of one 
another. 
 
The Levitical legislation on the jubilee concerns restitution of land, remittance of 
debt and redemption of slaves every forty-nine or fifty years, in contrast with the 
Deuteronomic seven-year cycle of debt remission. It indicates the sovereignty of 
God over the land and the will of God to cancel debts, free people from servitude 
into greater forms of self-reliance, and provide means whereby economic 
exploitation is automatically curbed. It represents a process through which God 
authorizes a periodic, new beginning for the created order by returning people to 
their ancestral land and their socio-economic origins. Each section of the jubilee 
legislation in Lev. 25 concludes with a theological justification (verses 17-22, 35-
38, 55), that „the LORD your God‟ was the one who had released the people of 
Israel from the Egyptians and had given them the land of Canaan. Israelites were 
special people, never to be treated as less than servants of the Lord.  
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The legislation concerning the jubilee year includes successive stages of 
destitution and can be divided into three main sections, dealing respectively with 
land (vv.2-22), redemption of property (vv.23-38) and release of slaves (vv.39-
55).  
8You shall count off seven weeks of years, seven times seven years, 
so that the period of seven weeks of years gives forty-nine years. 
9Then you shall have the trumpet sounded loud; on the tenth day of 
the seventh month – on the day of atonement – you shall have the 
trumpet sounded throughout all your land. 10And you shall hallow the 
fiftieth year and you shall proclaim liberty throughout the land to all its 
inhabitants. It shall be a jubilee for you: you shall return, every one of 
you, to your property and every one of you to your family. 11That fiftieth 
year shall be a jubilee for you: you shall not sow, or reap the 
aftergrowth, or harvest the unpruned vines. 12For it is a jubilee; it shall 
be holy to you: you shall eat only what the field itself produces. 
 
This proclamation introduces the institution of the jubilee, initiated by the 
sounding of the „shofar‟, the ram‟s horn trumpet, on the fiftieth year, proclaiming 
liberty to all. Verse 8 describes how the jubilee year is instituted in the year 
following seven sabbatical years, that is, seven times seven, thus it is the fiftieth 
year. The issue of whether the jubilee meant forty-nine or fifty years is relatively 
unimportant for our purposes here, though it may be an indication of the potential 
practical difficulties of implementation if such a key aspect is open to ambiguity. 
However, it may not be unreasonable to assume that this numerical uncertainty 
is a feature of interpretation, and not one recognised by the original audience.  
 
The word „jubilee‟ is a transliteration of the Hebrew yôbēl and was translated in 
the Septuagint as aphesis, meaning „release‟. This is the translation preferred by 
North (1954: 2, 108), but others (Chirigno 1993:13; Wenham, 1979: 319; 
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Gerstenberger, 1996: 378; Snaith, 1971: 111; Dent, 1994: 34) argue that there is 
a strong etymological connection between  yôbēl and the word for ram; hence it 
may stand for the ram‟s horn in Lev.25. The word „liberty‟, also translated 
„release‟, is rendered from the Hebrew dĕrōr, itself probably derived from the 
Akkadian word „andurarum‟ which is linked to Mesopotamian practices of debt- or 
slave- release (Chirigno, 1993: 313-7).3 This meaning can correspond to „be free‟ 
or „be at large‟ (Ringe, 1985: 23)4 and is the context for the translations in Jer. 34 
and Is. 61. Dĕrōr was translated as „liberty‟ in the King James Bible (and hence 
the text on Philadelphia‟s Liberty Bell), but at that time cuneiform was 
indecipherable. When the code was understood, the root of these words became 
apparent as indicating freedom of movement, as in running water. Thus the 
„liberty‟ proclaimed did not necessarily refer to complete autonomy, but rather the 
more limited freedom to return to one‟s territory and family roots, and from 
domination. It implied the freedom in which one may flourish and grow, but not 
unfettered self-determination (Houston, 2001).  
 
The next few verses are concerned with the people returning to their „allotted‟ 
land: neighbours must not be wronged, the commandments observed, and the 
people provided for by a three-fold harvest on the sixth year: 
 
13In this year of jubilee you shall return, every one of you, to your 
property. 14When you make a sale to your neighbour or buy from 
your neighbour, you shall not cheat one another. 15When you buy 
                                                 
3
 It might also mean „royal decree‟. Kuichi disputes the evidence for any firm connection between 
the two terms: Kuichi (2007: 457) 
4
 Three other references are translated differently: either as „bird‟ (Prov. 26:2, Ps. 84:3) or „liquid‟ 
(Exod. 30:23). Snaith (1971: 111) suggests flowing water or horses galloping freely. 
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from your neighbour, you shall pay only for the number of years 
since the jubilee; the seller shall charge you only for the remaining 
crop years. 16If the years are more, you shall increase the price, and 
if the years are fewer, you shall diminish the price; for it is a certain 
number of harvests that are being sold to you. 17You shall not cheat 
one another, but you shall fear your God; for I am the LORD your 
God. 
 
18You shall observe my statues and faithfully keep my ordinances, so 
that you may live on the land securely. 19The land will yield its fruit, 
and you will eat your fill and live on it securely. 20Should you ask, 
What shall we eat in the seventh year, if we may not sow or gather in 
our crop? 21I will order my blessing for you in the sixth year, so that it 
will yield a crop for three years. 22When you sow in the eighth year, 
you will be eating from the old crop; until the ninth year, when its 
produce comes in, you shall eat the old. 23The land shall not be sold 
in perpetuity, for the land is mine; with me you are but aliens and 
tenants. 24Throughout the land that you hold, you shall provide for 
the redemption of the land. 
 
25If anyone of your kin falls into difficulty and sells a piece of property, 
then the next of kin shall come and redeem what the relative has 
sold. 26If the person has no one to redeem it, but then prospers and 
finds sufficient means to do so, 27the years since its sale shall be 
computed and the difference shall be refunded to the person to 
whom it was sold, and the property shall be returned. 28But if there is 
not sufficient means to recover it, what was sold shall remain with the 
purchaser until the year of jubilee; in the jubilee it shall be released, 
and the property shall be returned. 
 
Verse 23 affirms the divine ownership of the land, which might be seen as the 
foundational basis for the entire jubilee legislation (Fager, 1993). Because the 
land belonged to God it could not be treated as a mere commodity as did the 
Canaanites, and must not be sold without right of redemption. If a fellow Israelite 
had to sell his5 land, there was an obligation on others to redeem the sold land; if 
the Israelite prospered in due course he should purchase the land back, the price 
                                                 
5
 The text naturally assumes that the active agents here can only be male. Houston (2001) alone 
makes this point explicit. 
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being deduced by a sliding scale since the date of sale. If he was not able to re-
purchase the land, the new owner had right of the land only until the jubilee year. 
 
29If anyone sells a dwelling house in a walled city, it may be redeemed 
until a year has elapsed since its sale; the right of redemption shall be 
one year. 30If it is not redeemed before a full year has elapsed, a 
house that is in a walled city shall pass in perpetuity to the purchaser, 
throughout the generations; it shall not be released in the jubilee. 31But 
houses in villages that have no walls around them shall be classed as 
open country; they may be redeemed, and they shall be released in 
the jubilee. 32As for the cities of the Levites, the Levites shall forever 
have the right of redemption of the houses in the cities belonging to 
them. 33Such property as may be redeemed from the Levites – houses 
sold in a city belonging to them – shall be released in the jubilee; 
because the houses in the cities of the Levites are their possession 
among the people of Israel. 34But the open land around their cities 
may not be sold; for that is their possession for all time. 
 
 35If any of your kin fall into difficulty and become dependent upon you, 
you shall support them; they shall live with you as though resident 
aliens. 36Do not take interest in advance or otherwise make a profit 
from them, but fear your God; let them live with you. 37You shall not 
lend them your money at interest taken in advance, or provide them 
with food at a profit. 38I am the LORD your God, who brought you out 
of the land of Egypt, to give you the land of Canaan, to be your God. 
 
There then comes a significant exception in the legislation: properties within 
walled cities were exempted from the right of redemption beyond a year from the 
date of sale; properties in unwalled cities were regarded as equivalent to land, 
since they were less secure (and hence less valuable) (Kuichi, 2007: 461). As 
regards cities belonging to Levites, houses could be redeemed at any time, and 
in any case would be released at the jubilee; Levitical land could not be sold 
under any circumstances. Israelites were obliged to support any destitute kin, 
who had the status of resident aliens; interest could not be charged nor profit 
extracted from them. 
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39If any who are dependent on you become so impoverished that they 
sell themselves to you, you shall not make them serve as slaves. 
40They shall remain with you as hired or bound laborers. They shall 
serve with you until the year of the jubilee. 41Then they and their 
children with them shall be free from your authority; they shall go back 
to their own family and return to their ancestral property. 42For they are 
my servants, whom I brought out of the land of Egypt; they shall not be 
sold as slaves are sold. 43You shall not rule over them with harshness, 
but shall fear your God. 44As for the male and female slaves whom 
you may have, it is from the nations around you that you may acquire 
male and female slaves. 45You may also require them from among the 
aliens residing with you, and from their families that are with you, who 
have been born in your land; and they may be your property. 46You 
may keep them as a possession for your children after you, for them to 
inherit as property. These you may treat as slaves, but as for your 
fellow Israelites, no one shall rule over the other with harshness. 
 
47If resident aliens among you prosper, and if any of your kin fall into 
difficulty with one of them and sell themselves to an alien, or to a 
branch of the alien‟s family, 48after they have sold themselves they 
shall have the right of redemption; one of their brothers may redeem 
them 49or their uncle or their uncle‟s son may redeem them, or anyone 
of their family who is of their own flesh may redeem them; or if they 
prosper they may redeem themselves. 50They shall compute with the 
purchaser the total from the year when they sold themselves to the 
alien until the jubilee year; the price of the sale shall be applied to the 
number of years: the time they were with the owner shall be rated as 
the time of a hired laborer. 51If many years remain, they shall pay for 
their redemption in proportion to the purchase price; 52and if few years 
remain until the jubilee years, they shall compute thus: according to 
the years involved they shall make payment for their redemption. 53As 
a laborer hired by the year they shall be under the alien‟s authority, 
who shall not, however, rule with harshness over them in your sight. 
54And if they have not been redeemed in any of these ways, they and 
their children with them shall go free in the jubilee year. 55For to me 
the people of Israel are servants; they are my servants whom I brought 
out of the land of Egypt: I am the LORD your God. 
  
This last section is concerned with release of slaves, by which is meant fellow 
Israelites who had found it necessary to sell their labour; in ancient times most 
Israelite slaves were debt slaves (de Vaux, 1973: 83, 172). Such persons had to 
be treated as servants rather than slaves, and they and their families were 
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released from all obligations at the jubilee in order to reclaim their ancestral land 
as redeemed persons. If a fellow Israelite sold his labour to a resident alien he 
retained the right of redemption, likewise his own kin could redeem him at any 
time; the price being calculated in accordance with the number of years worked 
in proportion to those remaining until the jubilee. Foreigners acquired as slaves 
through conquest and from the resident alien population were excluded from this 
legislation, an important exemption with significant and unfortunate 
consequences in history, as this clause was used to justify the institution of 
slavery. Such foreigners could legitimately be regarded as property, unlike fellow 
Israelites.  
 
The context of the jubilee leglislation 
 
Most commentators agree that the origins of the sabbath and jubilee are likely to 
be ancient.6 There are many common factors between the instructions in 
Deuteronomy and Leviticus and Mesopotamian practices, particularly the 
„misarum‟ and „duraru‟ which involve release of slaves or liberty to debtors. The 
parallels are very close in terms of function, though the Mesopotamian incidents 
of such releases were temporary and irregular (Weinfeld, 1990). The origins of 
the release in the jubilee may well lie with the ancient near eastern desire to 
preserve ancestral land. Roland de Vaux‟s view (1973: 176-7), that it was a 
utopian law and a „dead letter‟, is quoted frequently with some disapproval by 
commentators for its assertion that the jubilee was nothing more than a vain, late 
                                                 
6
 For more information on Mesopotamian practices see Hudson and van de Vieroop (2002) 
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attempt to extend the sabbatical legislation to include property. In terms of 
interest charging, it is believed that Israelites did not, in general, practise this on 
one another. Only one Biblical reference indicates any breach of this (Ezek.18), 
although other sources such as the Elephantine Papyrus give evidence to the 
contrary (Phillips, 1984). The rabbinic interpretation of the jubilee legislation 
prohibited the charging of interest only to the poor, not to all Israelites (Sloan, 
1977: 21). 
 
The key work for understanding the jubilee is Robert North‟s Sociology of the 
Biblical Jubilee (1954).7 Now more than fifty years old, it is still highly regarded by 
recent commentators and remains the most comprehensive. North maintains that 
the jubilee was not a universal, simultaneous event across the nation, but simply 
marked off the period from the taking out of a debt; most other commentators 
accept the premise of a simultaneous observance of the jubilee legislation. He 
argues that the origins of the jubilee lay in the concept of the sabbath and the 
extension of the seven-yearly cycle of the sabbatical year to a fifty year one, due 
to economic circumstances: the seven-yearly „experiment‟ of being able to use 
one‟s former land would not often be long enough to promote sufficient prosperity 
to be able to buy much of it back. In other words, seven years was insufficient 
time to effect much socio-economic change (North, 1954: 188). Thus the 
emphasis moved to a fifty year cycle in order that debts might not be passed on 
to future generations, and that the heirs of the indentured might be given a fresh 
                                                 
7
 Other key works are: North (1974), Fager (1993), Chirichigno (1993), Gnuse (1985a, 1985b), 
Wright (1984, 2004), Padilla (1996), Logan (1997), Glass (2000), Chaney (1991), Weinfeld (1990) 
and Kinsler and Kinsler (1999)  
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start. Against this view however, the sabbatical year contains no notions of land 
reform, and the regulations on debt repayments in such years are ancillary, not 
foundational (Fager, 1993: 95-6). Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that 
both the sabbatical and jubilee years are predicated on the basis of divine 
ownership of the land, albeit in slightly different ways. Wright (1992) argues for a 
comparatively early date for the origins of the jubilee, and that it later fell into 
disuse. He argues that it is unlikely to be exilic since by that time the notion of 
Israel‟s election had become less strongly tied to family and land than hitherto, 
and had even begun to include non-Israelites. Less conservative scholars believe 
the text to be either exilic, post-exilic, or both. Duchrow (2002), for instance, 
surmises that the regulations began with concern about the increasing divide 
between rich and poor in the eighth century BCE, as a property- and credit- 
based economy emerged; however, the purpose of the legislation in post-exilic 
times was to prevent latifundia and allow each family to own its own land. As 
such, the jubilee is therefore a relatively late adaptation of earlier customs, but 
placed within the „Holiness Code‟ as a means both of highlighting its importance, 
and establishing its raison d‟être within the context of the special covenantal 
relationship which God has established with the Israelite community. The jubilee 
reflected a time of renewed national self-awareness and religious obedience, and 
thus it represented a „decisive year of grace‟ linked to the Day of Atonement 
festival (Kanyandago, 2002: 47). 
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The balance of scholarly opinion leans decisively towards the jubilee text as 
belonging to the Priestly tradition, codified around the time of the exile. The 
immediate post-exilic period was one of considerable turmoil for the re-
constituted society in Israel. Successive waves of former exiles returned, only for 
disputes to arise concerning the ownership of the land. Doubtless, during the fifty 
or more years of absence others had taken over some of the land, and 
ownership was unclear in many instances. The Levitical legislation, expanding 
concepts of seven-year remittance to fifty, can therefore be understood as a 
means of remitting land back to the original owners - or at least, to those who 
owned the land immediately before the exile. Admittedly the context of the 
legislation is that of poverty rather than deportation into exile (Houston, 2001), 
but I do not see that this necessarily rejects such a view; as a political policy it 
may have been advantageous to locate the rationale for land distribution on the 
basis of natural justice rather than social obligations. One interesting possibility is 
that the legislation represents a victory of practical compromise over against an 
Ezekielian minority who advocated complete redistribution of land, that is, a 
reformist position over against a radical one (Logan, 1998b: 59).8 Whatever the 
precise nature of the legislation‟s origins, the jubilee was clearly a practice that 
would favour returnees, not least the priestly classes who were developing the 
understanding that the exile was primarily the consequence of Israel‟s 
disobedience; a return to ways of strict obedience would be a means of ensuring 
such calamites did not happen again: 
                                                 
8
 Unfortunately Logan is unable to recall his source of this information. 
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„the jubilee principle can.. be viewed as the political and economic ploy of 
the Aaronid priests to achieve leadership in restored Judah by dispensing 
benefits to a wide swath of the populace, presumably with civil and military 
support from the Persians.‟(Gottwald, 1997: 37) 
 
Such views are admittedly speculative, though this is no reason to deny their 
plausibility, not least since there are plenty of historical parallels with this 
hypothesis. One could argue, however, that the intention of the legislation was 
not so much the prevention of wealth disparity, but rather the maintaining of the 
status quo, in which land returned to its original (Israelite, not Canaanite) owners 
and could never be sold outside the local clan. The beneficiaries were clearly 
those with title to land such as the peasantry, rather than foreigners or Israelites 
without title.  
 
The issue of walled and Levitical cities is interesting, and rarely mentioned by 
debt campaigners. The reasons for this exemption are unclear, but it could be 
that the rule was effectively a means of compensating priests who would not 
otherwise benefit from the Levitical legislation. Freedom from jubilee would allow 
them to foster business enterprises without fear of losing their investments every 
fifty years. (According to Ezek.48:9–14, priests and Levites were allotted a 
sacred reserve which the latter could not sell or exchange in any part.9) Another 
possibility for this exception on walled cities is that it represents a clear indication 
of economic development moving away from a land-based economy. In large 
(walled) cities where professional elites became established, society had become 
                                                 
9
 This prohibits any form of economic activity: see Gerstenberger (1996). 
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stratified according to class, employment and prosperity (Milgrom, 2004: 308).10 
As such, tribal differences became less clear and so people lost touch with 
concepts of ancestral land. Under such conditions the jubilee legislation would 
have become meaningless. This is a significant development, for there is here an 
appreciation of the unrealistic elements within it and the limitations of the jubilee 
legislation in an environment other than an agrarian economy. Indeed, it is a 
major indicator that the legislation was formed at a time when the urban economy 
was becoming based upon money rather than land. This might be seen as 
supporting evidence for the historical practice of the jubilee, for the exemptions of 
walled cities indicate that the legislation was not entirely hypothetical. It seems 
clear that the jubilee acts as a modification of earlier legislation, and in so doing 
is cognisant of the viability of the sabbatical year legislation. An instance of this 
may be seen in the way Lev. 25:6-7 overrides Exod.23:10–11, permitting 
gleaning over earlier legislation stating that in the sabbatical year only the poor 
could eat its wild produce. Thus, „it is Leviticus that makes the Sabbatical law 
workable‟ (Milgrom, 2004: 312). Clearly the jubilee legislation contained intended 
benefits for society in the main, with the promise of social stability and a new, 
„clean slate‟ for all, instead of constant legal wrangles over land ownership. It was 
however, essentially conservative in outlook, locating the jubilee in a concept of 
original justice rather than the abstract equality of persons (Houston, 2001). 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Kiuchi (2007: 461) mentions the possibility that houses in walled cities were not regarded as 
family inheritance property and thus irrelevant to matters of economic survival. 
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Problems associated with the jubilee legislation 
 
There is widespread disagreement of opinion regarding the extent to which the 
sabbatical and jubilee years were actually observed. Whilst there is clear 
evidence of debt-release in other parts of the ancient near east (though never on 
a regular basis), there is no firm evidence in historical records of instances 
indicating that the jubilee year was ever enacted in Israel. The Hebrew Scriptures 
and the New Testament are noticeably silent on the matter, with the possible 
exception of Neh. 5 and Jer. 34 (discussed below). There are suggestions of 
particular years during the period of the Greek wars, but this evidence is far from 
clear. However, there are other indications that sabbatical years may have been 
observed – at least in part, for there is evidence that the Romans did not tax 
Jews during their sabbatical years as late as 66CE, for instance, and Josephus 
refers to the custom of the fallow year in Israel. Feliks (1997)11 affirms that during 
the period of the second temple the rules concerning the sabbatical year were 
observed, and cites Hillel‟s introduction of the prosbul (see below) as evidence 
that the sabbatical year was actively in force.  
 
The only clear instance of debt release in Scripture is found in Nehemiah 5, 
though most commentators see no direct connection between this account of and 
the Levitical legislation, despite their apparent similarities. The people 
complained that they were being forced to give up their goods, even children, 
                                                 
11
 De Vaux‟s contrasting opinion has already been mentioned in the previous section. 
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due to the increase in taxation – not least to the Persian empire. Nehemiah‟s 
edict did not occur in order to comply with divine law, but was prompted rather by 
the critical economic circumstances at the time. Nehemiah‟s reform was 
therefore intended as a once-only measure, not the institution of the jubilee cycle. 
There are some (Croatto,1997; Kandanyago, 2002) who, however, see great 
significance in this account and find it paradigmatic, not least since it occurs due 
to popular pressure rather than legislative processes. Croatto (1997) takes issue 
with some renderings of Neh. 5:11, in which the creditors are urged to repay one 
hundredth of the amount extracted from the poor; he argues instead for a 
translation meaning „hundredfold‟12. In this view, the text would indicate that the 
creditors had indeed become wealthy and could afford this cancellation. Against 
this, it must be said that Nehemiah does not refer to the jubilee explicitly, and this  
is an indication that the jubilee legislation might have been framed after this 
period. Nehemiah would presumably have referred to such a powerful theological 
resource had he been aware of it. 
 
Some theologians immersed in the Church in Latin America, such as Opiyo 
(1987) and Kinsler & Kinsler (1999) contend that there are many references 
indicating that the jubilee occurred, at the very least, on an occasional or partial 
basis. However, their logic is undermined by the very admission that these 
incidents are responses to local crises rather than due to the Levitical legislative 
timescale. Thus they cite, in addition to Nehemiah and Jubilees, Zedekiah‟s 
                                                 
12
 For example, earlier versions of the Jerusalem Bible, also the New International Version and 
the Revised Standard Version.  
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release of slaves (Jer. 34) and Ezekiel‟s „year of liberty‟ (Ezek 46:16-18) (Opiyo, 
1987: 8; Kinsler and Kinsler, 1999: 80). The release of slaves by Zedekiah may 
well have been instigated due to the military demands of the time in the face of 
Babylonian hostilities. Faced with the prospect of siege it may well have been 
prudent to release slaves in order to bolster the army (Lemche 1976: 51). 
Furthermore, although Zedekiah authorises the release of all the slaves and 
without reference to their longevity of service, this act in itself is not a firm 
indication of jubilee practice.  
 
There are rabbinical statements that the jubilee was suspended after the fall of 
Samaria, and it is clear that there is no direct evidence that the jubilee year, 
unlike the sabbatical year, was ever practised (Milgrom, 2004: 307-8). The fact 
that the jubilee was probably never practised is not shirked by modern 
proponents of jubilee but this is not regarded as necessarily problematic, for its 
value lies not in its historicity but its symbolism, and its broader intentions to 
ameliorate the conditions of those who inevitably suffer from natural disaster or 
economic failure. The problems of its implementation – not least under foreign 
rulers - are countered by the evident practical realism of the legislation. The 
extension to forty-nine years and the exception concerning walled cities are 
examples of earlier legislation being altered to take later circumstances into 
account. Thus the Levitical legislation can be viewed as a corrective measure 
concerning matters such as slaves and debt, and reveals how this has been an 
ongoing tradition, adapting to changing circumstances.  
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The most significant development of the jubilee legislation in Israel was the 
invention by Hillel of the prosbul, a technical device to avoid the problems caused 
by lack of credit as the sabbatical year approached. This is not necessarily any 
indication that the jubilee ever occurred, although its invention has been 
regarded as indicating some observance of jubilee regulations. North (1954: 91) 
comments that the prosbul was so widely praised by rabbis that it may be an 
indication that they saw the legislation as at least containing some relevance 
related to actual practice.13 Hillel realised that few people would have any 
incentive to lend money or buy land near the time of the sabbatical year, as they 
would have little chance of ever getting it back. The prosbul was therefore a legal 
mechanism that authorised the eventual repayment of a debt, whereby the 
contract is not between debtor and creditor, but between debtor and a special 
court. The word prosbul itself means „for the court‟, (Cohn-Sherbok, 1992; 
Wigoder, 1989: 624) thus the jubilee legislation – which applied only to 
individuals – was deemed irrelevant in such procedures. The court acted in effect 
on behalf of the interests of the creditor for the purpose of collecting the debt. 
The rabbis had the authority to perform such modifications since the sabbath 
year legislation was rabbinical, not biblical; the rules concerning sabbatical and 
jubilee years were considered only valid for Israelites living in the land of Israel. 
By the time of the late first-Temple, some tribes east of the Jordan had already 
been exiled and these regulations no longer obtained. Thus Raiser (1997: 92) 
concludes that „subsequent observance of the sabbatical and jubilee years could 
                                                 
13
 As stated earlier, North is convinced, unlike many others, that the Sabbatical and Jubilee 
Years were not enacted at the same time across the nation. 
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only be on the basis of rabbinical authority.‟ During the sabbatical and jubilee 
years, the prohibitions on working the land might have exacerbated the 
vulnerability of the poor and exposed them to loan sharks (who were presumably 
not fellow Israelites). In such circumstances the prosbul could have been 
beneficial for the poor, in that it ensured a more acceptable source of obtaining 
credit in the face of hunger and starvation (Green, 1997: 7-9).  
 
Present Jewish practice (excluding extreme Zionists) does not enforce the 
sabbatical year on the grounds that it applies only to Israel as portrayed in Lev. 
25. The jubilee regulations are understood either to refer to a past era (for 
example, the Davidic kingdom) or to be considered as eschatological; that is, 
directed at a future messianic age. This debate continues within Judaism today, 
but in any case the jubilee is now placed within private spiritual contemplation, in 
the practice of the sabbath. 
 
One striking insight of the jubilee year legislation is gained by consideration of 
the intended timescale. Fifty years was approximately the length of an adult life, 
and hence such a span would be sufficient to ensure that debts incurred by one 
man were not transferred to his children (Logan, 1997: 15). Future generations 
would remain on the ancestral land, and not have to bear the consequence of 
their forebears‟ failure or lack of fortune. Hence, one can surmise that an 
important element of the legislation was the view that people should not bear the 
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„sins‟ of their ancestors, and that each generation ought to be allowed to begin 
afresh. 
 
Contemporary uses of the jubilee and Sabbath economics 
(a) The radical hypothesis: jubilee as the beginning of a new social order 
 
One strand of jubilee usage within the campaign was the emphasis on the jubilee 
as a set of principles to be applied, chiefly concerned with the redistribution of 
wealth. In general, sources that clearly bear the influence of Liberation Theology 
were particularly prone to this. Here the jubilee is described more prescriptively 
as a manifesto for action, however seemingly impractical, in that the Church is 
called to proclaim the jubilee and the new dawn it heralds of God‟s eschatological 
reign, with its promise of peace, justice, renewal and liberty. In this approach 
Jesus‟ ministry is regarded as clearly jubilaic in character, with the prophecies 
concerning the jubilee becoming realized in him. Thus the ministry of Jesus is a 
call for jubilee to be enacted; it comprises a radical call for the equalising of 
economic disparities and the return of economic life to its basic principles once 
again. This has been the approach of Yoder (1994), whose work The Politics of 
Jesus, first published in 1972, can be credited with first bringing the jubilee to 
prominence within New Testament studies. This notion of equalisation in the 
jubilee is described by Pope John Paul II (1994: 20) as a „social doctrine‟, though 
it is more typically a feature of those whose approach is in sympathy with that of 
Liberation Theology. For instance, Padilla (1976), like Yoder (1994 and Green 
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(1997), understands the jubilee simply as demonstrating absolute equality 
between people as an ethical demand, not just a theoretical statement. The 
same applies to many pronouncements of Jubilee South. 
 
Equality was also a theme in the Jubilee 2000 coalition‟s own publications. The 
first edition of the Debt Cutter’s Handbook (1996) contained six pages of biblical 
and liturgical material reflecting on debt (Hanson, 1996: 38-43). Interestingly, the 
first section in this is headed „Jubilee‟ but the key reference is to Deut. 15, not 
Lev. 25. Indeed, there is no explanation of what the jubilee year involved, other 
than that it ensured that nobody would be left in debt slavery for ever. Forster‟s 
following article (1996: 40-41) described the jubilee year as a „50th year 
regeneration programme‟ which comprised „a total redistribution of wealth and 
capital back to the equalities of capital shared among the families at the 
beginning of their occupation of the land‟. This may have been the hope of those 
framing the jubilee legislation, but the text does not say so. Conflating jubilee and 
notions of equality is an inaccurate rendering of external ideas on to the text.  
 
A method of deductive theological reasoning was a feature of the Jubilee 2000 
campaign, yet this was not as major a component as might first seem; many of 
the references to jubilee did not make explicit the link between the biblical text 
and particular application, but were used rather to establish connections with 
debt relief and encourage the notion of a new beginning.  Most notable in Jubilee 
South, jubilee was not confined to matters of debt release, but embraced a 
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comprehensive hope for a new social order based on constraints upon power 
and the upholding of life. This vision encompassed social and global aspects, 
including the call to conversion and reparation: 
 
„...jubilee signifies freedom from debt and all forms of domination 
together with the restoration of land and a dignified livelihood to all the 
oppressed...‟ (Jubilee South, 2000a) 
 
 
Another instance of this also shows a clear debt to the work of Meeks: 
 
„our concept of Jubilee.... is a concept of justice, in this economic 
(oikonomia) justice. It embraces, apart from debt cancellation, the 
restoration and reparation concepts.‟ (Jubilee South, 1999b) 
  
There are several problems with this way of translating the jubilee legislation into 
contemporary Christian social ethics. One of these is concerned with the 
historicity of the jubilee, the likelihood of its non-implementation, the uncertainty 
over its period and the debate over whether it was intended as a once-only event 
or as a regular occurrence. Radicals rarely consider this issue: as we noted at 
the beginning of this chapter, Green even inferred that the jubilee had been a 
historical occurrence.  Attention to the text of the jubilee legislation reveals 
caveat and limitations, such as the exemptions for walled cities; although the 
release of debt slaves involves economic redistribution, the legislation does not 
call for a change to economic patterns nor does it challenge the institution of 
debt-slavery, which is assumed to be an acceptable feature in society. 
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In addition, a problem arises from the original context of the regulations, 
concerned with the various assumptions about economic life limited to the world 
of an ancient, agrarian society. Such an understanding of economic relations was 
confined to private debt, against which the fields of commercial borrowing on 
behalf of a collective in an industrial, capitalist society have no parallel. Clearly 
then, there are questions as to the applicability of any of the issues to which the 
jubilee points. The population is assumed to be stable and the economy to be 
static, subject neither to growth or change, though the background to the taking 
on of debt was often famine or disaster (e.g. Neh. 5). In a cyclical, agrarian 
economy, new beginnings are conceivable; in the global economy of today the 
notion of re-starting the economy is inconceivable because it is premised on 
capital growth using money.     
 
Perhaps most critical to an ongoing understanding of the jubilee, is the 
assumption in the legislation that despite the best of motives and intentions there 
will be some who will inevitably suffer from natural economic processes; their 
plight is not normally redeemable through such processes, but requires 
something extraneous, such as political action. However, a further problem with 
the radical hypothesis is that the jubilee was instigated by the priests and other 
governing classes; while their motives might have included consideration for the 
fabric of the society as a whole, the impetus for socio-economic change came 
not from the victims of the economic arrangements, but from those at the other 
end of the social scale. Thus the jubilee can be viewed as a means of 
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maintaining the status quo for the powerful, through appeasing the poorest, 
rather than challenging the economic structures in society. It has been pointed 
out that, today, it is also the clergy who are – perhaps uniquely - placed between 
powerless and powerful to point to matters of „common interest‟ (Logan, 1998b: 
62). The danger of approaches based on moral exhortations to the consciences 
of the powerful is that they absolve most people of their responsibilities. There is 
the potential for this to happen with the use of jubilee imagery, because it is 
based upon legislation enacted by the powerful on behalf of society. In other 
words, jubilee imagery does not regard the poor as agents of social change but 
as passive recipients of divinely authorised legislation enforced by the ruling 
class.  
 
We may therefore conclude that the jubilee cannot be regarded unequivocally as 
a radical concept since it also contains significant conservative elements and 
exceptions; nor can those elements of its genuinely radical character be readily 
applied, since the economic and social context of the legislation is so markedly 
different from that of today. 
 
 (b) Jubilee as metaphorical imagery of ‘release’ 
 
The jubilee theme may also be utilised as symbolical imagery, concerned not so 
much with the detail of the legislation but how its meaning has been employed 
since then, not least by Jesus, and how such imagery might continue to function 
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today. In large part this is due to the work of Sharon Ringe (1985), who in turn 
adapted the work of Sloan (1977); Ringe‟s work was influential for many of the 
campaign‟s writers, such as Logan and Selby. Sloan stated that the 
eschatological character of the jubilee became significant through its 
interpretation and usage by commentators in the centuries following the exile; 
Ringe also understands the jubilee and its content in the New Testament as 
being eschatological and symbolic but, critically, she uses the eschatological 
imagery in a way different to the prescriptive approach.  
 
Ringe‟s Jesus, Liberation and the Biblical Jubilee (1985) is an important work 
developing further the connections between biblical exegesis and the ministry of 
Jesus. Her work is typical, though with far greater depth, of those who perceive 
the message of Jesus as incorporating explicitly the message of the jubilee. 
According to Ringe, the jubilee motif is useful as a metaphor, a symbol of release 
into liberty for the poor, though the foundational concept underpinning the jubilee 
- of God‟s sovereignty  - is not metaphorical but understood both factually and as 
eschatological hope. As Brueggemann puts it in his introduction to her work: 
 
„[the metaphor of jubilee]… is no longer a flat social process to be 
implemented or rejected, but it is now a linguistic act that continues to have 
dangerous power in all sorts of contexts.‟ (Ringe, 1985: x) 
 
Indeed, metaphorical imagery is here described as the way in which we 
encounter Scripture, and whose purpose is to provoke responses rather than 
prescribe particular courses of action: (Ringe, 1985: 91) this is a crucial 
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methodological point. Ringe‟s approach to Christian ethics understands such 
imagery as helping to „establish the contours of the world in which one‟s action 
takes place‟ (1985: 10) rather than direct application or transliteration. Such 
images transcend the particularities of cultural and social context, and need to be 
opened up by each generation (1985: 97, 10). In this way Ringe seems to have 
found a way of obviating the difficulties discussed in the previous chapter, 
concerning the practicalities of devising ethics in a plural society where 
universally agreed concepts are absent. 
 
Sloan contends there is a close tie linking Jesus‟ announcement and jubilaic 
imagery, and, furthermore, that in the words of Jesus, forgiveness contains a 
„jubilary import‟. He argues that the world aphesis, the translation of the Hebrew 
dĕrōr (Lev. 25:10), in the Septuagint suggests a primary meaning of liberation, 
and is thus connected strongly to „dektos‟ („acceptable‟, Lk.4:19) (Sloan, 1977: 
34-38). Ringe is more cautious than Sloan in her approach to finding jubilee 
typologies in the New Testament, remarking that Greek makes less distinction 
between terms than does Hebrew. She takes particular issue with Yoder (1994: 
62), and by implication, Sloan, who have made much of such linguistic 
similarities, and whose approach she accuses of being based on inadequate 
textual analysis. She argues that not only has aphesis a wider range of meanings 
than jubilaic ones, but a more fruitful identification of jubilee traditions lies in the 
clustering of jubilaic imagery within a short passage of the Gospels (Ringe, 1985: 
34-35).   
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In Ringe‟s use of the jubilee theme the text of Is. 61 is pivotal, perhaps more so 
than Lev. 25. because in Lk. 4 Jesus quotes Is.61 and makes connections 
between it and his own person and ministry. According to Ringe, jubilee is 
fundamentally about liberty, and its features can be elucidated from consideration 
of the Isaiah text: the announcement of God‟s reign, the proclamation of good 
news to the poor, and the declaration of „release‟. This compares favourably with 
the Levitical format of announcement: measures to enact the redemption of land, 
and the reminders of God‟s sovereignty over the land. The Isaiah text contains 
the jubilee imagery that points to a „boundary movement‟ of God‟s eschatological 
and sovereign rule, where the new order breaks in upon the old.  
 
The weakness of Ringe‟s exegesis is that she bases the jubilee theme on dĕrōr,  
but in effect, the main source of jubilee information is taken from Is. 61 and not 
Lev. 25. Although the prophecy in Is. 61 can be seen as superficially similar to 
Lev. 25, much still hinges on the exegesis of one Hebrew word. This explains 
how, for instance, forgiveness can play a major part in the jubilee imagery, 
despite its complete absence from the Levitical text. The problematic link is 
between Is. 61 and Lev. 25, not between Isaiah and Luke. Others beside Ringe 
have asserted that Lev. 25 and Is. 61:1-2 are virtually identical in terminology and 
typology: „The combination of “proclaim”, derôr [sic], and “year of Yahweh” would 
almost certainly have recalled to Israelite hearers the jubilee year…‟ (North, 
1954: 228) North states that although there are no certain grounds for linking Is. 
61 and Lk. 4, nonetheless the circumstances indicate that Jesus was saying that 
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these lines of Is. 61 are fulfilled in him. This may indeed be so, but this does not 
mean that necessarily the teachings of Jesus embraced jubilee motifs if we 
understand these as being the spirit of the regulations found in Lev. 25; one can 
affirm that Jesus offered forgiveness and proclaimed the inauguration of the 
liberating kingdom of God, without necessarily including that his message has 
the jubilee at its heart. 
 
Ringe finds many aspects of the message and ministry of Jesus consonant with 
Is. 61:1 and 58:6 (which is also translated by aphesis). She sees the whole of 
Luke 4 (synagogue proclamation, deliverances) and Luke 7 (forgiveness) as 
mediating the „transformative events outlined in the Isaianic passages‟ (Ringe, 
1985: 48). She finds such jubilee imagery in the recognition Jesus gives to the 
poor (the beatitudes, banquets) and to those who respond to them (Zacchaeus, 
the woman at Bethany, the rich young man). She describes the Lucan Lord‟s 
Prayer as eschatological in that it looks forward to the coming of God‟s kingdom - 
which is, itself, described in imagery reminiscent of the jubilee traditions; its focus 
is on that boundary movement described above: 
 
„While it is not appropriate to call the Lord‟s Prayer a Jubilee prayer in the 
strict sense of being able to trace each of its petitions to specific Jubilee 
texts, it is nonetheless a Jubilee prayer in that it expresses … images in 
common with the Jubilee traditions of Hebrew Scriptures as elaborated 
elsewhere in the Synoptic Gospels.‟ (Ringe, 1985: 84) 
 
Ringe proceeds to identify nine jubilee images in eighteen instances in the 
Synoptics, including forgiveness, repentance, healing and exorcism as well as 
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the proclamation of good news to the poor. While Ringe asserts that she finds it 
„quite likely‟ that jubilee images figured in the teachings of Jesus, she admits that 
little can be known about how these featured. Jubilee imagery is woven into the 
Synoptics, but she doubts whether those gospel writers were cognisant of 
perpetuating the jubilee tradition. Ringe seems to be saying that although jubilee 
themes are undoubtedly present, they have been so detached from their original 
source of inspiration as to be no longer readily obvious. This is a little puzzling, 
for one could argue that if jubilee was so important then one might assume it 
would have been mentioned a little more overtly, even if one accepts that this 
imagery is subsumed into Jesus‟ eschatological kingdom of God announced as 
the „acceptable year of the Lord‟. Nonetheless, Ringe‟s approach does provide a 
better response than Yoder to the question of why jubilee is not referred to 
explicitly in the gospels. There is more to jubilee than release from bondage 
however, the work of Sloan and Ringe may thus be regarded as insufficient for 
wider theological reflection on debt rather than inappropriate: jubilee is also about 
repentance, and the conservative elements of its practice also need to be taken 
into consideration.   
 
One significant feature of jubilee imagery has been to provide an ideal against 
which to posit the contemporary situation, helping to throw into sharp relief the 
assumptions and power relations that lie underneath. The concept of radical debt 
release, though impractical, can thus serve to provoke wider questions about 
economic and political structures and the kind of social vision for which 
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Christians hope. It is in this sense that Fager (1993: 34, 121) maintains that the 
jubilee theme developed from an increasingly problem-ridden piece of legislation 
into theological symbolism „not in the sense of unreal but in the sense of truly 
real‟. He denies that the practical difficulties of enacting the jubilee legislation 
mean that it is necessarily utopian: rather, the jubilee lays claim to an underlying 
reality which contrasts with appearance. The jubilee is thus both descriptive and 
normative, it states what (really) is, and what ought to be. The jubilee can 
therefore be regarded as a didactic resource whose purpose is to hold up a set of 
values, rather than a set of statutes (Houston, 2001);14 such a description is 
broadly consonant with Ringe‟s view of the metaphor of jubilee helping to 
establish contours rather than specifics. Raiser observes that in holding up a 
vision of the future against the present economic order, the jubilee is able to 
prompt questions about the ideologies that distort our sense of what is 
happening, and may blind us to their consequences. Utopian projections such as 
the jubilee „may assume the role of a critical test for the existing reality, 
unmasking the ideological element‟ (Raiser, 1997: 20). The jubilee can thus be 
regarded as prophetic, contradicting the realities of economic practice and 
philosophy. It is indeed true that through conversations with the likes of the 
Jubilee campaign, some economists were made aware of the devastating human 
impact of their policies - to their surprise. It is also true that in consultations the 
WCC has preferred to lecture the World Bank with the worst examples of World 
Bank-aided projects, rather than a manifest desire to enter into meaningful 
                                                 
14
 However, Soelle (1991: 20) describes the jubilee laws as visionary, realistic proposals and 
„concrete socio-historical concepts of a better order‟ 
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dialogue.15  The jubilee as a utopian, idealist image can perform a valuable 
function helping people to realise the extent to which contemporary economics 
and politics continue to fail the poor, and to articulate a vision of the nature of the 
good society:  
„At best, the jubilee, like love, is an impossible possibility. It is always 
there to question our self-satisfied achievements and call us to new 
heights. It is highly useful as a goad [sic] but never realizable.‟ (M. 
Taylor, 1995: 169)16 
 
One is reminded here of Bonhoeffer‟s concept of the dependent relationship 
between ultimate and penultimate, for in the ultimate of the jubilee the 
penultimate issues of practical debt relief derive inspiration and guidance; in the 
penultimate there is the focus is on the ultimate yet without expectation of 
actually achieving it fully. 
 
(c) Jubilee as a worked example of practical faith 
 
Here the concept of jubilee is appraised as neither principled legislation nor 
symbolical imagery alone, but emerges from a reflection upon both. In this way 
the problems in the legislation detail such as the exemptions of walled cities, and 
issues of contextual difference are brought fully into the discussion. Logan 
(1997), for example, has developed Ringe‟s approach using the jubilee image as 
a tool for discovering the nature of divine salvation for the present situation, and 
asking the question of what we mean by „release‟ today. He states that the 
                                                 
15
 I am grateful to Wendy Tyndale, former Co-ordinator of the World Faiths Development 
Dialogue, for this observation (2003).   
16
 Niebuhr‟s phrase „impossible possibility‟ was also used by Spray (1999) 
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important factor is not how Jesus may have used the jubilee image – if at all – 
but how the powerfulness of its imagery can reveal to human beings other 
possibilities of living beside the status quo.  
 
Like Ringe, Logan avoids direct application of jubilee practices, but uses the 
imagery of release to address the nature of economic dependency, such as 
wage slavery and debt. Rather than based upon land, as in the Levitical jubilee, 
Logan is concerned with money and the way power is related to it, determining 
availabilities and conditions of credit, for instance. As with his understanding of 
the Levitical jubilee, Logan sees the practice of jubilee release as one which is 
reformist, benefiting all sectors of society. He does this not by imposing a 
particular doctrine of release on to economic circumstances, but positing the 
questions of power and dependency alongside matters of political and economic 
realism. 
 
Atherton (1997) describes the jubilee as combining both idealism and realism, 
hope and economics, but without the utopianism expectation of a revolutionary, 
new economic and social order. Here the recurrent fifty-year cycle in the jubilee 
legislation is viewed as evidence of its rejection of revolutionary intent, 
recognising that, as we saw earlier, economic systems will inevitably all fail. 
Atherton sees this as examples of sin and finitude within the jubilee as the 
legislation was being framed: the principle of the jubilee is not therefore a simple 
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one of release from debt bondage, rather a set of insights about human systems 
and organisations.  
 
This realism is manifest in the campaign‟s awareness of the problem of moral 
hazard: jubilee remission in Leviticus is unconditional, and therefore the jubilee is 
open to the accusation that it rewards laziness as well as thrift. The prosbul 
serves here as a pertinent indication of how the availability of credit would dry up 
if incentives were removed. The campaign‟s rhetoric, in the UK, in Zambia and as 
a coalition, firmly stated that remission should not be allowed to reward 
corruption and waste; its endorsement of conditionality from below was one 
attempt to obviate this possibility. 
 
Summary: the jubilee in theological reflection on debt 
 
Jubilee 2000 used the theme of jubilee primarily as a symbol for a new start, free 
from the bondage of debt slavery. This chimed brilliantly with the zeitgeist of the 
1990s. As a political device, jubilee was invaluable to the campaign; as a 
theological resource its main function was, with the exception of Jubilee South 
and a few other radicals, to develop the broad theme of release for a very 
different context, rather than doctrinal imposition. It is therefore little surprise that 
technical difficulties of the jubilee legislation, such as the exemption for walled 
cities, or slaves for that matter, rarely appeared in the advocacy material of the 
Jubilee 2000 campaign or the theological reflections of its supporters. We have 
228 
 
 
considered how the jubilee image functions, but we need to ask questions of the 
content of that vision also.  
 
The jubilee year was not directly aimed at the remission of debts, unlike the 
sabbatical year, but was concerned with the restoration of sold and lost land, and 
the remission of certain types of slaves. Thus the jubilee did posit the 
consideration of financial obligations within a wider economic perspective. As 
many commentators have attested (Fager 1993: 26; Ringe, 1985: 95; Logan, 
1997; Selby, 1997), power relations are the issue, not debt, for debt is not itself 
detrimental. The destructive element lies in the taking out of debt, as with any 
other economic contract or transaction, where one party has much greater power 
than the other. In contrast to those who see the jubilee as unrealistic, the very 
realism of the legislation – for example the exceptions due to practical 
considerations – can itself be inspirational. We see that struggle between 
idealism and social realities in the way the legislation was framed; the jubilee is 
illustrative of the compromises and caveats that were granted in order to make 
the legislation appear workable. There is a strong case for claiming that the 
jubilee, in its evolving tradition as recorded in Leviticus, is consistent with 
Brown‟s „dialogical traditionalism‟ discussed in the previous chapter.  The jubilee 
therefore offers clues about the extent to which visionary programmes can be 
incorporated, if not translated, into more contemporary considerations on 
economic matters. Its ethics are not limited to considerations of individual justice 
and rehabilitation but towards the general welfare of society as a whole. 
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Preston (1994: 132) argued that the text of Leviticus does not lend itself to the 
extraction of a particular principle, other than perhaps the divine sovereignty of 
the land, yet it is abundantly clear that there is a fundamental underpinning the 
jubilee: this is to do with the contingency of human possessions and systems. 
One aspect of this is that property rights are not absolute but conditional, a 
reflection that „the earth is the Lord‟s (Ps. 24:1); the other is the realisation that 
there are limitations to the concept of possession, that human systems will fail, 
the „poor will always be with you‟ (Deut. 15:11) and hence, extraneous, corrective 
measures will always be required from time to time.  
 
Preston moreover warned that the use of symbolic actions and eschatological 
realism is inadequate to formulate decisions on contemporary economics (M. 
Taylor, 2004b: 205). He is right that these are insufficient, though as we have 
seen, the jubilee offers more than mere statutes or symbolism, for it functions 
well at the emotional and imaginative levels of Christian prophetic action. This is 
a most important aspect of theological ethics, the expression of the vision of the 
future in such a way as to condition our present actions (Forrester, 2004: 14). As 
a metaphor for liberation it is extremely powerful, and as an ideal of what can be, 
it calls the world to judgment and repentance. It recognises the damage to social 
relationships and the wider society caused by the long-term skewing of 
inequalities, and calls into question the way in which power and wealth become 
distributed. It is able to combine both devotional and practical matters: 
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„The Jubilee paradigm… seems to have a tremendous potential to bring 
into common focus … creation and redemption, God‟s grace and human 
action, the spiritual and the social, justification and justice, human 
liberation and the liberation of life and nature, the kingdom of God and the 
city of man, mission and world tasks of construction and reconstruction.‟ 
(Arias, 1984: 34) 
 
Indeed, the liturgical and devotional aspects of jubilee are often ignored by 
commentators.17 North‟s work is a major exception to this and he locates the 
jubilee in the context of family and national life. Surprisingly, the link between the 
proclamation of jubilee and the commemoration of the Day of Atonement has 
gone relatively unacknowledged,18 which has consequences for the way the 
concept of forgiveness was marginalised, as discussed in our next chapter. 
 
Jubilee was both radical and conservative, and it managed successfully to 
combine both idealism and realism (Spray, 1999: 37-8). It was radical in its call 
for the redistribution of property, but reformist in its attitude to the system that 
enabled inequalities to emerge. Indeed, the jubilee assumed that the system 
would not change, and hence it would be required every generation or two. It did 
not call for a new social order but rather for modifications to the existing one, and 
it relied not on the actions of the poor but adherence to priestly legislation by the 
powerful. Its weakness for contemporary Christian ethics lies in its location of the 
ideal society in the past; in the details of significant exclusions allowed to walled 
cities, Levites and to foreigners; and in the lack of clear, unequivocal linkage to 
the ministry of Jesus. One cannot dispute the distinct possibility that the 
                                                 
17
 A notable exception to this is Harris (1996) 
18
 Logan and Dent are notable exceptions 
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„acceptable year of the Lord‟ in Lk. 4 may be a reference to echoes of jubilee 
found in Is. 61, but the case is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. There are 
dangers in the desire to return to a former golden age (Houston, 2001: 45), and 
these are exacerbated by the dissimilarities in economic conditions and 
processes between the ancient world and the present day. Today‟s economies 
are not static, and one cannot simply re-start such processes.  
 
The main potency of jubilee lies in its being fuel for the imaginative dimension of 
Christian social ethics, but there are also some pertinent insights into the 
progressive imbalances in wealth that lead to entrenched poverty, and the means 
by which these might be redressed. However, the jubilee presents important 
difficulties in establishing specific courses of action leading towards a world 
devoid of debt slavery, and the dangers of reading into the text from a later 
perspective are significant. The jubilee is more a call to repentance on the part of 
the oppressors than a call for revolution on behalf of the oppressed (Logan: 
1997: 26); it represents an important contribution to reflection on debt, but does 
not enable us to attend to the matter in all its dimensions. Accordingly, we find 
that jubilee alone presents insufficient resources for theological engagement with 
the issues of debt, individual or collective, although many helpful insights emerge 
nonetheless. We therefore need to turn now to consider more comprehensive 
approaches to the problem of debt from a theological perspective that are 
cognisant of jubilee, but not dependent on it. 
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Chapter 7 
 
 
Grace and Forgiveness:  
theology and political economy in a wider context 
 
 
 
 
One of the foundational themes of the Jubilee 2000 campaign was that 
ultimately, human needs should have priority over economic demands.  
In this chapter we shall examine attempts to frame theological responses to 
debt in a wider context, developing the themes of grace and forgiveness, in 
order to see how a continued, meaningful reflection on debt might further be 
developed. In each of these we see how an alternative economics is placed 
alongside the prevailing system of economic exchange. The location for this 
reflection begins with international debt but is not confined to it, for it also 
introduces concepts of exchange that involve non-monetary aspects of human 
life, such as cultural and social ties. In other words, human beings are viewed 
not in isolation but as integral parts of a wider society: mutuality and 
reciprocity therefore emerge as important features of this reflection. We will 
consider the extent to which these themes are helpful in theological 
engagement on debt, and how they may be used constructively, drawing on 
Atherton’s framework in chapter 5 
 
We saw in chapter 3 that the campaign opposed SAPs on the grounds that 
human needs - the basic conditions of life, food, shelter, education and health 
care - were essential requirements and had moral priority over the legal 
obligations of debt repayment. A common refrain in the campaign as well as 
in this chapter, is the view that economic tools such as money and interest 
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rates, as purely human constructs, are not immutable but open to 
transformation through popular support in order to improve the lives of the 
poor (M. Taylor, 2000).1 We shall investigate what is meant by this prior 
demand, the weight it is given, and the implications it presents for theological 
engagement. The popular campaign for debt cancellation inevitably portrayed 
a simplified argument, but despite appearances, the underlying dynamics are 
those of theological attempts to posit human and political economy in some 
kind of constructive interface.  
 
In order to discern material for fruitful theological reflection we need to look 
beyond the campaign materials to the work of a few select theologians who 
have made distinctive contributions or highlighted significant issues. We need 
to enquire: what are the contours of a theological engagement with debt, and 
to what extent are these approaches genuinely dialogical? How can grace, 
forgiveness and political economy be correlated, and what theological insights 
emerge through the interaction?  
 
First, we consider the work of Michael Northcott, a leading theologian and 
ethicist whose main academic work in recent years has been on 
environmental ethics. He supported the campaign and wrote the most 
popularly accessible book advocating debt cancellation, in 1999 (Northcott, 
1999a). His approach is rooted in the concept of divine sovereignty that calls 
into question all other forms of knowledge and obligation. Secondly, we 
examine the work of Selby, the former Bishop of Worcester and leading 
                                                 
1
 In addition see Jenkins (2000), Cowley (2006), Pettifor (1998b). Many other instances could 
be mentioned. 
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campaigner within the Church of England. It was his initiative that led to the 
presentation on Jubilee 2000 at the General Synod of the Church of England 
in 1999. His work is the most detailed and profound on the issues to date. He 
is as committed to the plight of the suffering as is Northcott, but offers a 
method based on discerning points of interaction in which theology and 
economics can engage in dialogue. His attempt to formulate a theological 
ethic for the economy based upon divine grace is also a feature of the work of 
Tanner, whose approach is not dissimilar. Her work postdates the campaign 
but, nonetheless, offers fruitful insight. Simon Taylor’s advocacy of 
forgiveness was contentious among campaign supporters, yet raises wider 
issues concerning the role and nature of justice in such engagement. Daniel 
Bell in turn offers a contrasting approach to forgiveness that goes beyond 
human conceptions of justice and is rooted in the extravagant grace of God. 
 
Michael Northcott : the divine sovereignty of grace 
 
 
Northcott grounds his theological approach in the experience of the poorest 
affected by the debt crisis, affording prominence to the experiences of the 
victims of the debt crisis rather than to economic theory. He calls for the return 
of divine sovereignty over money, for the IFIs to pursue the common good 
rather than private gain, for the regulation of the financial and trading systems, 
and for a return to the physical link between money and commodities such as 
gold or land (Northcott 1999a: 157, 1999b: 14). The key feature of Northcott’s 
theology is the sovereignty of God’s kingdom and the Lordship of Jesus 
Christ; the cross and resurrection represent Christ’s victory over the powers in 
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both the spiritual and earthly realms. Thus all earthly power – not least that of 
economists and politicians - is provisional, derivative and secondary to God’s: 
secular authority is ‘accountable to the moral laws and commands of the 
Bible, and … to the living people of God’ (Northcott 199a: 91). In theological 
terms, the cause of the debt crisis lies in giving to financial systems an 
authoritative status above divinely teaching. By contrast, divine sovereignty 
over human affairs is manifest when those debts are cancelled whose 
consequences endanger human life. For Northcott, therefore, the touchstone 
for judging the morality of economic policies is their effects upon people’s 
welfare. 
 
Northcott links Christ’s triumph over the forces of sin and evil to the moral 
responsibility of Christians to acknowledge that victory by submitting to the 
divine authority: 
 
‘Christians have a duty to name this evil for what it is, and against it to 
continue to affirm the authority of the ascended Christ who is Lord of 
Lords and who has dethroned the principalities and powers of this 
world.’(Northcott, 1999a: 179) 
 
The prior ‘gift’ has been ‘paid’ by Christ and the world stands in his debt. 
Therefore, as part of the obligation to that act of grace, the West should 
forgive the poor, indebted nations of the world: 
  
‘If the sacrifice of Africa’s people…[is] to come to an end the power of 
debt in Africa must be dethroned, and the power of the external 
agencies which impose this debt on Africa must be challenged and 
overturned..... Christ has paid the debts of the peoples of Africa in his 
sacrifice on the cross. Debt forgiveness is not only the moral but the 
spiritual response which the desperate plight of Africa’s peoples 
requires.’ (Northcott, 1999a: 92) 
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Northcott views the present form of capitalism as a clear evil, a manifestation 
of idolatry, a representation of Antichrist, for in its own interests its inexorable 
domination has brought untold misery and chaos to the majority of Earth’s 
inhabitants. The source of this evil lies in the free market’s basis on a ‘false 
theology of humanness’ that bases its understanding of human satisfaction 
upon people in isolation. According to this view, one can separate the 
economic component from other aspects of human affairs, and consider 
people as lone individuals dissociated from social networks, cultural ties or 
obligations. Indeed, such social and cultural factors act as potential obstacles 
to freedom of individual choice, and in so doing, confine people in poverty. 
Northcott is clear that such an individualist view denies the essential, 
relational nature of humankind.  
 
Northcott’s analysis of global capitalism betrays the heavy influence of 
Liberation Theology, especially the work of Gutiérrez and Sobrino, and his 
economic analysis owes much to dependency theory and Marxism. This helps 
to explain his understanding of how the rich become richer and the poor 
become poorer as one process, reducible to a single cause. The debt crisis in 
Africa is, therefore for him, not the result of unpredictable events, but the 
direct consequence of deliberate policy decisions in that the IFI advisors and 
policy-makers on debt were well aware of the likely outcomes of their actions 
and guidance. The effects of Structural Adjustment Programmes - hunger and 
homelessness, environmental devastation, drugs and war - are ‘clearly a 
denial of God’ who cares for the poor and who demands an equitable 
distribution of the earth’s resources (Northcott, 1999a: 47).  
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Northcott’s strength lies in the way he explores the political consequences of 
debt. He draws causal links between the drastic effects of debt repayments in 
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and their ensuing civil wars (1999b: 11-
12). Yugoslavia was the twelfth most indebted nation in 1981 and adopted 
austerity measures on the instruction of the IMF and the World Bank. The 
effect of these measures on unemployment and public services, added to the 
withdrawal of funds allocated to some republics, fuelled the secessionist 
process and ethnic tensions, as happened in Germany in the 1920s and 
1930s. Northcott claims that in Rwanda, although ethnic tensions were 
present, it was the austerity measures of the World Bank, introduced in 1990, 
that ignited the genocide four years later.2 Such measures were indeed 
factors that exacerbated economic and ethnic tensions, although Diamond 
(2006) and Gourevitch (2000) do not consider this a dominant theme. 
 
Northcott’s tendency to describe matters in stark, polar opposites means he 
devotes little attention to ambiguities and exceptions. This leads him to 
generalise in ways that are not always helpful or accurate. He is right to claim 
that SAPs have resulted in austerity measures which, in turn, make 
governments unpopular, leading them to purchase Western armaments to 
suppress civil disturbances. Yet not all arms purchases can be explained in 
this way. Northcott does not address the problem of inter-African struggle, not 
all of which can be assigned to strife promoted by debt-induced poverty. For 
example, the Ivory Coast’s purchase of French Mirage fighter aircraft3 had 
                                                 
2
 Ndungane (2003: 24-5) also supports Northcott here. Gray (2002: xvii) contends that conflict 
over scarce natural resources – in this case water, was a factor. 
3
 I am grateful to Nicholas Cournoyer, Managing Director of Montpelier Asset Management 
Limited, a company which specialises in the secondary debt market trade, for this information. 
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little to do with the prevention of internal unrest, though one could argue that it 
did represent a prestige project. 
 
In terms of economic alternatives, Northcott rejects the orthodox one-size-fits-
all approach that the route from poverty occurs through growth-led models of 
economic development, recognising that Africa’s economy is sufficiently 
distinctive that the prevailing market economics of the IFIs cannot apply. It is 
highly vulnerable to primary commodity price fluctuations, its internal patterns 
of trade are weak, and for cultural reasons it is particularly vulnerable to 
external manipulation. Northcott (1999a: 68ff.) draws on the work of the 
anthropologist Mauss, who developed an understanding of the centrality of 
gift-giving in primitive human society. In contrast to modern processes of 
exchange and money, Mauss contends that early societies viewed gift-giving 
as a reciprocal process, involving obligations upon the recipient. Northcott 
contrasts contemporary practice with the primal gift economy of earlier 
societies (including ancient Israel) in which the bonds of care and respect 
were integral, were seen as acts both between people and between people 
and God, and which prevented severe inequalities of wealth. Such a system 
was designed to keep the common wealth in perpetual circulation, that is, 
through the absence of hoarding or saving. By drawing such a contrast, 
Northcott exposes the moral bankruptcy of current trade and financial 
operations, in which money has become a commodity in itself and networks of 
relationships are severed. Yet Mauss’ examples which Northcott quotes are 
all taken from primitive societies (even pre-agrarian ones), and Northcott does 
not discuss how the value of such evidence might translate to an entirely 
different set of social and economic relations. Such an omission betrays the 
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hallmarks of an approach based on imposition of principles rather than 
dialogue. 
 
Northcott’s maxims for ethical development advocate ‘non-economic’ criteria 
for measuring the quality of life (1999a: 165-7). He argues for a greater value 
to be afforded to creativity rather than to consumption, though he does not 
indicate how such creativity can be assessed. Preference should also be 
given to economic interaction that lies between people belonging to ‘morally 
charged networks’ of local people or communities, rather than free-standing 
networks with little sense of community or kinship. His approach is one which 
attempts to return power to local, self-reliant communities and adopted 
through smaller-scale patterns of trade. Northcott advocates more locally 
based solutions to the relief of poverty, citing the examples of Kerala and 
Eritrea, who have each pursued alternative directions to that of the Western, 
growth-led practices, through land redistribution and locally sustainable 
agriculture. Such examples are illuminating and afford evidence that such 
alternatives can be remarkably successful. Yet it is hard to see how these 
very particular instances can be instructive for contexts so environmentally 
different. Northcott makes no suggestions for the wider, international 
dimension of financial trade, nor - crucially - does he address issues of 
economic growth. He challenges the view of conventional development that 
human needs are insatiable and argues instead that our needs require finite 
resources, not ever expanding ones. Although the latter point is strictly true, 
one cannot equate the finite nature of needs with the abandonment of 
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economic growth. We are given the impression that Northcott’s view of the 
economy is essentially static. 
 
Northcott’s view of economics is shaped by his conviction that it is a social 
construct created in a network of social relations, and does not reflect natural 
processes, nor is it ‘governed by invisible and incontrovertible laws’(1999a: 
169). Because of this human origination and dependence, the way to poverty 
relief lies in the re-assertion of politics over the discipline of economics in 
order to produce all kinds of goods for the benefit of all. Thus Northcott affirms 
state provision for shelter, employment, taxation and welfare systems. In so 
doing, he does not base his ethics on the concept of human rights, because 
the true source of morality is God, from whom all rights are derived (1999a: 
176). Secular, human rights lack any moral foundation and are open to abuse 
and manipulation by powerful interests (1999a: 176). In positing his case so 
starkly, Northcott implies, like Pettifor, that there are no economic ‘facts’ of life 
which politics and theology need to take into account. We find no 
acknowledgement of the experience that sudden economic change is always 
traumatic and socially divisive;4 that some system of allocating scarce goods 
needs to operate; that growth is necessary, and involves calculated 
incentives, loans and associated risks.  
 
Northcott’s approach is to confront economic and political processes where 
the poor are suffering greatly, with the demands of God’s kingdom. In his 
view, it is through such reflection that theology can recapture its former role as 
                                                 
4
 This is discussed by Alkire (2001) 
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genuinely authoritative.5 He is very clear about the nature of the ideal society 
and the Christian principles and elements that constitute this. His method is 
very good at exposing the inadequacies and contradictions of global 
capitalism and its effects on the world’s poorest; he reveals clearly the way in 
which globalisation and debt erode the capability of national governments, 
and  how poverty undermines democracy, for example, through corruption. 
However, although his work is directed at a popular audience, his arguments 
require more thorough rigour and tend to reduce matters to polarised goods 
and evils. His view of capitalism and economic processes is too narrow, and 
in emphasising the softer, social aspects of economic considerations, he 
omits any of the technical insights. It is the totality of the way economics is 
subservient to politics (itself dependent on theology) that is problematic, for 
there is no appreciation of any distinctive insight from economic practice. 
Northcott does not consider issues of scarcity, nor many of the moral hazards 
involved in debt cancellation, although he is aware of the extent of corruption 
and the urgent need for internal political reform in indebted nations.  
Moreover, it is not easy to see how to progress from Northcott’s principles to 
specific courses of action, nor what criteria can be used to ascertain clearly 
when government proposals do indeed endanger the lives of the poorest. It 
would appear that for Northcott, in those apocalyptic contexts where debt-
related poverty is extreme, such criteria are all too evident.  
 
Essentially, Northcott eschews economics for a consciously aneconomic 
approach. For more general application, his approach is inadequate. 
                                                 
5
 Here Northcott shows his debt to O’Donovan: O’Donovan (1990: 19) 
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Northcott’s work is highly polemic and valuable as a campaigning tool, but 
less useful from the point of ethical discernment. Precisely because the issues 
are too starkly delineated, theological engagement is reduced to prophetic 
condemnation alone. His contribution is most useful in his engagement with 
political matters, but his economic analysis and assumptions undermine 
aspects of this. His theological understanding is apparently unaffected by 
encounters with international debt in its various guises, and does not offer 
guidance as to how his ideals might be attained. He appears unaware that in 
many cases the practical issues faced are ones of balance between 
competing convictions, interests and principles. 
 
Peter Selby: introducing grace into economics 
 
Peter Selby was a key figure for Jubilee 2000 within the Church of England. 
As Bishop of Worcester and a keen supporter of the movement, he was 
responsible for getting the matter of debt cancellation on the 1998 Lambeth 
Conference agenda. He has long been fascinated by the changing role and 
nature of money in society, and his treatise on debt Grace and Mortgage 
(1997), remains the most articulate, theological engagement with this issue to 
date. A world without debt is not what Selby envisions; rather, one in which 
the experience of indebtedness is not one of domination but thankfulness and 
freedom for all. He would like the world to be characterised by grace and 
reciprocity, where debts can be ‘occasions of delight and thankfulness’ rather 
than means of degradation and enslavement.  
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Selby constructs a framework from the writing of Bonhoeffer, indicating its two 
key foundations: the need for the Christian apologetic in a secular world, and 
the call for the gospel to address humanity at its points of strength rather than 
weakness.6 By ‘address’, he means not so much the notion of cultural or 
contemporary relevance, but rather identifying points of connection - those 
aspects of human life and society that need the gospel message. This is a key 
methodological feature of Selby’s approach. One area of strength is the 
international financial community, and Selby identifies debt (and credit), 
particularly the language of debt and redemption, as an issue touching this 
deeply. In this arena, speaking of Christ with authenticity requires an 
emphasis not so much that the secular economic insights must be afforded 
equal regard as theological ones, but rather that theological insight needs to 
be able to make meaningful connections in this field. Neither dialogue nor 
prophecy are excluded. With the matter of debt, Selby believes he has found 
an issue which addresses both communities, and which finds its resolution in 
the gospel of Jesus Christ. 
 
In this dialogical task, Selby stresses the critical task of discernment in sifting 
the competing perspectives and opinions. He detects two important voices: 
that of the strong, powerful and agenda-setting, and which expects to fit Christ 
into their world-view. The other is that of the weak, powerless and vulnerable, 
in which the crucified Christ is located. Significantly, among this latter 
category Selby includes the unborn generations of the future, who naturally 
have no say now on matters such as debt and the environment, whose 
                                                 
6
 Selby has also employed this approach in his response to the terrorist attacks in the US on 
11
th
 September 2001. 
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consequences of present decisions they will bear in the future. Selby clearly 
favours the perspective of the weak, but he does not want to dismiss entirely 
the insights of the strong even as he positions himself elsewhere. Not 
unrelated to this process of discernment is Selby’s consideration of whom the 
Church should stand alongside, and who should be its partners. The 
distinction between allies and opponents is framed through the lens of 
Christian solidarity. We shall only know what we mean by ‘we’ when we know 
who Christ is:  
 
‘... on the basis that Jesus Christ is not the one who accommodates 
himself to prior decisions… about who ‘us’ is, but on the basis that only 
in and through him is the decision about the boundaries of our 
solidarity to be made...’  
 
‘... We shall need to assert, for our time, the unique right of Christ to 
the definition of ‘us’, and that means refusing that right to institutions in 
society, however useful they may seem to be for certain purposes.’ 
(Selby, 1997: 25-6)  
 
 
In other words, ‘us’ is shaped by our understanding of the nature and gospel 
of Christ, and our engagement in his work, rather than our own parochial, 
detached notions. Selby (1997: 143) asks: ‘With whom do we locate ourselves 
in a world of injustice – with those who have or those who have not?’ 
 
Selby is apposite in his observation that global capitalism has made the world 
‘smaller’, both through information technology and the way economies have 
global implications. He is acutely aware of the increased number, faster and 
more complex nature of human interactions through the use of money in the 
globalised economy. The nature of ‘us’ is now much narrower, yet 
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simultaneously more all-embracing, as for instance with the global nature of 
current environmental issues: 
 
‘We have… grown out of our village life, only to find that the global 
village has enclosed us again. We have supposed that we could all be 
winners in a process of wealth creation that would produce gains for all 
and losses for none, only to find not only an ever-increasing army of 
losers, but that loss is quite evidently threatening us all.’ (Selby, 1997: 
141)7 
 
Selby is particularly astute on the often unequal power relations that debt 
contracts entail. Most commonly the debtor is the weaker party, though there 
are occasions where the creditors themselves feel under obligation (for 
example, to their shareholders) to reschedule payments or run the risk of 
greater losses. 8 Since many people borrow money out of a sense of 
desperation rather than greed or opportunity, in such cases the inequality of 
the power relation is considerable and the debtor is in a very weak bargaining 
position. Selby has no problem with credit issued when the participants are 
‘voluntary and equal’. Presumably he is thinking of loans that are not for 
emergency relief, but he does not develop his argument to describe what 
would constitute equality in such a situation. One particular factor likely to 
upset the power balance is poverty, for it drives people to desperation and, in 
so doing, to underestimate the true value of the debt. Selby calls for the 
equalisation of power within economic exchange, but he does not develop this 
with guidance as to how such equality might be recognised, nor how it could 
be achieved, nor the processes that could be involved. Such imbalances of 
power lead Selby to suggest a solution based on the Biblical tradition, that the 
                                                 
7
 The ‘all’ is a reference to environmental issues 
8
 Examples of this would be Eurotunnel, or Argentina’s recent negotiating policy with the IMF, 
or the UK and US government bailouts of the banks during the ‘credit crunch’ begun in 2008. 
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dangerous power of money should be restricted in some way, by placing 
controls upon it. He does not wish to replace the basis of the economy, unlike 
Northcott’s aneconomic approach, but rather to reform it: 
 
‘... what is fundamentally at stake is the rehabilitation and control of the 
economy of debt: to bring it within the bounds of mutuality, equality and 
concern for its effects.’(Selby, 1997: 72) 
 
 
In so doing, Selby highlights key concerns for reflection on debt: issues of 
power, justice, and outcomes.  
 
Selby explores the phenomenon of domestic debt with insight, remarking that 
there is an important link between troublesome debt and poverty. Serious 
debts occur when desperate people borrow in order to survive, not to 
purchase time for the development of enterprises. What generally drives 
people into serious debt is not personal irresponsibility, but the toxic 
combination of desperation amid a society in which obtaining credit is lauded 
as the only route to prosperity. Selby questions the morality of this prevailing 
view, and contends that the source of ‘bad’ debt is located within ‘good’ debt. 
That is, Selby raises the issue of whether even non-exploitative, safe debt is 
genuinely beneficial to the wider economy. Selby’s view is that the credit 
system is unsatisfactory because the scale and depth of the social costs 
outweigh the benefits that are derived for some; his criteria are determined by 
the fact that people suffer as a result of such economic processes, but he 
does not weigh this against the potential effects of alternatives. He is 
fascinated by the processes through which money operates in the global 
economy today, and emphasises the power that money exerts, now becoming 
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elevated to ‘a divinity’. Selby is also aware of the extent to which the 
deleterious effects of the debt economy are masked from the sight of the 
prosperous. There is, it would seem, a deeply seductive aspect to credit that 
plays on human vulnerabilities, and fosters the belief that, in general, gain can 
be the only outcome. He is in no doubt that the global economy is manifestly 
sinful: ‘the world and national economies cannot be declared just, let alone 
Christian, in their outworking.’ (Selby, 1997: 161) 
 
Selby urges a clear distinction between debts that bring positive outcomes 
and those that cause misery, and sees the person and work of Christ as the 
means by which that difference is seen. Debts that give ‘cause for delight’ are 
non-financial: friendship and support, and the vision of freedom that Christ 
embodies and offers. However, he seems to regard financial debt as always 
constraining. Such debt ‘binds the future’ because the debtor’s choices are 
restricted by the necessity and conditions of repayments. Although Selby 
does agree with the justification of purchasing credit for investment in 
business enterprises and mortgages, he does not explicitly mention their 
benefits. He does not consider the ways in which debt can also be a means to 
opening the future. Debts effectively buy time and allow the debtor to obtain 
goods or services otherwise impossible which can benefit society more 
widely. To be fair, Selby does not suggest that every instance of credit is bad, 
only those that are taken out unfairly, a concept developed in more detail 
below. 
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Selby introduces the biblical idea of regulation to prevent widespread poverty, 
and which was rooted in the experience of agrarian indebtedness and Israelite 
slavery. These insights were shaped in an agrarian order in which economic 
cycles were cyclical rather than linear; however, all matters we consider 
‘economic’ were tied into considerations of kinship and community. Concern 
for social welfare of the poor was as important as the processes of food 
production or trade, and hence the need for restrictions on the powers of 
creditors, should these cause undue suffering to the debtor, were introduced.9 
In such an environment, gain was always at someone else’s expense, a zero-
sum economy. Although Selby acknowledges the different nature and 
dynamic of contemporary capitalism, he affirms that the Christian scriptures 
and tradition have a repository of truth on economic matters that is now often 
ignored. He argues that such insights are still valid for contemporary contexts 
because the binding experience of indebtedness retains many common 
features from that in antiquity. This is a moot point: experiences of poverty 
and powerlessness may be ones that have plagued human history, but the 
causes and the dynamics may differ. The critical question here is not just 
about the impact upon those who suffer through economic practices, but 
whether any distinction can be made between the dynamic of the economic 
system itself and its effects. Can an ethic be transposed from one economic 
system into another simply because the experience of vulnerability is very 
similar? What is missing is the location of this argument within the wider 
economic context in which credit and debt now function, in contrast to that of 
ancient times.   
                                                 
9
 cf Exod. 22, Deut. 24. 
249 
 
 
Selby wishes to assert the prior claims of the divine economy, characterised 
by gracious giving, over the ‘exchange’ economy of contemporary capitalism. 
The former does involve obligations, but of a different kind from the latter. The 
economy of exchange ‘debases’ everything, not least our relations with each 
other to a kind of contract; its conditionality - the demands of reciprocity and 
limitations on what can be offered - excludes notions of gift and grace. By 
contrast, in the grace economy obligations are left open because the giver is 
not expecting or demanding anything in return. Such obligations often take a 
non-financial form, such as in a change of attitude in the recipient, or their 
willingness to devote time or enthusiasm, or their consequent generosity to 
someone else. They are, therefore, not always directed back at the original 
donor, but remain obligations nonetheless. This reveals a flaw in his argument 
that Selby recognises, but does not attach sufficient weight. That is, some 
gifts carry particular obligations that are not so open – the social rules 
surrounding Christmas presents being one example – and one cannot make 
too firm a distinction between debts and gifts. 
 
The relationship between the two economies of grace and exchange are 
clear: ‘The economy of gift is always an economy of excess, and the economy 
of exchange is the one which is exceeded’ (Selby, 1997: 149). Selby argues 
that the economy of exchange is, in fact, dependent upon the gift economy, 
and not, as is often assumed, the other way round. He uses the parable of the 
workers in the vineyard (Matthew 20:1-16) to show the way in which the gift 
economy challenges the exchange one (in the form of the arbitrary actions of 
the vineyard owner), and thus reveals ‘which economy has ultimately to 
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prevail’ (Selby, 1997: 151). The word ‘ultimately’ here is crucial to Selby’s 
argument; it is only from the perspective of the end that the ‘real’ priority of 
these economies becomes apparent. Therefore, when the exchange economy 
produces outcomes that are unjust to the poor, here ‘something has to 
happen to re-establish the priority of the economy of gift and the conditionality 
of the economy of exchange’(Selby, 1997: 151). In other words, Selby does 
not use the concept of the grace economy as a clumsy, prescriptive formula 
for contemporary economics, but as an eschatological statement: the ‘truth’ of 
the primacy of the economy of gift ‘always remains over and above whatever 
the economy of exchange may deliver’ (1997: 151-2). The provisional nature 
of the global economy is thus revealed, rather similar to the way utopian 
ideals can unmask otherwise unseen distortions, as discussed in chapter 6. 
 
It is this eschatological sense of the grace economy that leads Selby to be 
attracted by the ‘divine economy’ of St Paul, through which the 
‘superabundance’ of God’s generosity leads to a culture of human generosity 
in return. He quotes approvingly from Paul’s instruction (Rom. 13:7) to ‘owe 
nobody anything except to love one another’ (Selby, 1997: 71; 1996: 41-2). 
This represents the living out of the jubilee that Christ declared rather than a 
culture of acquisition; the advocacy of the economy of gift rather than financial 
transactions. Yet here as elsewhere, Selby does not describe how these 
insights might be employed, other than describing a radically different set of 
values for the life of the world. In Athertonian terms, this reflects a lack of 
pragmatism and as such is a significant weakness; Brown (2004a: 218) is 
right to suggest that a ‘theology of the interim’ would be helpful.  
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The endemic nature of poverty across the globe is a sign that the economy of 
exchange denies, or remains ignorant of, its dependent role in relation to the 
economy of gift. Therefore, the call of Jesus to restore the perspective of the 
gift economy possesses much relevance, and the Christian community has a 
distinctive role in this regard. The Church is able to embody the life of the gift 
economy, comprising as it does people immersed in the global economy but 
also cognisant of the divine one. In contrast to the way indebtedness forestalls 
freedom of choice, Selby urges the Christian community to embody a love 
that endlessly offers new possibilities, that opens up the future. Such a love is 
both social and transcendental; it exposes the falsehood of the global 
economy and reveals a different way for the world to pursue.  
 
Selby presents a powerful, insightful critique of the way money has changed 
the nature of politics and economics, and offers a thorough theological 
response to the problem of debt. He often sounds like the liberal in whose 
tradition he stands, as one wanting to avoid the dangers of a stance that 
posits theology over against the world, for he sees the need for engagement 
and dialogue with secular insights and authorities. Yet in the end, as Brown 
(2004a) suggests, he adopts a more confessional position. Scripture and the 
Christian tradition are more than metaphors, for their content reflect a 
prophetic challenge to the established order. Selby is persuaded to call for 
radical transformations of the global economy, but does not regard the biblical 
evidence as prescriptive. His argument is a sophisticated synthesis of the 
contemporary experience of indebtedness and the Christian tradition, but it is 
less like a dialogue, for we have seen how, in effect, he places great 
252 
 
 
emphasis on experience of indebtedness over the technical arguments over 
debt relief. Selby’s instincts are against the positing of one view over another, 
but this is what he ultimately performs. Genuine dialogue would allow not only 
the display of the Christian insight, but also permit some questioning of the 
Church’s own sense of identity and distinctiveness. That examination also 
needs to be seen against the backdrop of a plural world that includes 
knowledge on the scarcity of goods for example, but this is not hinted at. 
Selby’s confessional position comes from the requirements of solidarity – that 
is, in including as ‘us’ the victims of indebted nations, nothing else will suffice 
(M. Brown, 2004a: 217). The level of human suffering is such that Selby can 
ultimately go no other way, and this raises questions about the ‘us’, for 
although Selby includes future generations in this solidarity, he does not 
explore how this suffering might affect his argument. He does not seem to 
have factored in the possibility of competing needs between different 
generations. Furthermore, he does not counter one argument used against 
debt campaigners, that radical change now will make matters worse for the 
poor in the near future. 
 
Selby’s argument is ultimately polemic because it is so eschatological. For all 
his detailed description of the nature of the debt economy, Selby sees the 
resolution of debt as a clear issue between two contrasting economies, the 
global economy and the grace economy, and representing a stark choice 
between justice and injustice. Yet Selby’s approach allows insufficient 
consideration of the ambiguities of the debt situation, nor does it address how 
individualist ethics (such as grace) can be articulated collectively. The very 
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complexity and varieties of collective indebtedness are not drawn out, and we 
are left with too stark a contrast. Selby also fails to provide an identifiable 
means of guiding the Christian community to proximate strategies and goals. 
The gift economy is, like the concept of jubilee, a utopian ideal, but it can 
inspire and challenge in dramatic ways. Yet Selby’s use of it, as with the 
jubilee in the previous chapter, does not identify the means by which this road 
can be travelled (other than the campaign to end the idolatrous facets of 
today’s global economy), nor how they might be translated from the Christian 
treasury into more earthly kingdoms. 
 
Kathryn Tanner: grace amid economics 
 
Kathryn Tanner uses the principle of divine grace in a new direction. Unlike 
Northcott and Selby, she is dismissive of attempts to base an economy of 
grace upon concepts of gift exchange: such an economy is built on the 
transfer of gifts and associated obligations, and so this accumulation of 
obligations effectively becomes a form of debt without limit. Tanner is 
reluctant to establish any foundational premises for a theological economy, 
but rather favours the deployment of Christian insights and guiding factors into 
critical aspects of the global economy, which she terms ‘intervention points’. 
This at first sight appears similar to Selby’s approach, yet there are significant 
differences between them. Tanner (2005: 1) contends that theological ideas 
emerge from the interaction with the beliefs and practices of the secular world, 
originating from the process of critical reflection upon the world, its values, 
assumptions and imperfections. Since economics is the study of the 
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production and distribution of goods, and particularly because it offers insight 
into the way value is created, she asserts there is a sense in which every 
theological concept could engage with it. On this basis that Tanner explores 
the way in which correspondence may be made between these two thought-
worlds. Like Northcott, Tanner emphasises a view of human persons in the 
economy not as isolated, rational agents but rather as participants in social 
networks, with consequent implications for values and obligations. Human life 
may therefore be viewed as comprising many discrete networks or ‘fields’ with 
their own rules about how goods are distributed, their own traditions and 
cultures, values and methods (Tanner, 2005: 10). The critical task is the 
identification of arena – the ‘correspondence points’ - where these fields 
intersect. One of these points of correspondence is where the notion of non-
competition is introduced as a distinctively theological contribution, 
characterised by the desire to realise an economic system in which goods 
circulate to the advantage of all, equally, and fully, and produce no disparity of 
status (Tanner, 2005: 25).  
 
In contrast to Selby’s emphasis on mutuality and power-sharing, Tanner 
believes the key to a theology of grace is the complete lack of reciprocity, 
giving without conditions or expectations. She articulates three principles for 
such an approach: unconditional giving, universal giving and non-competitive 
relations. The key aspect here is not the relationship between donor and 
recipient, nor the circulation of goods, but the nature of the benefits. The only 
appropriate response to unconditional giving is the expansion of such grace to 
others. Grace can extend beyond the social confines of normal gift-giving into 
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wider society and it can, Tanner (2005: 63) argues, become a broad social 
force.  
 
From her belief in the universal, unconditional nature of God’s grace, Tanner 
proceeds to derive the premise that such divine gifts, for instance, of life and 
health, are offered to all as rights. These are rights without condition, simply 
according to one’s need rather than one’s ability or desire to reciprocate. Thus 
one’s capacity to work, to be creative, and to care for others are factors quite 
irrelevant in relation to the possession of these rights. The universality of 
giving leads to the abandonment of private ownership, for property is not an 
individual possession, and God’s gifts are to be held in common: 
 
‘God’s primary gift is the gift of a particular sort of community; one 
without boundaries and organized so as to make common possession 
rights a reality; a community in which common possession rights are 
the social priority, a community dedicated to the well-being of all, 
without exception.’(Tanner, 2005: 74) 
 
 
Because one cannot rely simply on the social expression of individually 
gracious behaviour, a framework is required in order to encourage, and 
establish, unconditional giving in society (Tanner, 2005: 76). As with Niebuhr’s 
remark about justice being the public face of love, Tanner (2005: 76) attempts 
a parallel with her theology of grace: ‘Noncompetitive relations are necessary 
to set up a social structure that encourages unconditional giving to others.’ 
This corporate expression of grace requires the affirmation of a principle of 
non-competition in our relations with each other, which embraces an inclusive 
understanding of property. Because God showers abundant grace upon all 
creation, goods cannot be regarded as private possessions, but are to be 
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shared commonly. Such goods do not lose value in their transmission, so that 
everyone can obtain them in equal and abundant measure. In addition, they 
can belong to more than personal simultaneously, without diminishing the 
extent to which they belong to any one person. Non-competition also includes 
the principle of ‘least sacrifice’, that one should not benefit at another’s 
expense, and that reciprocally one should not benefit others at one’s own 
expense (Tanner, 2005: 134). As a community that seeks to enhance the 
quality of life for all, rich and poor are bound up with each other, and this is 
achieved through non-competitive relations, This stands in direct contrast to 
competitive relations in which, typically, one party benefits at the expense of 
others. Tanner thus develops the concept of a theological economy that is 
both non-competitive yet effective at resource delivery. She favours a strong 
welfare state with an abundance of welfare provision. Public goods, such as 
the provision of amenities, lighthouses and the emergency services are a 
striking example of the principle of noncompetitiveness in practice (Tanner, 
2005: 137).  
 
Tanner identifies a point of intersection between the fields of theological 
economy and secular world in the common desire for the global economy to 
become dedicated to fulfilling the needs of all in ways that are mutually 
beneficial (2005: 95). This means that change needs to be in the interests of 
financiers as well as the poor (2005:142). She advocates the search for 
means of providing full employment, poverty reduction and profits that ‘do not 
come at the expense of people and their ability to realize their capabilities’ 
(2005: 95-6).  
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Tanner advocates regulation to prevent the non-competitive disequilibrium in 
capitalism that can result from monopolistic practices. However, she places 
her stress on the role of international regulatory bodies, whereas many 
economists would tend to favour greater emphasis on national strategies 
here. With regard to the debt crisis, Tanner argues for an international 
mechanism for debt ‘forgiveness’ on the basis that, otherwise, the in-built 
disadvantages to the poorest nations will remain, and those relatively 
powerless nations continue to be at the economic mercy of those much richer. 
 
Tanner is imaginative in the way she draws together the correspondence 
between theology and economics, seeing both as at least partially dependent 
on each other; her approach is devoted to a conception of theology ‘with’ 
economics rather than theology ‘and’ economics. She is astute in identifying 
correspondence points of grace-filled economics in the practice of the 
capitalist economic system, such as the interdependence brought about by 
globalisation. Yet she does not appear to appreciate fully the way in which 
economics operates: she seems to have little regard for the concept of 
relative scarcity, nor the way in which some phenomena cannot be shared or 
circulated without diminution. Tanner’s proposal that access charges for 
public goods be prohibited (2005: 138) sits well with her values but is naïve, 
for she fails to address the counter-arguments, not least the issue of personal 
responsibility. An example of this might be the debate concerning prescription 
charges in the UK, where across its constituent nations the practice of 
charging varies considerably; small access charges may act as a mild 
deterrent, preventing unnecessary calls on medical facilities.  
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For all these criticisms, however, Tanner’s broad approach is commendable 
for its recognition of the autonomy of the market economy and the attempt to 
find correspondence points between it and a theological perspective. Tanner’s 
elucidation of principles from her theology of grace allow her to relate this 
theology to practical issues because she is able to identify areas in which 
such principles can be developed from within economics itself. We are not 
faced, as so often elsewhere, with theological material being imposed a priori 
on to another discipline (Atherton, 2008: 271).  
 
Tanner’s approach is thoroughly inter-disciplinary, but is nonetheless 
inadequate in that it is too wedded to an understanding of competition, and 
thus of capitalism, which narrowly reduces everything to a win-or-lose 
scenario. She fails to compare this with alternatives from practice rather than 
theory, and her illuminating advocacy of public goods cites examples that 
cannot be derived from private ones. The issues of competition and non-
competition are complex and do not reduce easily to a simple equation of 
strict benefit or loss. Although competition produces winners and losers, one 
does not need to see the issue in such a polarised fashion, and it would be 
better for Tanner to concentrate, as Selby does, on the dimensions of that 
loss rather than the fact that all do not gain equally. In addition, non-
competitive practices do not necessarily lead to mutual benefit, for it may be 
that the outcome is loss for all parties. 
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Forgiveness 
 
We saw in chapter 3 that the Jubilee campaign quickly rejected the language 
of debt forgiveness in favour of debt cancellation. This was because 
forgiveness was felt to be too closely linked with conceptions of blame, and 
campaigns in indebted countries were clear that this would be most unhelpful.  
Indeed, they felt they were the sinned against rather than those who had 
inflicted wrong on others: 
 
‘The Third World is already burdened with the sin of the First World... It 
is up to the Third World to forgive, not the other way round.’ (Sobrino, 
1987: 31)  
 
 
This was founded on a long-standing reservation concerning the use of 
forgiveness terminology among liberation theologians, who have long 
criticised the perceived naivety about sinful structures and the implied 
permission for sin to continue. Although the principle of forgiveness is to do 
with power dispensed to enable rather than dominate, its practice often 
implies a relationship between a superior forgiver and a dependent recipient 
(Peters, 1996: 8-9). Furthermore, in the context of endemic poverty and gross 
exploitation, Christian forgiveness demands the exposure of the reality of 
human suffering and its removal; forgiveness requires the conversion of the 
sin of oppression, so that injustice is transformed into justice (Sobrino, 1986: 
48). 
 
Few references to debt ‘forgiveness’ - in any theological sense, at least - 
emerged during the brief history of the campaign. Those that occurred did so 
to oppose the concept of unconditional debt forgiveness and to argue for 
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conditionality to avert moral hazard. A symposium of the Association of 
Christian Economists in the United States in 2000 expressed this caution: 
 
‘What’s striking about the Biblical concept of forgiveness is that it is 
never understood conditionally. God’s love is unconditional, and 
individuals are exhorted to love one another in that manner as well. But 
forgiveness is always linked to repentance and the restoration of right 
relationships between the parties involved...’ 
  
‘... Christian teaching offers no support for unconditional debt 
forgiveness.’(Smith, 20002: 10,12)  
 
 
More positively, Hoksbergen (2000: 18) argued that the critical issue 
regarding debt forgiveness was its efficacy, not its principle; Jesus was 
interested not in explanations but in solutions: 
 
‘Forgiving debts without regard to the consequences is irresponsible, 
though forgiving debts with discernment and purpose can be a 
powerful force for good.’ 
 
 
One significant move to draw the concept of forgiveness into the arena of debt 
relief was by Simon Taylor, whose attempt to reassert its importance was met 
with opposition from activists in the South.10 They argued that the use of the 
term gave the moral high ground to the creditor and removed issues of justice 
from the debate, despite Taylor’s unequivocal assertion that forgiveness 
necessarily entails justice. He argues (S. Taylor, 2000: 5-6): 
 
‘Forgiveness... is a constituent part of Christian faith, centred on and 
shaped by the cross and resurrection of Christ. Forgiveness is 
therefore inescapably concerned with, and rooted in, the nature of God 
as revealed in Christ.’ 
 
                                                 
10
 Taylor’s lecture, ‘Debt Forgiveness’ at the Modern Churchpeople’s Union Conference in 
1999 generated voluble opposition to the term, particularly from delegates from developing 
countries. 
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Taylor develops a parallel analogous to Bonhoeffer’s ‘cheap grace’, the notion 
of a ‘cheap forgiveness’ that is devoid of judgment and repentance. By 
contrast, a ‘too-costly forgiveness’ is that in which judgment, sin and the 
requirements of repentance dominate, rather than grace.’ In the context of 
developing country debt, this corresponds to an undue emphasis on the 
failings and injustices of both creditors and debtors; it represents burdensome 
conditionality requirements, or insufficient debt relief to make much of an 
impact, and comes at the expense of effective debt cancellation and a new 
beginning for both parties. Taylor accurately describes the dynamic of power 
in forgiveness, but suggests that the key question concerns not the ‘ifs’ of 
forgiveness but identifying those who will bear its cost. He argues that true 
forgiveness is necessarily mutual, and that the cost must be shared. Moral 
hazard must therefore be ‘addressed in both directions’ not only to debtors, 
but crucially also to creditors for irresponsible lending. Taylor’s emphasis on a 
costly, but not too-costly, forgiveness leads naturally to a call for the wider 
acknowledgement of the role of creditors in the debt crisis (repentance), and 
for new systems of lending (discipleship). It moves beyond simple restoration 
of error into discussion of how future errors might be prevented. 
 
Taylor has been accused of misunderstanding the debt situation, laying 
responsibility for the situation on both sides whereas in fact the blame lies 
with only one party (Selby, 2001a). Selby feels that Taylor has sacrificed the 
demands of justice and failed to acknowledge that many in indebted countries 
feel deeply wronged by debt repayments imposed by an unforgiving system: 
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‘... we generally accept that justice demands recompense for wrongs 
done and that forgiveness is not a burden to be laid upon those whose 
suffering at the hands of others has not been adequately recognised.’ 
(Selby, 2001a: 112) 
 
 
This is a harsh criticism, and Selby is inaccurate to imply Taylor is even-
handed in his assignation of blame. The key difference between them is that 
Taylor strives for a position in which responsibility lies with both parties – 
though not equally – whereas Selby is impelled to opt for a more exclusive 
position. According to Selby, the debts that need to be forgiven are those of 
the economic system: ‘fundamentally, the debt is owed by the economy as a 
whole to the economy as a whole’ (Selby, 2001a: 114). Taylor’s weakness is 
his failure to acknowledge the underlying causes of debt, and thus the 
redemption he proposes can only address matters in a rather piecemeal 
fashion.  
 
Taylor’s approach is pragmatic, however, and his notion of forgiveness does 
incorporate justice, and he emphasises the requirement for judgment in order 
that forgiveness be both effective and costly; he sees forgiveness as a means 
of moving the debt issue beyond mere restorative measures toward a new 
framework between creditor and debtor based upon mutuality of shared risk, 
and the willingness to re-examine economic conventions and models. In this 
way Taylor is able to address the vexed issue of conditionality, accepting the 
criteria of sustainability and poverty reduction for debt relief, but condemning 
the overly burdensome conditions of SAPs. 
 
A contrasting approach to, and understanding of, forgiveness, is found in the 
work of Bell (2001), who argues that it is a more appropriate concept to use 
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than justice. Rather than demand their ‘rights’, the poor should offer the ‘gift’ 
of forgiveness to those who have harmed them; in the context of poverty in 
developing countries, this refers to the creditors. Bell’s reluctance to base his 
ethics on the concept of justice lies in its inability to solve the cycles of 
violence and conflict; justice effectively replaces one kind of ‘terror’ with 
another (Bell, 2001: 149). The view of justice Bell opposes is a rights-based 
one premised on ‘what is due’. He argues that such an abstracted approach is 
incapable of producing any new solution to counter sin, or of transforming the 
existing social order, for justice merely represents a ‘counter-force’, limited to 
producing, at best, equilibrium. Such a weak justice represents the refusal to 
take up the cross of Christ and relies instead on means that are incompatible 
with the gospel: 
 
‘... the atoning grace of God in Christ displaces such justice as the 
modality of God’s overcoming of sin and sets in its place forgiveness. 
God confronts sin, injustice, capitalism, not with justice conceived in 
the liberationists’ terms, but with the gift of forgiveness.’ (Bell, 2001: 
146) 
 
 
Forgiveness represents the redemption of justice. Christ’s acceptance of the 
cross and his refusal to advocate violence or force are critical. His 
unwillingness to impose his will on others in this way marks the defeat of sin; 
it is a newly creative act, and gives rise to hope (Bell, 2001: 152). Forgiveness 
represents not passivity but the refusal to cease suffering: ‘an instantiation of 
a crucified power and of a suffering against suffering’ (Bell, 2001: 5). Acts of 
forgiveness thus embody the resistance to capitalism. 
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The problem Bell has with justice is that it makes forgiveness conditional upon 
repairing the wrong that has been done and thereby placing this above the 
efficacy of grace. Rather, forgiveness should come first, for it alone enables 
repentance and it alone can usher in the reconciliation that is its goal: 
 
‘By making forgiveness contingent upon reparations, it does not 
faithfully reflect the way God has revealed the Kingdom in and through 
Christ.’ (Bell, 2001: 181) 
 
 
In the divine economy, forgiveness returns desire to its source, which is 
extravagant generosity and an excess rooted in God’s abundance (Bell, 2007: 
333). By contrast, the market economy is defined by the notion of scarcity (a 
‘contingent reality, the product of sin’ (Bell, 2007: 341)) and assumes a 
negative view of human beings, trapped in continuous competition and conflict 
with each other for resources (Bell, 2007: 327-8). The purpose of forgiveness 
is not to act within the market economy, making small improvements, as in the 
narrow concept of debt relief; rather, forgiveness is the agent of 
transformation in which the divine economy becomes superimposed on to 
market economics (Bell, 2007: 326): 
 
‘Christ’s gift of forgiveness opens an aneconomic space where the 
plenitude of grace spills over with the result that sacrifice becomes 
gain...’(Bell, 2007: 340) 
 
  
In receiving and offering forgiveness, Christians fulfil their calling as Christ’s 
body: 
 
‘... the gift of forgiveness renews the possibility of a true mutuality and 
reciprocity of desire through non-possessive participation in the other.’ 
(Bell, 2001: 151) 
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‘... the poverty of economy is eclipsed as a divine order of gift 
exchange is enacted, beginning with the people of God.’ (Bell, 2007: 
337) 
 
 
The critical question, as Bell acknowledges, is whether forgiveness really 
does have the capacity to resist capitalism. Here all Bell can do is fall back on 
the theme of sin being defeated through being borne, that suffering is 
redeemed through its being entered into rather than avoided, in the ‘hope’ that 
it will dissolve. His use of the word ‘hope’ is deliberate, for he sees 
forgiveness as an inherently risky approach, but the only credible one. It is, 
moreover, an act of witness rather than a stratagem, and dependent upon 
God’s faithfulness to renew all creation. 
 
Bell’s approach is sophisticated but unsatisfactory on several counts. His 
premise that justice is nothing more than a rather static demand for rights is 
questionable, and his view of forgiveness as necessarily unconditional is 
contentious. The methodology he employs is similar to that of Northcott, 
positing the divine economy over and above that of the world; it is 
Christological but not incarnational, absolutist rather than dialogical. His 
approach offers no guidance on the practical dilemmas over conditionality, 
other than to suggest an entirely different metric. Most of all, his advocacy of 
forgiveness as a mode of behaviour is based upon individual responses. Bell 
does argue that a collective expression of forgiveness may be found in the 
traditions of ‘Works of Mercy’ (almsgiving and hospitality), and expressed 
collectively in the cooperative movement and other alternatives markets. Yet 
these are unconvincing, for Bell takes too little account of the critical issues 
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faced in translating individual ethics into collective contexts, and in particular 
the prevalence of sin in systems. The criticisms made in Banking on the Poor 
still seem apt here: 
 
‘The ethics of Jesus appear to be rather personal. They have much to 
say about love and forgiveness, for example, virtues which make sense 
in small-scale inter-personal relations but not in institutional ones… It is 
less easy, despite the language of ‘forgiving debts’, to see how 
institutions and governments forgive or love one another...The 
dynamics of large groups make it far less likely that they will act 
generously than small groups and individuals.’ (Christian Aid, 1988: 35) 
 
In order for Bell’s approach to relate to the actual contexts of debt 
forgiveness, a different framework for developing this ethic within the 
corporate sphere is required. 
 
Summary 
 
Northcott’s approach is representative of many whose method affords 
exclusive priority to the poor and marginalised. It provides a powerful critique 
of how the debt economy fails the poorest, and the way in which any 
theological engagement must confront the issues of power. However, 
Northcott’s assumptions about capitalism are too simplistic, and his approach 
allows no easy method of engagement other than prophetic condemnation, a 
description of how the economy falls short of the divine order. Here some 
appreciation of the connection between ultimate and penultimate, to use 
Bonhoeffer’s phrase, would be helpful in avoiding the dichotomy of Northcott’s 
position, yet without ever losing sight of the kingdom of God (Bonhoeffer, 
1954: 99-100). It is not so much that Northcott is unaware of the ambiguities 
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in the global financial institutions and the phenomenon of international debt in 
general, but rather that, from the perspective of the poor, such matters appear 
peripheral in contrast to the extreme nature of the issues they themselves 
face. Nonetheless, his approach cannot be considered helpful in terms of 
encouraging engagement with specific issues that debt relief raises, for there 
is no import from the world of economics and politics into the realm of 
theological discourse. One key issue this discussion raises is the point at 
which the extent of human suffering becomes the central foundation for the 
ethic, rather than a major factor. For most commentators, the dialogic process 
breaks down at some point when confronted with the critical, extreme poverty 
in indebted countries. 
 
Selby and Tanner base their approach on the search for points of connectivity 
between the theological and the economic, though in each case this is done 
by identifying areas of convergence, where the theological and the economic 
issues are already embedded each within the other. In Athertonian terms, 
such an approach is commendable, for it enables dialogue whilst 
simultaneously staying rooted in the experience of the poor. Selby’s analysis 
of the power of money is astute, and his work represents the most articulate 
and thorough approach to international debt to date. Ultimately, however, he 
is not able to hold together the dialogic stance with his more radical call for a 
new economic order. Like Selby, Tanner rests on a theology of abundant 
grace, yet this needs to be balanced with an acknowledgement of sin and 
finitude. What are required here are theological insights that not only reflect 
the ideal society and the desire of God for humankind, but which are also 
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perceptive about the weaknesses of the human condition and the prevalence 
of sin at both an individual and institutional level. This might lead, for instance, 
to a more satisfactory attempt to deal with the questions of moral hazard. 
 
Any discussion of forgiveness among debt campaigners is likely to become 
fraught, yet Taylor and Bell, in their very different ways, indicate that the 
concept has much to offer. Here I agree with Taylor and disagree with Bell, in 
that forgiveness does not so much enact justice but rather requires justice 
(‘conversion’ (Duquoc, 1986: 42)); forgiveness does, however, lead beyond 
justice. Unfortunately, Bell does not translate an individual ethic of forgiveness 
into the corporate sphere, and his insistence on its unconditional nature raises 
the same kinds of difficulties mentioned in the previous paragraph, namely the 
deep-seated reality of sin.  
 
The strength of forgiveness is that it acknowledges that the world is a place of 
sinfulness and finitude, of weakness and vulnerability in its recognition that 
there will always be a need to make amends, similar to an understanding we 
found with jubilee. Niebuhr famously referred to forgiveness being the ‘final 
form of love’ due to the prevalence of conceit even in our most virtuous acts 
(Rasmussen, 1989: 282).11 Following Bell, forgiveness is genuinely 
transformative and desiring of reconciliation between all people. Furthermore, 
it opens up a space in which new, creative solutions might emerge: 
 
‘Forgiveness is not a forgetfulness of the past, it is the risk of a future 
other than the one imposed by the past or by the memory. It is an 
invitation to the imagination.’ (Duquoc, 1986: 40) 
                                                 
11
 The reference comes from Niebuhr’s ‘The Irony of American History’ 
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In an Athertonian framework, the use of forgiveness might lead to greater 
possibilities for a pragmatic theology, fragmented but focused on the 
contingent, than the use of grace. Again, like jubilee, it also has significant 
potential for the imaginative aspects of theological engagement.  
 
Our next chapter focuses one source of immense benefit, temptation, and 
poverty: a discussion on money, credit and interest. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Usury 
 
 
 
For much of the history of the Christian Church, ethical thought on debt was devoted 
principally to the theory of usury. We saw in chapter 3 that one of the main 
arguments deployed in favour of debt cancellation was the Christian Church’s 
opposition to usury, and that debt repayments from impoverished, indebted nations 
constituted this.1 The campaign attempted to claim clear moral authority and to 
expose the extortionate aspects of the loan repayments. The theme of usury was not 
particularly prominent, however, and was more implicit than explicit. Although 
several debt campaign supporters referred to usury, most gave it scant attention; the 
campaign literature did not employ the term either, not even in its theological section 
in The Debt Cutter’s Handbook, nor in any of the contributions to Proclaim Liberty. 
The exception to this is the frequent but thin polemic in the pronouncements of 
Jubilee South; it featured in many articles published in the name of Jubilee-Zambia. 
As a political resource, usury had little resonance and thus references to it were 
confined to more theological works; this is an indication of the way campaigners 
focused too narrowly on justice issues to the exclusion of others. In the past few 
centuries the notion of usury had become discarded, consigned to the realms of 
church history. Nonetheless it constituted a major role in the development of ethical 
objections to the international debts. The debt crisis provided the fertile ground for a 
revised appreciation of its wisdom and relevance, and a topic that was formerly the 
predominant theme in medieval times was able to reassert itself (Buckley, 2000: 328; 
Vallely, 1990: 235) even to the extent that usury could be regarded as the ‘primary 
                                                 
1
 For example: Pettifor (2002: 13) 
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cause of economic injustice’ today (Van de Weyer, 2010: 58). Indeed, through our 
discussion on usury we shall see that despite the limitations of usury theory, it 
contains valuable insights. I shall argue that the capacity of theological reflection to 
deal adequately with debt is dependent on its ability to develop the issues that usury 
raises, consonant with the Athertonian approach developed in chapter 5. In 
particular, these issues are changes in the conceptual understanding of money, the 
dynamics of risk, and the interaction between past, present and future 
responsibilities. 
 
Historical overview 
 
We begin with a historical summary in order to show the reactive nature of much 
theological thought in relation to the legitimacy of interest charges. We see the 
eventual marginalisation and moribund nature of Christian ethics in this field as 
theologians attempted to relate to the changing economic contexts but failed to 
engage in dialogue to any meaningful extent. As political economy and, 
subsequently, economics emerged as disciplines within their own right, theology 
gave insufficient scrutiny to their insight and authority. The role that changing 
economic patterns played in the demise of prohibitions on usury is still the subject of 
argument, though it is clear to many that it was a causal factor. In addition, the rise of 
humanist Renaissance thinking helped to engineer huge changes in the Church’s 
approach to its understanding of usury, though commercial factors accelerated the 
rate of change. 
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The history of usury is a complex one, witnessing significant changes as a 
theoretical basis became established and was then adapted.  It is not our place here 
to rehearse this history in detail, but rather to outline the trends and their reasons, 
which can often be summarised as an adaptive reaction to a changing economic 
context. One key feature here was the rise in usury prohibition that accompanies a 
growing mercantilism in Western Europe during the Middle Ages, followed by an 
increasing plethora of exemptions that effectively permitted the charging of interest 
as capitalism became a dominant feature of social relations. The demise of usury 
prohibitions was complete by the nineteenth century, by which time usury had 
become redundant in all but name, leaving its remaining force as an expression for 
the levying of rates of interest so high as to be deemed exploitative. However, in 
making too rigid a causal connection between the development of usury theory and 
economic events, one should exercise due caution, for the picture is indeed a multi-
faceted one. No one simple explanation emerges and one cannot automatically 
apply inferences garnered from one period onto another one. For instance, of equal 
significance is another key feature during the same period; the shift from usury 
understood as greed or lack of charity to its being one of injustice - no ‘just title’ to 
profit.  
 
For much of its history the practice of charging interest has been regarded as 
inherently sinful. The Biblical basis for understanding usury is Deut. 23:19-20, which 
clearly prohibits usury of money, provisions or anything else that is lent to one’s 
‘brother’, but permits it to the stranger. Usury here refers to any kind of interest at all 
– not just those attracting high rates (Buckley, 1998: 10). The word used for 
‘stranger’, nokri, is distinctive from terms referring to resident aliens or protected 
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travellers, and refers to the foreigner who is external, with whom there is no bond. 
Thus the Biblical restrictions on lending money to foreigners resulted in a two-tier 
economic system; interest on loans to fellow Israelites was forbidden but permitted 
for outsiders. Although the original emphasis may have been more on the forbidding 
of interest toward fellow Israelites rather than what may be allowed toward others, 
the implication nonetheless is that one may extort from the foreigner, but an Israelite 
is a ‘brother’ who should be regarded differently.2 The charging of interest was 
clearly an everyday reality for people living in the time of Jesus and was illustrated in 
the parables; 12% was the commonly understood maximum rate of interest (Homer 
and Sylla, 1996: 54; Preston, 1991: 135; Selby, 1997: 124).3 The Church understood 
the New Testament to show that distinctions between Israelite and Gentile were no 
longer valid, and therefore regarded the practice of charging interest with suspicion. 
 
It is clear that the first few centuries of the Church saw little interest in usury, 
restricting its use among clergy but not others. A letter by Pope Leo the Great stated 
that usury was ‘shameful gain’; the Council at Nicea forbade interest to clergy on the 
basis of Ps.15:5, where the characteristics of the ‘just’ include the refraining from 
lending money at interest, and from receiving a bribe against the innocent; both 
clauses are linked by their concern for the exploitation of the vulnerable. The Early 
Church Fathers viewed usury as contrary to the obligation to love neighbours as 
oneself, rather than as any contractual sense of justice denoting fair exchange 
(Ruston, 1993: 174). Usury became consonant with gain at the expense of others’ 
suffering. Prior to the eighth century, clergy were prohibited from taking interest by 
the Church, but no theory had been developed, and hence the basis of Christian 
                                                 
2
 Lister (2006: 124) disagrees, and claims that ‘interest could only be used for mercantile purposes, 
and not when the non-Jew needed funds for subsistence.  
3
 This was calculated at the rate of 1% per month as simple interest, not compound interest.  
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thinking on usury was predominantly the views and activities of the Early Church 
Fathers rather than the injunctions contained in Scripture (Noonan, 1957: 11). For 
instance, Ambrose of Milan extended the Deuteronomical conditions for charging 
interest from Jews to the Christians; within the Church interest should be forbidden, 
but it was legitimate – even desirable – to charge interest to its enemies.  
 
Usury restrictions grew during the reign of Charlemagne in the eighth century and 
usury became prohibited and criminalised. Further biblical references were added to 
bolster a movement gathering momentum. However, penalties were mild, other than 
Church punishments on clergy.  Such prohibitions on usury were extended gradually 
during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, from the internal matters of the Church to 
wider society, and in so doing, became systematised. Although there was still no 
single theory of usury, the intention to gain from loaning money became the 
signature of usury, rather than technical matters concerning actual fiscal outcomes. 
This period witnessed considerable growth in commercial activity. Usury merely as a 
lack of charity seemed to have lost its force. St Anselm declared instead that usury 
was a form of theft. With increasing concern among influential Church leaders, in 
1139 the Second Lateran Council prohibited usury to ‘all men’ and declared usurers 
to be wicked. 
 
Restrictions were tightened further during the second half of the twelfth century. 
Pope Alexander III declared that usury included not only interest on loans but 
included sales of credit at prices higher than cash value. The Third Lateran Council 
(1179) extended the restrictions further and went so far as to deny the right of 
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Christian burial to known usurers. Urban’s quotation of Luke 6:354 was to have 
enormous influence on the theory of usury, for here we see for the first time the 
emergence of motive, for the intention of financial gain itself now constituted usury. 
By the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the Church regarded usury as a matter of 
major social concern. In 1311 Clement V declared an absolute prohibition on usury, 
and this represented the high watermark of usury restrictions which were to last, 
more or less, for some three hundred years. 
 
By medieval times the position on usury was therefore highly detailed. Usury 
comprised any addition to the principal: any recompense that was demanded as part 
of a loan agreement that was not the loan itself. Usurers should accordingly repay 
their usury in full; high prices for sales of credit were denounced as implicitly 
usurious. Interestingly, the levying of interest was permitted, but as compensation on 
a loan extended for solely charitable purposes. The ‘scholastic theory’ of usury, was 
clear that usury was a sin of injustice, in effect a violation of property rights. The 
charging of interest was equivalent to the stealing of money, for one could not add 
value to a metal coin: its value and its metallic nature were one and the same. This 
line of reasoning was based on not only the damaging social consequences of usury, 
but moreover on two interacting principles. The first was that the use and the 
ownership of money were indistinguishable; the second was that the value of money 
did not change over time. Much of this was due to the legacy of Aristotle, whose 
teaching became particularly significant in the Middle Ages and helped to form the 
basis of usury theory. Aristotle regarded money simply as exchange-value, a sterile 
entity, and its use to generate additional money was thus essentially unnatural. As a 
                                                 
4
 ‘lend without expecting any return.’ (Revised English Bible) 
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result of these principles, considerations concerning the value of money did not 
intrude into the ethics of exchange, sales or loans. A just exchange (the ‘just price’) 
was dependent on the equality of the goods exchanged, and since one could not 
separate use and ownership, and since money would neither increase nor decrease 
in value during the period of a loan, to make any charge would be manifestly unjust. 
Usury was unjust because it effectively charged rent for money loaned – rent which 
continued even when the money loaned had been spent.  
 
The rise of mercantilism saw the beginning of the erosion of usury restrictions, as 
increasingly credit was issued for the purposes of establishing a business or venture, 
rather than for emergency relief (consumption). Although Luther and other early 
Reformers were strongly defensive of usury prohibitions, the first major reforms to 
the scholastic theory were advocated by Calvin. He understood the Biblical 
injunctions to be based on the commands to demonstrate charity and justice toward 
the poor and destitute,5 and urged modifications to the theory of usury rather than its 
complete abandonment, though these caveats were widely ignored. Calvin (1616: 
46-7) understood Christ’s injunction in Lk. 6:35 to be an instruction to lend to the 
poor rather than to the rich. Calvin realised money used in commercial activity was 
not generally sterile, and redefined usury away from the technical matters of the 
scholastic theory, basing the defining criteria for usury upon the possibility of injury to 
the other person through financial arrangements. He did not, however, extend this 
notion of damage to the way in which the burden of loss can fall disproportionately 
between creditor and debtor, so that the former can make gains while the latter is 
impoverished (Pettifor, 2009). Calvin, however, for all his relaxation of usury 
prohibitions, was instinctively against the taking of interest in general (Calvin, 1616: 
                                                 
5
 Usury is only forbidden when it is ‘repugnant to equitie and charitie.’ Calvin, (1616: 48) 
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51; Noonan, 1957: 366). He criticised the former Church authorities that permitted 
some exceptions to the usury regulations, such as the idea of interest as 
compensation for the possibility of late payment or for the risk of default.  
 
The demise of prohibitions on usury came through application of insurance to loans. 
The Church’s understanding of money moved from the confines of the Aristotelian 
assumptions that money was sterile, dead value and unproductive in itself, to 
embrace the realisation that where investment is open to financial risk, profits could 
be achieved legitimately. The scholastic theory thus first became undermined 
through the acceptance that insurance could legitimately be applied to loan contracts 
(Noonan, 1957: 202). Financial risk had become acceptable, and a new 
understanding began to emerge that money could, under certain circumstances, be 
a productive agent – of more money. Typically the means of circumventing the strict 
letter of the usury prohibitions was the ‘triple contract’ in which three distinct financial 
contracts were made. The lender would invest (not loan) the sum with the borrower, 
make the borrower pay the cost of the insurance for the ‘investment’, and finally sell 
to them the rights to any profit made above a certain percentage of the investment. 
These three elements combined to effect the equivalent of a loan contract, which the 
Church was unable to prohibit. In consequence, the credit business developed 
significantly to incorporate bonds and stocks (Noonan, 1957: 202). The result of 
these changes can be seen in the formation of a consensus that certain rates of 
interest, commonly 5%, could be charged without being considered usurious. With 
this development, interest had become justified on several counts; to offset any 
losses by the lender for not having used the money elsewhere, for the risk of lending 
in the first place, and for expenses incurred in the loan arrangement. Usury became, 
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in effect, relegated to any gain from the loan contraction process to which the lender 
had no just title (Nelson, 1969: 406). From this original idea of ‘just price’, what 
emerged in practice from these revisions was the acceptance of interest unless it 
was at an exorbitant rate. The doctrine of usury had therefore moved from the public 
realm to the private conscience (Jones, 1989: 199). However, these developments 
did not make the necessary distinction between loans for investment purposes and 
those to help subsistence in times of emergency – and thus the charging of interest 
remained potentially exploitative (Ruston, 1993: 173). During the following centuries 
Church pronouncements and encyclicals on usury declined markedly both in number 
and in clarity as the gap between the classic scholastic theory and contemporary 
practice became ever more apparent. 
 
We have seen the concept of usury move from a basis of uncharitableness to one of 
injustice against nature and God, to injustice against others. Another way of looking 
at this history is to see the development of usury regulations as representing the 
expansion of the ‘moral community’, those whom we regard as our natural 
neighbours, but at the cost of diminishing the strength of those bonds:  
 
 ‘It is a tragedy of moral history that the expansion of the area of the moral 
community has ordinarily been gained through the sacrifice of the intensity of 
the moral bond, or... that all men have become brothers by becoming equally 
others.’ (Nelson 1969: 136)6 
 
 
Hyde (1983) develops Nelson’s thesis further, pointing out that the Deuteronomic 
regulations both prohibit and permit the practice of usury, in different circumstances. 
Within the tribal community usury is prohibited, but it is permitted when dealing with 
                                                 
6
 Noonan (1957: 400) argues against Nelson that he has confused interest and usury, and that usury 
theory always assumed that there were some instances under which interest could be legitimately 
charged.   
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strangers. The former community is characterised by gift-exchange among 
reciprocal, close-knit bonds where people have a strong sense of cohesion and 
belonging; where there are bonds between people, usury is wrong and acts as 
violator of the social order. The latter typifies the need for contracts of exchange 
where trust requires some material reinforcement. The Early Church, with its 
universalist understanding that all were now one in Christ, accordingly sought to 
outlaw usury among Christians. The Reformation, however, separated the realms of 
Church and State, with the effect of narrowing the moral field from the wider society 
down to people with close personal ties. It no longer made sense to lend to a 
stranger, with the accompanying uncertainty as to whether the loan would be repaid. 
Therefore, restrictions against usury began to become more relaxed as that moral 
field diminished. Calvin’s approach can therefore be seen to be based upon 
reciprocity between neither foreigners or kin but between ‘cordial strangers’. It 
represents an ‘ethic of equity’ in which there are no victims nor any tangible bonds 
established through the exchange (Hyde, 1983: chapter 7). Interest has become 
distinguished from usury.  
 
Contemporary views on usury 
 
The legacy of the above history has been to leave two co-existing views on usury 
today. One is the view that usury, strictly defined, is now rendered conceptually 
obsolete due to changing economic circumstances, and that interest charging is 
perfectly legitimate in the absence of coercion, injury or illegitimacy. The use of credit 
for enterprise is thus endorsed within the boundaries of reasonableness and 
fairness. Usury has therefore come to be equated with extortionate rates of interest, 
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exploitative of the borrowers: the Jubilee campaign did use the term in this sense, 
with all the moral opprobrium its use conjectured. The other view maintains a distinct 
unease concerning the charging of interest, for there remains within the Christian 
tradition a strand that continues to find the notion of interest hard to accommodate. 
This perspective includes the recognition that such practices can be deeply inimical 
not only to the participants, but moreover to wider society. For instance, the pace 
and nature of economic growth is strongly connected to the level of interest rates, 
which then raises questions about long-term sustainability in both economic and 
ecological terms. Thus such concerns are linked to the issue of exploitation of both 
economic agents and environmental resources. The Jubilee campaign reflected this 
view also, critical of the unquestioning acceptance of interest payments, and in 
particular the ‘nexus of credit and debt’ (Selby, 1996: 42). Pettifor (2003b) was not 
untypical in her view that ‘making money out of money is wrong’ – though the 
campaign did not reflect this.  
 
The compounding of interest was also condemned, with the Tegucigalpa Declaration 
stating firmly: ‘Usury and the charging of interest on top of interest should be 
forbidden’ (Jubilee South, 1999a). The damaging effects of interest within the 
economic system has been highlighted by Mills (2000b) and Van de Weyer (2010): 
interest performs an amplifying function, where borrowing serves both to heighten 
economic booms and to deepen recessions when repayments are burdensome. Mills 
(200b: 187) attempts to expose the ‘fallacy’ of compound interest, observing that the 
growth of compounded interest is exponential – and that this cannot be sustained 
without some opposing force such as bankruptcy or inflation. He is accurate in all 
this, but the danger of compound interest is not always manifest. Where rates of 
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interest are low, or where the time scale for repayment is short, the compounded 
aspect of the interest may not be particularly significant, assuming the loan is 
generating its own income for the debtor. The real fallacy is that over long periods, 
and assuming low inflation, the growth of compounded interest will often exceed the 
rates of productive growth for an enterprise. More significantly, as Mills indicates, 
when credit is offered it occurs at differential rates according to the risk of default, 
with the effect of increasing the concentration of wealth among the already wealthy. 
 
Such deeper concerns about the credit process led some to call for a broader 
approach to the use of usury, to incorporate issues of inequality: 
 
‘Simply talking as if usury were excessive interest in an otherwise fair system 
will not account for its significance in Christian ethics. Usury both causes and 
is a consequence of poverty and inequality...it violates our basic duty towards 
the common good.’ (Ruston, 1993: 175)   
 
An illustration of this revisionist understanding may be found in Pettifor’s own 
definition: 
 
‘Usury is the practice of exalting money values over human and 
environmental values; of creating money at no cost and lending at rates of 
interest not to foster and maintain humanity or the ecosystem; but to 
accumulate reserves of unearned income; extract wealth from the productive 
sector in a moment that is parasitic; extract wealth from those who lack wealth 
(the asset-less) and to transfer this wealth to the already-rich – (those with 
assets); and make a claim on the future.’ (Pettifor, 2009) 
 
Such a comprehensive statement combines the concern over the disproportionate 
cost that is inflicted upon the poor, but also displays a principled opposition to the 
entire process by which credit is derived: the references to ‘creating money at no 
cost’ and ‘unearned income’ reveal her inability, as with the scholastics, to relate 
theology and insights concerning interest in a dialogical manner. Ruston’s definition, 
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that ‘Usury... is a failure to accept the God-given purpose of money as a token of 
worldly goods’ (1993: 175) is also deficient, in that his understanding of money is 
confined to exchange-value – a view that will be discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter.  
 
Selby’s work is, however, more balanced; he is cautious about the use of the usury 
tradition, but does feel it contains important insights. One the one hand he approves 
of Gorringe’s forceful condemnation of all interest as usury, inimical to the poor, and 
in need of redemption (Selby, 1997: 122); on the other, he recognises the degree of 
difference between the practices of debt and credit in history (particularly ancient 
times) compared to their purpose and dynamics at the turn of the Millennium.  This 
leads him to state that there is both ‘truth and self-deception’ concerning 
reservations about the usefulness of the tradition: 
 
‘Maybe we cannot return at a stroke to the arena in which that ancient wisdom 
evolved; but maybe the wisdom is returning to offer us the way forward we 
need.’ (Selby, 1997: 131) 
 
 
Such truth is founded not so much in the detail of proscriptions, but in the experience 
of suffering (and consequent social upheaval) that indebtedness has been 
responsible for. In addition, the phenomenon of globalisation has made the world 
effectively smaller, and led to a greater sense of the connections between each other 
and between ourselves and the earth’s ecology. In this sense Selby reverses 
Nelson’s dictum, suggesting that the bounds of the earth’s moral community may 
have been reached, and that the bonds are in fact strengthened through an 
increased sense of our interdependence upon each other and the environment. The 
core of this tradition lies in the realisation of the dangerous power of money and thus 
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the need to control that power through regulation (Selby, 1997: 143), for unrestrained 
lending is inherently dangerous (Selby, 1999b). 
 
Central to the validity of any usury insight today is the issue concerning exploitation 
of the vulnerable. Therefore, the focus for ethical enquiry will be a means of 
understanding the circumstances of the loan and the power relations between lender 
and borrower. One key issue for critical reflection on usury is the distinction between 
the different purposes of credit: for enterprise or emergency relief. It cannot be 
reduced to an abstract principle based upon an understanding of the nature of 
money, for fundamentally the usury legislation in Scripture is concerned with the 
quality of human relationships. 
 
Two components of usury theory therefore warrant further consideration. The first is 
a discussion on the changing understanding of money, and how this affects the 
theory, not least as it considers the phenomenon of risk. The second is a 
consideration of the moral responsibility between generations, and in particular the 
sense that the present generation owes a debt to future generations. 
 
Money and interest 
 
We have seen how usury today is understood commonly to refer to unjustifiably high 
rates of interest, rather than the practices of lending per se. However, as has already 
been mentioned, there remains a deep suspicion in many theological circles 
concerning the rightfulness of money to generate further money.7 Linked strongly to 
                                                 
7
 For example, Ruston (1993: 175)  
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this is the view that unearned income is unnatural; that money functions necessarily 
as a mechanism enabling commercial transactions to take place, but when it 
becomes elevated to a commodity in its own right, then it has become a ‘self-
perpetuating power’ (Visser and MacIntosh, 1998). It is nonetheless clear that the 
Church’s failure to develop an adequate theory of usury lies in its inadequate 
understanding concerning money. Church leaders consistently failed to understand 
the concept of the just price (the market rate set by supply and demand and, 
therefore, changeable and subjective (Preston, 1991: 139)). Instead, they remained 
attached to the Aristotelian view that money was fungible, and therefore used up in 
the process of buying and selling. 
 
We now consider attempts by supporters of the Jubilee campaign to suggest ways of 
reforming the interest-based economy. Some of these proposed the principle of 
placing limits on interest that could be charged on loans. Peters, who described 
himself as suspicious of the ‘magic’ of compound interest, suggested legislation to 
place an upper limit on the total amount that could be repaid (Dent and Peters, 1999: 
145); Müller-Fahrenholz (1997b) pondered whether there ought to be ‘time limits’ for 
the growth of money, for ideally money should be subject to decay, although he 
admitted he did not know how this might come about. In Müller-Fahrenholz’ view, 
money is a commodity like any other, and hence can be valued, cancelled or written 
off as other assets are. Again, however, he does not indicate how this writing-off 
could occur. Such ideas may inspire further attention to the inexorable spiralling of 
debt repayments under high interest rates, and attempt to place a brake on its 
damaging consequences, but in their present form they are little more than 
speculative. 
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From the theologically conservative flank that affords great emphasis to the role of 
the family in social, economic and political matters, Mills (2000b) and Schluter (2004) 
advocate economic systems that are not based upon interest-bearing debt. They are 
both unequivocal on the Biblical prohibition on charging interest, although they play 
down the exemptions towards foreigners in Deuteronomy (Schluter, 2004: 68). Mills 
questions the very purpose of interest, arguing that one should not be rewarded for 
the voluntary surrender of one’s property rights on money. In the face of alternatives, 
not least those pursued by Islamic financial organisations – such as profit-sharing 
and the Biblical injunction against lending expecting any return, Mills implies that the 
levying of interest is unjustified. Instead, he advocates a greater emphasis on profit-
sharing and rental arrangements for lending (Mills, 200b: 189). His proposals are 
insightful yet his rather intransigent opposition to all forms of interest marginalises 
the impact of his suggestions. In a not dissimilar vein Buckley suggests a new, 
broader use of ‘usury’ terminology which includes a return to its Biblical origins; that 
is, she poses fundamental questions about the practice of charging interest for the 
use of money at all, not merely at rates deemed to be extortionate. Her concern is 
how the practice of lending affects the most poor and vulnerable, and she suggests 
that a consideration of how they are affected is integral to defining what is usurious, 
in a similar vein to Calvin centuries earlier (Buckley, 1998: 6). She places usury 
theory within the wider context of how the poor experience financial pressures, 
opportunities and practices. She does not therefore advocate an alternative to the 
credit system for all, but argues that alternatives are required for loans to the 
powerless and poor, such as power-sharing arrangements (see below) and non-
monetary credit schemes (Buckley, 1998: 24). In this regard there is much that the 
Christian faith can learn from Islamic and Judaic teaching on debt and interest. 
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Usury is one area which has much potential for multi-faith dialogue, since the three 
Abrahamic faiths all contain codified instructions on the charging of interest.  
In recent years interest has been expressed by theologians such as Schluter, Mills, 
Buckley and Atherton in the principles behind Islamic finance, and in particular the 
Islamic restrictions upon lending. Indeed, in Atherton’s typology this represents both 
a type of ‘overlapping consensus’ (across faiths) and a ‘distinctively different’ 
approach to wider society. The legacy of the Christian restrictions upon money-
lending are, sadly, all too closely linked with anti-Semitism, since Jews alone were 
permitted to lend at interest and became despised as a result. Judaic legislation is 
framed from the perspective of charitable giving – obligations to one’s neighbour - 
rather than of abstract justice. In Islam interest is strictly prohibited and the process 
of lending has to be done in a different way. Here, the lender makes an investment in 
the borrower’s business for a fixed rate of return. Thus, both parties share in the risk 
of failure and the profits from success. A central feature of this arrangement is that 
power is shared more equitably, though it is not without practical difficulties. Sharia-
compliant mortgages involve complicated financial arrangements in which charges 
are levied for the loan, but are not charged as interest. If a venture is successful and 
profits are considerable, the lender receives substantial remuneration – though it is 
the borrower who has expended the skill and time. In such circumstances one might 
argue that such an equitable power-sharing is unjust when one considers the 
disparity of contribution that each party has made. Furthermore, it is uncertain how 
easy it might be to obtain credit under such arrangements where the risk is known to 
be other than low. High rates of interest (however exploitative) act as compensation 
for creditors in such circumstances, and hence provide the incentive for investment. 
Some, such as Schluter (2008), see Islamic finance as a challenge to the Christian 
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faith to respond in similar vein, and there is much to commend it, for it points to a 
reconnection of economics with theology. Although in Islam there is a theological 
economy rather than dialogue between two discrete disciplines, it does highlight the 
significance of relationships through economic activities. Under Islamic lending, 
creditor and debtor are tied together far more closely than in Western arrangements 
and, consequently, there is an intrinsic sense of social responsibility governing the 
entire process, including the question of whether the loan is indeed in the 
prospective borrower’s best interests. 
 
In order to be able to come to theological conclusions over the validity of charging 
interest, therefore, one must understand the function and role of money in the 
present economy. To what extent did the debt campaigners appreciate this? The 
cognisance that money is a social construct - exchange-value - led many to argue 
against its commodification, but in a way that denies the significant differences in the 
way that money functions in the contemporary economy. Certainly changes in the 
role money plays in the world economy were highlighted by supporters of the 
campaign. They recognised that since the 1970s there has been a massive shift in 
the patterns of international trade, with the vast majority of trade (in monetary terms) 
being conducted through financial transactions rather than the actual exchange of 
goods. Pettifor (1998: 11) frequently quoted the statistic that in 1970, 90% of world 
trade was in goods and 10% represented financial transactions, whereas by 1990 
this pattern had been reversed.8 Some commentators have given the nature and role 
of money more reflection, and their position is more nuanced. Selby is perceptive in 
acknowledging the power that money now exercises in international markets, where 
                                                 
8
 Gorringe (1994:40) states that 95% of all transactions today are concerned with making money out 
of money. 
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– importantly - money ‘drives’ trade rather than follows it, as in the past. A central 
feature of his analysis is that the astonishing rise in both the quality and power of 
money has effected a change in the way we understand the world; our view of Truth 
is affected by changes in the way money now functions (Selby, 1999b). This is a 
profound observation, but unfortunately one which Selby does not pursue with 
sufficient vigour, and to which we now turn our attention, in particular as we consider 
the phenomenon of risk. 
 
We see that a key component in the legitimacy of interest charging, and in much of 
the way money functions in the economy today, is the notion of risk. In the absence 
of risk, profits are regarded with suspicion in many theological quarters; for example, 
Schluter (2004: 68) remarks that: ‘the Bible determines the legitimate return on 
capital by the amount of risk taken to achieve it’.9 Risk is inimical to the efficient 
operation of any economic system. High levels of risk prevent financial exchange 
altogether, due to the fear that one may have little recourse to legal means if the 
exchange is fraudulent or the goods are not supplied as promised. Those with wealth 
will seek to translate their assets into commodities that are least risk-prone, such as 
gold. Moderate levels of risk are also highly deleterious, making the process and 
price of credit very high, and preventing long-term planning and investment. From a 
theological perspective, however, it is the skewing of risk in ways that affect 
disproportionately the most vulnerable, and in favour of the creditor, that causes 
greatest concern, leading to the charge of modern usury (Van de Weyer, 2010: 17-
8). 
 
                                                 
9
 The Fifth Lateran Council in 1512 established one criterion for usury as the gain without risk: Van de 
Weyer (2010: 12) 
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A good example of theological reflection upon this changing role of money is found in 
the work of Cowley, who presents a very considered understanding of money, and in 
particular the way money is used to obviate risk. Her approach to ethical 
considerations on money focuses on the societal aspects of monetary exchange. In 
contrast to reductionist economics, but also moving beyond simplistic 
characterisations of money as mere tokens of exchange, Cowley acknowledges that 
money must be appraised in the context of its cultural contexts and symbolic 
functions. Money is a symbolic reality:  
 
‘There is a tendency to treat money in a polemical way which does not 
account fully enough for the ambiguity present in power/empowerment.’ 
(Cowley, 2006: 105) 
 
 
Cowley asserts (2006: 96) that money has become not only less of a substance (i.e. 
metal) but that it is more accurate to regard it as being a function of social 
relationships. Clearly money requires trust in order to make it acceptable in 
exchange, and it requires a stable legal framework to guarantee the promise of 
payment that it represents. The derivation of the term ‘credit’ from the Latin credo is 
a significant indicator of this trust (Ferguson, 2008a: 30). In addition, money needs to 
keep its value over time, for high inflation destroys its ability to act easily (a point 
which counters the arguments of Müller-Fahrenholz above.) Financial markets help 
to smooth the fluctuations and imbalances that occur within society – for example, 
over long or short-term investments. In so doing, money helps the economy to 
function more effectively, and thus benefits the common good.  
 
Risk is minimised in various ways by financial markets. The most straightforward is 
the purchase of insurance against loss. Increasingly, however, producers and 
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purchasers seek assurances that protect them against other kinds of risk such as 
currency exchange-rates, for instance by buying guarantees of future trading 
arrangements at pre-determined prices. Such arrangements make the processes of 
investment in production much easier. Producers of raw materials, such as minerals, 
and agricultural producers also find that their interests are well served if they can 
‘future-proof’ the market through the purchase of price guarantees. Derivatives may 
play a part in this, since they act to spread the exposure to risk among many parties. 
In such a way very large financial undertakings – such as major infrastructure 
projects – can be handled. The strange paradox about derivatives is that their 
purpose is to minimise risk, but they are high-risk products themselves. Typically 
they are opaque to scrutiny and are supported by a relatively small number of 
financial institutions. These factors mean that they are more vulnerable to the 
possibilities of miscalculation and the effects of financial shocks (Cowley, 2006: 
chapter 8). As we have seen already, the risks are borne disproportionately by 
certain sectors of society. Cowley’s maxim for assessing the moral validity of 
derivatives is to posit the perceived benefits against the possible dangers; weighing 
up the possible scenarios and their relative probabilities of occurrence aids ethical 
decision-making. 
 
Cowley’s chief concern about the way money has been functioning in recent years is 
to do with the way in which it is drawn increasingly to high-risk areas of the financial 
market which naturally hold out the promise of potential high returns. The 
phenomenon of investment attracted to the prospects of greatest return is not new, 
of course, but Cowley discerns a change in its dynamics. She indicates that it is the 
sums of money involved that are the most significant, as risk-prone business 
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becomes the dominant source of income for financial institutions and individuals.10 A 
major feature of money in modern times has been the extension of means-ends 
chains, which consist of many links that are not ends in themselves, but merely 
staging posts on the way to the ultimate goals. This means that money can be used 
for purposes quite unforeseen by its previous users, completely divorced from the 
original intentions of the initiators of the chain.11 Thus money facilitates a convoluted 
nexus of exchanges between people that are not necessarily reciprocal; the 
essential ‘human-ness’ or personhood has been dissipated. In contrast to the 
process of trading in commodities, where highly developed networks of inter-
personal bonds are required, money exchanges are characterised by impersonality 
and detachment: ‘Possession of money loosens the individual from the unifying 
bonds of other economic and social relations’ (Cowley, 2006: 102). Exchanges are 
no longer between people, or even people and objects, but between inanimate 
objects. Money is therefore defined by what it symbolises rather than its innate 
properties. Cowley gives the example of the investment in stocks; one is making no 
personal commitment other than the financial cost of the purchase and one may be 
utterly uninterested in the actual company’s sphere of operations. What matters to 
the investor will be the value of the stocks and their dividends. She concludes: ‘the 
growth of capital in itself has become the priority’ (Cowley, 2006: 103). This 
‘rootlessness’ of money is the central feature in thinking about risk. Money has no 
attachment to any ‘real’ (productive) economic activity, rather risk-prone business 
has become the chief source of financial activity. Furthermore, the consequences of 
risk-prone investment – such as derivatives – are borne by certain groups 
                                                 
10
 This point is also made by Ruston (1993: 177), who comments that greater profits are made from 
lending than from investment. 
11
 This can also happen, of course, with manufactured goods, such as metals that end up as 
armaments. 
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disproportionately, not least because they can lead to the widespread destabilisation 
of national economies (Cowley, 2006: 134ff.). Such investments are therefore 
matters of concern in the public arena, and not confined to the realm of economists: 
 
‘The search for a risk-free life is a nonsense doomed to failure... An ethics of 
risk management is required which incorporates both prudence and courage 
without recklessness.’ (Cowley, 2006: 152) 
 
 
Money becomes idolatrous when it becomes the centre of ethical concern, where its 
acquisition and preservation is paramount and sufficiently dominant that it becomes 
impossible to give weight to other issues and values (Cowley, 2006: 140). In Cowley 
in particular, we see how a pragmatic, interdisciplinary approach can lead to 
theological issues of human relationships and power alongside economic issues 
such as risk.     
 
Responsibility toward future generations 
 
One further area in which any theory of usury must be located is within a conceptual 
framework that establishes ethical connections between the present time and the 
future. This is particularly so in the medium to long term; much economics, as we 
have seen, operates under a very short-term perspective. Creditors and lenders 
have legal obligations to each other, underlying which is the unstated principle that 
obligations made on one day continue to the next: today I am the same person I was 
yesterday, and I am accountable in the present for my conduct in the past. In the 
case of collective debt, such as that taken out by governments on behalf of their 
citizens, this becomes a more complex matter, which has been discussed above in 
connection with odious and unjust debts. However, when the time span becomes 
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many years, the ethical considerations become more complex. In what sense does 
the present generation have obligations to subsequent ones? This question is at the 
heart of many contemporary discussions concerning pension provisions, so-called 
‘intergenerational theft’. This is the notion that one generation has inflicted financial 
obligations upon another – in this particular instance the allegation is made that the 
present generation is unfairly burdened by commitments it inherited from its 
predecessor, and to which it is obligated. Pension contributions need to be increased 
in order not only to provide current scheme members’ payments when they are 
older, but also for those who are already older. It thus represents a transfer of 
resources from the working population to the retired and retiring, but is likely to be 
difficult when the current contributors are themselves older. In the case of 
international debt, the criticism by campaigners is that future generations will bear a 
disproportionate burden of the debt servicing cost.  
 
A further development of usury theory is the view that usury – understood as 
unjustifiably high rates of interest, not only acts as a transfer mechanism of wealth 
from poor to rich, but that it ‘discounts’ the future. This is a clear violation of 
intergenerational equity, the consequences of which might be catastrophic: appalling 
poverty and the extinction of species (Vissor and MacIntosh, 1998). Here the needs 
of future generations become subservient to the perceived requirements of today. 
Debt campaigners were acutely aware of the burden debt places on future 
generations. Pettifor’s definition of usury (above) reveals the conceptual link between 
debt today and future consequences, particularly for the environment, a theme 
pioneered by George (1992). Selby is, however, the most articulate of all, cognisant 
of the ways that debt ‘binds the future’. It is not right, he argues, for certain critical 
294 
 
 
aspects of human life to be ‘mortgaged’: ‘you can’t have the Truth today and pay for 
it tomorrow’ (Selby, 199b). 
 
The theological perspective on the relationship between present and future 
generations is, with the exception of Selby, rarely articulated, although increasingly it 
is implicit in ecological reflections. The concept of the stewardship of creation implies 
a responsibility that lies beyond each person’s particular lifetime, and cherishes the 
vision of God’s world being brought to fulfilment of the divine purpose. The fact of our 
common creation by God not only unites men and women as brothers and sisters, 
but provides the basis for a relationship across the generations. God is creator of 
time as well as material things, but stands beyond both their confines. Accordingly, 
there is a unity through God between people who have no physical contact or 
knowledge of each other: future generations are still brothers and sisters to the 
present generation. Jesus refuted the idea that a person can justifiably bear the 
suffering caused by the misdemeanours of his or her ancestor.12  
 
One key feature of intergenerational responsibility is discerned through ‘truthful self-
understanding’ of our world and ourselves which sees beyond the short term and 
perceives the true interdependence of all our relationships (Williams, 2010). In other 
words, truly to be human is to embrace a sense of our dependencies not only with 
our contemporaries but across the generations. There is thus an important bond 
between the generations. The needs of one will be the same as its successor: food, 
a stable climate, an economy unburdened by oppressive debt. Justice within the 
present is thus linked inextricably to justice to the future.   
                                                 
12
 John 9:2-3. Green (1998: 83) also refers to this. 
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The communion of saints is also a repository of theological insight on this matter, 
originating with the notion of linking present worshippers with those of the past, and 
particularly in the participation in the eucharist, in which all are joined together in the 
praise of Christ (Pannenberg, 1972: 149).13 Pannenberg (1972: 152-4) develops a 
view of the Church that is highly eschatological: communion with Christ can only be 
understood in the context of a self-understanding of the Church as ‘God’s community 
of the end-time’, waiting and hoping for the parousia when God’s kingdom comes in 
the fullness of divine glory. Charles Wesley put this well: 
‘Whate’er we hope, by faith we have, 
Future and past subsisting now.’ (Hymns and Psalms, 1983: no. 662) 
 
 
The Church’s character is thus derived from this expectation and its unity in Christ. 
Hence, the communion of saints goes beyond notions of mere gratitude for the 
encouragement and inspiration of the past faithful, and suggests a powerful bond 
between people caught up together in the work of salvation. The bonds that lie 
between the generations are thus not only those of obligation to each other, but 
moreover a sense of envisioning the future. In the context of debt, the future vision is 
of a world in which the kingdom has come, and no one is burdened. The Christian 
responsibility is therefore the ensuring that future generations will not be crushed by 
the burdens of debt. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Bonhoeffer (1963: 67) also writes of the eschatological understanding of time shared by a 
community. 
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Summary 
 
The complex history of usury theory itself demonstrates the way in which theological 
ethics have often reacted to economic developments and had to absorb the realities 
or necessities of interest, or else abandoned the notion altogether. In general, debt 
campaigners, particularly those in the South, did not examine the historical tradition, 
and invoked selected Scriptural texts prohibiting the charging of interest. (Selby is a 
notable exception here.) The paucity of references to usury may be considered as 
indicative of a narrow theological response to debt, separated from wider issues 
about money. 
 
The continuing value of the concept of usury in facilitating a constructive 
engagement with economics is dependent upon the basis on which it is understood, 
for as we have seen, there are two differing foundational arguments. One is based 
on the tradition that the charging of interest is inherently unjust, but this is derived 
from an outdated understanding of the role and nature that money now plays in 
society. The other is based on the consequences of lending for human relationships, 
and concern for the exploitation of the powerless. It is difficult to establish a rigid 
separation between these two facets in the minds of those who framed the 
Deuteronomic legislation; however, it may be helpful to be cognisant of the 
distinction, made by Preston, between Biblical ethics and Christian ethics 
(Kamergrauzis, 2001: 74). This would be particularly helpful, for instance, in dealing 
with the Lukan injunction that one should not expect to gain from lending money, and 
help the process of reflection on this text to move from doctrinal imposition to a more 
dialogical one. 
297 
 
 
The pragmatic approach to the theological engagement with usury is found in the 
importance given to the distinction made between the purposes and motives 
involved in the loans-making process, between emergency relief loans offered for 
consumptive purposes and those made to enable investment in commercial 
enterprises. The difficulty with this is that not only is it not always possible to make 
an easy distinction between the two. In the case of many loans to developing 
countries, the purpose was ostensibly for investment in infrastructure, machinery and 
development projects, but these were by no means purely commercial activities. 
Although some bilateral loans may be classified in this manner (such as the example 
of the Romanian tractors exported to Zambia), many of these loans, together with 
the multilateral ones, were devised with the aim of assisting in the long term 
development of the borrowing country. There is no easy demarcation between what 
is ‘charitable’ and that which is ‘commercial’. The theological requirement of relative 
autonomy, described in chapter two, means that any use of usury in a contemporary 
context must acknowledge the enormous change in the way that credit is offered, but 
moreover the way in which money functions; otherwise the danger is that the focus 
will remain on a principle about lending that is located within an outdated context. 
Mills’ and Schluter’s approaches would benefit from a stronger recognition of this 
point. 
 
Pettifor’s definition extends the concept of usury considerably, embracing ecological 
considerations, but is too confessional. Her language, describing usury as the 
placing of money values above human and environmental ones, returns us to a clash 
of competing values that is obstructive of dialogue. Cowley’s observation is apposite 
in this context: 
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‘Genuine moral debate cannot take place between one who argues in terms 
of social utilities and one who believes in the priority of rights. They justify 
moral priorities in different ways... All that results is a dialogue of the deaf.’ 
(Cowley, 2006: 4) 
 
Selby’s observation that changes in the ways money functions have affected our 
notions of truth are profound; the acknowledgement that the theological tradition has 
been shaped in part by such change satisfies one of Brown’s criteria for theological 
engagement in the economy. Cowley’s approach to money is a good example of an 
inter-disciplinary ‘theology with’ rather than Pettifor’s ‘theology and’ approach, for 
Cowley recognises the new functions of money yet retains theological issues that are 
intrinsically part of economics: questions about the nature of obligations, trust, the 
public dimension to risk management, and the consequences - especially on the 
types of people who bear these most – of unpredictable situations. Money clearly is 
productive all by itself, but paradoxically it is this tendency which most leads to the 
excesses of risk-prone investment with all their consequent dangers. Ruston’s 
question concerning how ‘productive’ money is, and particularly who it is productive 
for, is critical. 
 
The heart of the original usury regulations, in Deuteronomy, was that usury 
comprised the taking of advantage of a vulnerable person, someone who was in no 
position to bargain and thus was open to exploitation. Within the Israelite community 
this was unacceptable. This same maxim can still underpin theological reflection 
upon debt today; moreover, particularly with the case of international debt, we see 
that advantage can easily be taken, and possibly in ignorance. The usury tradition 
serves as a reminder that high levels of interest damage social relationships within 
the community, and that financial transactions are located within the context of social 
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relationships, rather than the detached, impersonal exchanges that typify much of 
the market economy today. This tradition can therefore act as a check-list to warn 
against unfair advantage being taken – wittingly or not. 
 
Lastly, the morality of interest is found to be questionable inasmuch as there is a 
significant disparity in power relations that can lead to exploitative behaviour, hence 
the attempt to develop methods of lending based on a greater mutuality of profit or 
loss. Shared interest schemes are, in Atherton’s terminology, both performative and 
bear the hallmark of being ‘distinctively different’ from conventional economics, yet 
also reflect an overlap of consensus between many faith-based organisations. The 
use of the concept of inter-generational responsibility linked through debt and 
interest reflects an imaginative ideal trying to provoke deeper analysis. Ultimately, 
however, a critique based purely on power disparities or one devoted solely to the 
more technical issues concerning the role of money are inadequate, for both are 
essential. Our study of interest charging and money shows that the ideological and 
the practical can indeed be brought together in creative tension. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Conclusion 
 
  
 
‘One of the saddest of the companions of poverty is debt: the legacy of 
past help and sometimes of past error. It is a burden that weighs heavily 
on the poorest people of our planet and one, also, that denies new and 
greatly needed assistance. Accordingly, both for economic development 
and for human compassion, there is need, indeed urgency, for debt relief 
for the poorest nations. This is currently being urged by the most 
compassionately intelligent people of our time. I join them in their plea for 
early and comprehensive action.’ (Galbraith, 1999b)1 
 
 
 
My thesis has been concerned with tracing the development of the Jubilee 2000 
campaign, drawing out its critical theological features and suggesting the 
direction for further reflection upon international debt. In doing so the value of an 
analytical framework drawn from Atherton’s work has been demonstrated, 
particularly as it relates to the development of an inter-disciplinary approach 
facing the challenges of pluralism and globalisation. This concern for 
methodological issues of theological engagement through the second part of the 
thesis has involved discussion on the relationship between ideals and realities, 
on the kingdom of God inaugurated but not fulfilled. The Jubilee 2000 campaign’s 
often simplistic approach nonetheless contains possibilities that offer a new 
avenue away from the deficiencies of liberalism, and which may yet be genuinely 
dialogical and prophetic.  
 
                                            
1
 Surprisingly, this endorsement appears never to have been published in any of the campaign 
material. 
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In this final chapter we begin with a summary of the campaign, before offering a 
critique concerned principally with methodology, identifying requirements that are 
necessary for ongoing theological reflection on debt to be developed. We then 
turn to examine key themes that have emerged during the previous chapters, 
before returning to the issues of idealism and realism that have been a constant 
undercurrent.  
 
 
Jubilee 2000 and theological economics 
 
 
 
Jubilee 2000 was an incredibly successful campaign, both in terms of the support 
it generated and the extent to which its objectives of debt relief were achieved. 
Led by Christians and church organisations, its aims were closely related to the 
Christian faith. The campaign was able to stimulate interest in a topic many in the 
aid agencies had tired of, helped to re-shape conventional thinking on debt 
cancellation, and broke new ground in terms of its campaigning strategy. 
However, the prevalence of developing country debt has not disappeared, and 
despite the substantial relief achieved through the HIPC process, many countries 
still face considerable debt repayments. The Jubilee campaign is now but a 
distant memory in the West and assessments of its significance range widely, 
from important to peripheral.  
 
The campaign’s short but dramatic history demonstrates the way in which the 
Church still has the capacity in Western society to galvanise popular opinion in 
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support of causes that resonate deeply. Some measure of debt relief would 
doubtless have occurred without the campaign, simply due to the economic 
necessity of debt write-offs, but its scope and scale would have been much 
smaller, and far more stringent conditions would have been set: the campaign’s 
influence upon the World Bank to amend the terms of its HIPC programme is 
evidence of this. The campaign drew considerable inspiration and ammunition 
from overtly theological concepts and traditions, in particular, the use of Jubilee 
and the Church’s historical opposition to usury. The liberation of the poor and 
enslaved, in addition to Scriptural injunctions to forgive debts and avoid 
indebtedness, was also made forcefully. Moreover, it was the way that the 
campaigners used these insights and traditions, rather than the fact of their use 
that was significant, for it suggested a sense of confidence in the relevance of 
such material, much of it hitherto regarded as outdated by theologians, and in the 
face of cynicism towards religious agencies in a pluralist, Western culture. The 
role of the churches was critical in obtaining sufficient support for the campaign 
to attract popular attention in the media; church leaders were pivotal in this task, 
but so too were the aid agencies that offered financial and logistical support once 
the campaign was seen to be viable. As the campaign gathered momentum, 
considerable impact was made through the intervention of prominent Christians 
whose credibility and personal connections enabled the campaign in the United 
States. Key to the success of Jubilee 2000 was the sophisticated nature of its 
campaign led by an experienced and media-aware Coalition Committee, coupled 
with the churches’ and aid agencies’ organisational structures which informed 
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their congregations and supporters. Mass demonstrations and a series of other 
high-profile events maintained the political pressure on governments and the 
multi-lateral agencies. Although the sheer number of ordinary people in Britain 
prepared to attend the G8 Birmingham summit effectively launched the campaign 
into the headlines, in reality the success was just as much due to good 
connections in the media and among senior politicians and celebrities, especially 
in the United States. It was therefore a campaign that, to a significant extent, was 
voiced by the powerful on behalf of the powerless. Although debt relief 
campaigns had been pressing for many years in the developing world, the 
catalyst for the movement’s success internationally was the campaign in Britain 
and the US rather than the Jubilee campaigns in the indebted nations 
themselves. These national campaigns did, however, not only add legitimacy but 
provided vital information concerning the impact of debt repayments upon living 
conditions. 
 
For affluent Christians in the West, looking towards the new millennium, 
conscious of their marginalisation and of the intractable nature of global poverty, 
the campaign represented a welcome opportunity to combine hopes of a new era 
with tangible action to benefit the poorest. Christian aspiration and witness were 
forged together, for the campaign also represented an opportunity to 
demonstrate an example of the relevance of the Christian faith in a refreshingly 
uncomplicated way. Western Christians were galvanised by the sense that they 
could use their relative power and influence to make a necessary difference in 
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the affairs of the world as they affected some of the poorest people on earth. The 
ability of the campaign quickly to embrace all the major denominational strands 
within Christianity assisted considerably, and in this respect Pontifical statements 
were of great significance. Protestant and Catholic, conservative and liberal, 
traditional and Pentecostal were united in a common aim. The inter-faith 
dimension, in which all the major world faiths expressed their commitment, added 
much credibility to the campaign in the eyes of the media.  
 
The campaign was overt in the role that matters of faith played, and that the 
Christian heritage was a source of pride and inspiration rather than a feature to 
be understated. Despite this, it is also evident from our study that the movement 
contained many internal sources of friction and was far less united than was 
apparent. It was a loose coalition theologically, politically and sociologically, and 
it is clear that underlying divisions would have split the Coalition had the 
international campaign continued much past the year 2000. Tensions between 
the Leach proposal in the US on the one hand, and the call for unconditional debt 
relief from the South on the other, reflected starkly contrasting approaches to the 
effectiveness of debt relief in alleviating poverty. Furthermore, a clear divergence 
emerged over the extent to which corruption is caused by, or is a feature 
endemic to, poverty. The call for reparations generally fell on deaf ears in the 
developed world, where the chief interest lay not in retrospective justice, but in 
practical measures to combat the contemporary situation. The Coalition’s 
leadership realised that to campaign overtly for reparations would be a distraction 
305 
 
 
that could damage the campaign’s credibility and was unlikely to be 
unsuccessful, yet it continues to be a point of principle for campaigns in the 
South today. 
 
The decision to limit the campaign to the end of the millennial year was highly 
contentious, and caused much friction with campaigns in the South. The tension 
between the exigencies of a political campaign in the North and the sense of 
abandonment in the South was keenly felt: at its heart was the difference 
between the Northern campaigners, who saw debt cancellation as one facet 
among many towards the relief of global poverty, and those in the South who 
saw debt as an issue demanding a more longstanding, distinctive response.2 The 
2000 tag therefore proved more helpful to the campaign in the North than it did in 
the South. Probably ‘Drop the Debt’ and the Jubilee Debt Campaign would not 
have been initiated but for pressure from activists in both North and South to 
continue the work. 
 
The campaign against international debt is suggestive of a shift in Christian 
social engagement towards a more self-consciously theological economics, but it 
is one which is capable of constructive dialogue and prophetic witness. Linden’s 
observation that the campaign is incidental when set in a broader context is 
premised upon a superficial judgement, and would be more accurate had the 
                                            
2 Such a move was not unexpected: the first debt campaigners such as Dent and Peters had 
always viewed debt as only one aspect of the forces that keep millions in poverty. Following the 
ending of the campaign at international level, attention moved among the Western aid agencies 
to the campaigns for Trade Justice and Make Poverty History. 
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campaign been confined to a narrow, theological economics. It is my contention, 
however, that the initiative begun by the campaign can continue to be developed 
in ways appropriate to the task of ongoing, effective engagement if it is brought 
into a wider political and economic context and through a more dialogical 
methodology. We turn now, therefore, to a critique of the theological foundations 
and approaches that characterised the campaign. 
 
The Jubilee 2000 campaign: theological critique 
 
The campaign was particularly effective in its analysis of the debt problem and 
the way this was underpinned by the historical legacy of colonialism and deep 
flaws within the global financial system. In the case of Zambia we saw how its 
indebtedness could be traced in large part to political issues as well as economic 
ones, such as the struggle for independence, its opposition to apartheid South 
Africa, and its consequent trade isolation. We have also seen how the question 
of debt relief opened up a maelstrom of issues concerning democracy, political 
accountability, and the role of civil society in a developing nation. It revealed the 
disparities in power between creditors and the debtor nation, and the way debt 
relief could catalyse the democratic process – at least in those countries with 
stable state institutions. Thus a major strength for the campaign was the way it 
emphasised the political nature of indebtedness and its role in determining debt 
relief. However, it can be argued that in its stress on debt in relation to political 
economy rather than economics per se, the campaign paid insufficient attention 
to the detail of the economic issues themselves. 
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We have seen how the thrust of the campaign’s arguments was primarily moral 
and political rather than technical in nature, despite the technical data they 
published. The use of odious debt and particularly the parallel with slavery were 
ingenious and emotionally powerful tactics; the historical instances of debt 
cancellations served to establish the credentials of debt cancellation. In 
Athertonian terms, odious debts and past examples of cancellation served to 
engage the political-economic sphere on terms it recognised: legal frameworks 
and economic history. Much of the campaign’s moral argument was predicated 
upon the manifest injustices of debt repayments and the SAPs associated with 
rescheduling, and on the need for governments and the IFIs to have the moral 
and political will to effect the changes needed. In general, Jubilee 2000 employed 
a deductive methodology, grafting biblical principles such as justice, provision for 
the poor, and prohibitions on interest on to contemporary considerations 
concerning international debt. This was successful because the campaign’s 
cause achieved a wide resonance primarily due to its emotive and political 
appeal, rather than to its theological contribution: Jubilee 2000 was, after all, a 
political campaign not a research establishment. Our discussion of theological 
engagement with political economy shows however that, leaving political 
expediency aside, such a direct application of theological material is fraught with 
difficulty and methodologically is ultimately unsatisfactory.  
 
The campaign clearly espoused the principle that the welfare of people in the 
poorest nations demanded a higher priority than the strict entitlements of 
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creditors, and in so doing demonstrated that economic rights were subservient to 
other ones. This was the basis for opposition to the drastic and most damaging 
SAPs: here economic reform meant death, poverty and welfare reduction for 
many. This emphasis on human rights before economic ones is found most 
clearly in the publications of the WCC, the work of liberation theologians and 
those influenced by them (such as Gorringe and Duchrow) who advocate an 
economic order founded on the delivery of basic human needs to all as an 
essential prerequisite for a just society, for human dignity and world peace 
(Fitzgerald, 1999). Indeed, it is the provision for such needs that becomes the 
criterion for distinguishing what is just from what is unjust, and a spirituality of life 
from one of death. Such an ethics affords paramountcy to the preservation of life 
characterised not only by physical existence but by literacy, shelter, access to 
health care and education. The experience of the poor thus provides the 
cornerstone for ethical judgement upon economic matters. Such a rights-based 
approach is very helpful in establishing the boundaries of what is unacceptable, 
such as the stringent conditionalities of SAPs, or the pernicious nature of 
secondary debt and vulture fund markets. This is indeed a good, yet insufficient 
basis for engagement with an economy as a whole. Its problem lies not with the 
nature of the ideal but with the way that ideal is introduced into the engagement 
as eschatological imposition. What is meant by this, is the kingdom imperative for 
justice and human well-being being injected as a pre-requisite and not as an 
aspect within the dialogue. The domination of this imperative rejects the notion 
that economics can contain any valid insight, and views its claims and 
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assumptions (such as scarcity) as self-deceiving. Moreover, this approach is 
predicated on the questionable belief that complete solutions to poverty are 
indeed possible: that God has equipped humankind with sufficient resources to 
provide for all to an adequate extent. The argument for human rights in 
preference to economic ones represents a clear, succinct point of principle, yet 
for ongoing theological engagement a more nuanced approach is required which 
avoids an absolutist position and, in particular, offers guidance on how to 
prioritise competing rights and demands. 
 
The language of forgiveness was dismissed by most campaigners and 
commentators due to the view that its use would imply fault more on the part of 
debtors than the creditors, and that it might encourage a view that the campaign 
was about charity rather than justice. It could also lead to a blurring of the sharp 
distinction between victim and perpetrator, and the demands of the political 
campaign for debt cancellation militated against this. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
the absence of forgiveness as a theme represented a missed opportunity for 
deeper theological reflection and engagement. Debt ‘forgiveness’ was a term in 
common currency until the mid 1990s, and its continued use might have offered 
the chance for the campaign to address not only the need for the mutuality of 
forgiveness – thus leading to an acknowledgement of the responsibility played by 
the lenders – but also to the ultimate goals of forgiveness: reconciliation and a 
new beginning. Forgiveness is a more progressive concept than justice, and is 
inherently dialogical. It involves learning from past failings on all sides, and the 
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resolve to grow into the likeness of God through divine grace. The significance of 
the link between the proclamation of the Jubilee and the Day of Atonement which 
heralds it, continues to be ignored by many commentators. 
 
We have seen how the jubilee legislation in the Hebrew scriptures advocated a 
very occasional act of redistribution of land and the freeing of slaves. It 
represented an interruption in the established socio-economic order, an instance 
of the constraints placed upon the economic system couched in the terminology 
of divine law, but in effect a piece of social and political engineering. The 
legislation did not, however make any comment on the economic system itself: 
any condemnation is at best implicit in the need to make amends every 50 years; 
the persistence of both slavery and debt are assumed. Nor, as we have 
discovered, did the jubilee laws redirect society to some primeval, perfect idyll, 
despite the assertions of Spray (1999) and others who see in them the intention 
to equalise wealth. At the jubilee the land was to be returned to its former 
owners, not equally divided between the people. The legislation does not give 
any guidance on economic behaviour between jubilees (Spray, 1999). The 
Jubilee legislation is therefore of significant importance to arguments in favour of 
debt cancellation, as it represents a constraint upon the economic system, but it 
is of limited usefulness in helping us understand a theological engagement with 
political economy. The issues surrounding Zambia’s escalating debt following its 
HIPC debt relief extend way beyond instances of debt contraction, and raise 
disturbing questions over the whole debt contraction business. 
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The introduction of the notion of grace into theological reflections upon debt was 
prompted by the desire to contrast the secular, exchange economy with an 
alternative order more in accordance with an economics premised upon the 
essential human, relational aspects of commercial enterprise. Northcott imposes 
this doctrine upon economics as one system vying with another for hegemony; 
his approach reveals the extent and ramifications of the fallen-ness of the debt 
crisis, but does not guide us into practical measures to make the current system 
reflect theological principles and values more clearly. Selby identifies points of 
intersection between theological insight and economics, and in so doing is able 
to make more astute observations concerning power and reciprocity in debt 
obligations, yet he, too, eventually discards the dialogical approach. Again, we 
saw how theologies founded on the principle of applying a doctrine of grace into 
matters of economics are unable to provide guidance on the practical matters of 
how one moves from the present situation closer to the ideal in tangible steps, 
because they forsake dialogue for theological maxims. Tanner’s approach is 
even more embedded within the discourse of economics than Selby’s and, like 
his, does not lose the distinctiveness generated by Christian faith; unlike Selby 
however, her insights emerge from the interaction rather than through imposition 
upon it; her approach has much to offer as a model for engagement. All the 
above approaches illustrate the potential and the limitations of using one 
theological concept in relative isolation; as we noted earlier, a theology of grace 
cannot be predicated upon a theology of creation without sufficient reference to 
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the prevalence of sin. Accordingly, and despite the significant contributions both 
authors make, ultimately their proposals appear naïve. 
 
The use of usury reveals a similar pattern: an ancient theological insight which 
has experienced great difficulty in adjusting to changing economic realities. The 
failure of its applicability lies in its basis in an outdated concept of money. 
However, its underlying theological and social conviction – the concern to 
prevent exploitation of the vulnerable in the face of the damage caused by 
interest – still holds promise. Interest-free economics and shared profit schemes 
represent tangible signs of a breakthrough that embraces the values of mutuality 
and shared responsibility in ways that accord with economic growth, though 
these are still on the margins of the credit industry. They provide an excellent 
example of the performative role of theology that Atherton and Brown are so 
keen to emphasise. The development of usury reveals the methods by which 
people will seek to obviate the regulations where possible, thus providing many 
practical difficulties in regulating against the charging of interest. The ways in 
which Moslem riba prohibitions are avoided in Islamic banking are ingenious but 
ultimately do not suggest a credible alternative. 
 
Usury was, in fact, primarily concerned with power relations and recognised the 
personal and social damage interest payments could cause. Rather than being 
used in any prescriptive way in the modern, global economy, for example by 
opposition to all interest as a matter of principle, the primary value of the usury 
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tradition is the way it connects the phenomenon of interest with issues of power 
and exploitation. Germane to this discussion is the way in which risk is appraised 
and tackled, for as with interest, the aim cannot be its elimination but the 
minimisation of its damaging consequences. Paradoxically, money serves to 
mitigate the risk of market fluctuations (which affect the poor hardest) and yet 
also, in recent years, has become increasingly drawn toward high-risk 
investments. Theological considerations concerning interest and usury must 
therefore take account not only of the relative balances of powers in such 
arrangements, but also, vitally, the nature and role of money itself. A theology 
that teases out the moral connectivity between generations is another legacy of 
the usury tradition, and a vital component of any consideration upon debt. 
 
We see how debt becomes a wider matter of political economy and inseparable 
from the issues of global capitalism itself. Capitalism is dependent upon a debt 
economy, upon people and organisations borrowing money in order to grow 
economically, to be producers and creators, on the assumption that the proceeds 
of their endeavours will be able to repay the loan principal and interest. In order 
for this self-consciously theological economics to be genuinely capable of 
dialogue as well as of prophetic witness, debt must be placed into the wider 
context of theological engagement with political economy as a whole. Jubilee 
2000 was adept at identifying those areas where the extent of human suffering 
raises serious questions as to the efficacy and moral acceptability of particular 
economic policies; this feature is also present in many other aspects of 
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theological reflection on such topics as domestic welfare, housing and poverty. 
These areas may be considered to represent ‘boundary conditions’ which 
demarcate what is acceptable, though still subject to criticism, from what is quite 
unacceptable. Often these boundary conditions are imposed upon economics 
from without, and can even form the basis for a theological economics: the 
economic ideals of many theologies of liberation lead on from these. Such 
boundary conditions do not in themselves suggest a new Christian economics, 
merely the limits of particular economic conventions and regulation. They ought 
not to arise externally, imposed by the theological perspective in isolation, but 
should emerge from within the very engagement process with politics and 
economics itself. That is, there should be a clear link between those boundary 
conditions that are established and the processes that lead to them. Economics 
operates within the wider sphere of human operations and constraints, which 
includes trust, the acceptability of money and of currencies, the rule of law, 
political conventions and so forth. Such constraints restrict the scope of 
economic activity yet also enable its effective operation. There are therefore 
concepts within political economy that acknowledge the limitations of economics 
– conditional values - and can serve as a point of interaction with theology. As we 
have seen in our discussions on jubilee and usury, the theological tradition 
contains a rich repository of wisdom of advocating specific mechanisms, 
frameworks and parameters within (rather than ‘upon’) political economy. 
In terms of Atherton’s ‘faithful economics’ spectrum described in chapter 5, we 
can see that in many ways Jubilee 2000 appears to be a fairly clear example of 
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theological economics: distinctive, critical of the economic status quo, and 
offering a radically different solution. Yet there are signs of ethical economics too, 
not least in the emerging inter-faith work on interest and ethical finance that the 
Jubilee movement generated. The wider context into which theological 
engagement on debt needs to be set represents, in this typology, a more hybrid 
approach. This combines, or more accurately oscillates between, the facets of 
ethical economics (consensual) and theological economics (confessional) rather 
than a single approach. Thus future reflection on debt will need not only to 
embrace wider considerations of both interest charging and usury, but also take 
account of the broader nexus of credit and debt relations, and even examine the 
way in which money itself operates in the global economy. 
 
Themes that emerge 
 
 
We have discussed the strengths and deficiencies in the Jubilee 2000 campaign, 
and identified key requirements for a satisfactory theological engagement in 
matters of debt, and more widely, with political economy. We now turn to 
consider the key issues that a theological engagement must address, and 
indicate the contours of such engagement. 
 
(a) Power and mutuality in debt contracts 
 
A central theme of the campaign has been the assertion that in order to be 
considered just, and thus valid, debt contracts must exhibit a certain mutuality. 
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Such a mutuality cannot be established merely on the basis of the just price, nor 
even on the confessed approval of all the parties, for they may still be acting 
under duress or be removed from the interests of those they represent. Mutuality 
can only be considered on the basis of power relations, and their credit the 
campaign made this point strongly. Loans often came with stringent conditions 
attached (for instance, to purchase items from the creditor nation), and once the 
loan had been agreed the creditor was in a position to dictate terms should the 
debtor seek to renegotiate it. In addition, we saw allegations that the process of 
complex financial negotiations are sometimes beyond the capabilities of some 
officials, for instance in international trade negotiations, where a few staff from 
Zambia might be pitted against scores representing powerful interests in 
transnational companies, Western governments and financial institutions. 
 
Equality of power might be desirable but is hard to enshrine; it is also hard to 
ascertain whether it is indeed present in all kinds of other transactions that are 
rarely questioned from an ethical standpoint. Equality of power simply cannot be 
guaranteed, and attempts to do so are fraught with complications; however, this 
does not mean one should not strive for measures which challenge, as much as 
possible, the imbalances of power in transactions rather than hope to abolish 
power differentials altogether. A point of theological engagement here is not 
solely through the advocacy of equality of power to be imposed upon financial 
transactions, which as with all theological impositions raises questions of 
practical difficulty, but also through the attempt to discern points of convergence 
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within the field of political economy. Large disparities in power relations impair 
market operations: monopolies, corruption and protectionism all hinder 
competition and drive prices higher; new creative processes may also be 
deliberately quashed. A more even balance of power presents distinct benefits to 
the economic system, and thereby to all, as well as making steps towards 
safeguarding the position of the more vulnerable. Although there is much to 
suggest that less inequality is better for all in society, affecting levels of 
happiness, longevity, crime, violence and environmental concern (Wilkinson and 
Pickett, 2009), it may also be argued that the same logic applies between states 
as well as within them. George (1992) illustrates this point well, showing how first 
world economic dominance may rebound in the form of increased trade in illegal 
drugs and environmental pollution.  
 
Exploitative relations occur when one party feels they have no choice but to 
consent to the transaction under the terms on offer: the key issue here is the lack 
of choice. When an item is purchased, the purchaser may regret the purchase 
but will have the opportunity to make amends, either by selling the item 
(assuming it was not consumed) or starting afresh, wiser and poorer for the 
experience. With debt this is not possible, for the repayments continue to bind 
one’s freedom of choice, and the debtor’s negotiations on repayments tend to be 
done according to the creditor’s preferences. Creditors are usually in a very 
powerful position, and some measure of regulation is necessary to prevent 
exploitation of the vulnerable and to safeguard the smooth working of the 
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economic system. It is only in rare instances that creditors are not in this position, 
as may happen in cases of high inflation, or unusual debts such as those of 
Eurotunnel or Northern Rock where a political element in the economic situation 
skews the dynamics. The recent public disquiet in Iceland over the proposed 
repayment of £3.4bn to Britain and the Netherlands as compensation for those 
who lost money when the Icesave bank went bankrupt reveals the extent to 
which the matter has become a major political issue, and how political leverage is 
being exerted upon the Icelandic government to comply with its debt repayment 
obligations (Guardian, 6/1/10). Some kind of ‘boundary condition’ needs to be 
established here to which the debtor has redress, either from a loan taken out 
under exploitative terms, or from a loan taken out responsibly which 
circumstance has rendered extremely damaging. Redemption must always be a 
genuine possibility. Such a parameter does not dictate the nature and conditions 
of the loan, but merely acts as a limit upon repayment, and a reminder of the 
limitations which politics sets upon economics. Bankruptcy performs a vital task 
in society where people are unable to meet their debts, releasing them from their 
liabilities, extracting what can be repaid, but not to the extent that they become 
unable to work, or support a family. The courts recognise that there are limits to 
what can reasonably be demanded in repayment, irrespective of the terms of the 
original loan. Attempts to frame a version of sovereign bankruptcy have to date 
made little progress, but the general principle still has much to commend for 
further reflection by economics, politicians and theologians.   
  
319 
 
 
Mutuality and reciprocity in credit arrangements must be the ultimate goal of 
theological endeavour with debt, but the more pressing need is the recognition 
that in practice this will be necessarily difficult to enact. As with Muslim avoidance 
of riba and Hillel’s prosbul, ingenious ways of avoiding the letter of the regulation 
will always occur.3 That is not to argue that strenuous efforts should not be made 
to strive for greater reciprocity, but one needs to realise that vigilance will always 
be required amid all efforts to reduce inequity in debt and credit arrangements. 
Appeals to mutuality and reciprocity in economic transactions can only be but 
one aspect of theological influence; discernment and reflection upon economics 
opens up awareness that great disparities of power in economic relations are 
ultimately damaging for the economic system as a whole. As we have seen, debt 
defaults (Mexico, Russia) have triggered economic crises. 
 
(b) Conditionality 
 
Divine grace is unconditional, but the practice of forgiveness is often not so. The 
decision of many Paris Club members and other creditors to annul Haiti’s 
bilateral debts following the January 2010 earthquake was not unprecedented, 
but cannot easily be extended to scenarios unaffected by natural disaster. The 
issue at stake is the detail of conditionality, not its existence. The important 
debate is over the nature of the conditions and, more importantly, who 
                                            
3
 As Barrera (2005: 125) states with reference to the jubilee: ‘the deliberate efforts to get round 
the legislation suggest that the Hebrews found these economic statutes to be troublesome in their 
demands...there is a large, unavoidable, sacrificial element involved in implementing the principle 
of restoration.’ 
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establishes them. In particular, the Jubilee 2000 campaign argued that the 
IMF/World Bank imposition of proven economic performance conditions in order 
to gain debt cancellation would be self-defeating and increase suffering; instead, 
debt cancellation could catalyse civil society through poverty relief. Thanks to the 
campaign, the cold logic of IMF conditionality is now much discredited. 
Conditionality ‘from below’ would seem to be a most promising avenue; it 
recognises the dangers of fungibility and corruption, though clearly it requires a 
minimum degree of both political freedom and state capacity to make such 
conditionality work effectively. 
 
(c) A new appraisal of money  
 
Our consideration of interest charging and usury in chapter 8 revealed the need 
for a re-evaluation of the role and function of money in theological reflection. 
Money is not confined to exchange-value, a useful economic means to aid the 
exchange of goods and services; it has become, under global capitalism, a far 
more pivotal aspect of the way in which people relate to each other through 
politics, social organisations, social values (such as freedom of choice) and the 
way we view ourselves as individuals.  
 
We have observed the catastrophic human consequences of debt repayments as 
funds are diverted from essential provision such as welfare, food subsidies, 
health care and education; yet it is also evident that the global economic system 
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has brought much prosperity to many, not just a few; economic growth continues 
to lift millions out of poverty. Many goods, despite their attractiveness, contain 
dangers through the way we misuse them.4 Food and possessions can all be 
debased or distorted through the sin of greed, temptation and selfishness, as can 
the non-physical attributes of power, fame and knowledge; this is true not only for 
individuals but also in a collective sense. It may be preferable not to consider 
such goods in isolation from their influence upon us, and as intrinsically morally 
neutral; it is in the way in which such goods are owned or used by human beings 
that the potential for good or evil becomes apparent. That is, at the heart of the 
issue about our interaction with these goods is a concern about the inner human 
being. This is theology ‘with’ things, rather than theology ‘and’ things: 
 
‘What we are struggling with is not a series of problems, capable of 
resolution if only the proper structural analysis could be made, the proper 
people aligned, or the proper program [sic] forged. No, what we struggle 
with (within!) is the mystery of the human condition, rooted in ambiguity, 
scarred by sin, moved only with great reluctance, and never completely, 
toward faith.’ (Johnson, 1981: 116) 
 
 
Money is good, not least in the way it enables markets to function smoothly, yet it 
presents the greatest potential for both good and evil, for prosperity and for 
impoverishment. One cannot opt out of this discussion and advocate non-
monetary economics unless one is willing to rule out economic growth. It is the 
particular tendency of money, because of its dissociation with its formative 
transactions, to lead to consequences far at variance from its initial purpose, and 
                                            
4
 The way in which technological goods such as computers and the internet improve quality of life 
yet may also impair relationships is one current example: Bunting (2010) 
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without counteracting forces it seems inexorably drawn to those areas of highest 
risk and greatest reward. The risk of financial loss through these endeavours is 
not borne proportionately by those who stand to gain, since governments will 
often bail out major financial institutions in order to prevent collateral failure in 
other sectors of the domestic economy.5 Thus one challenge theology brings to 
bear on the issue is the question of responsibility and cost-bearing: are the costs 
justified vis-à-vis the potential gains, and on whom does the burden of cost fall? 
Scripture is emphatic that the cost of social goods should not be heaped upon 
the poor.  
 
Our discussion so far leads us to conclude that a critical issue for theological 
reflection is the nature of money in the global economy today and in particular its 
deep paradoxical tendencies, whose origins lie not so much in money as a 
commodity, but in our relationship with it. 
 
(d)  Theological realism and paradox 
 
Our discussion constantly returns to the need for theological reflection to 
acknowledge the profound ambiguity in human beings and their structures. It is 
insufficient simply to assert that the world’s problems and human suffering are 
the consequence of human sinfulness, both individual and structural; we must 
                                            
5
 Hence the argument that banks should separate their capital (investment) and their deposit 
functions: Van der Weyer.(2009: 11-14) 
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recognise the insidiousness of the way in which these items cannot be redeemed 
completely, because of what we are individually and collectively. The reason for 
this impossibility is that the propensity for things to go wrong is so tightly bound 
to their essential functions as we perceive them. We must therefore expect sin 
still to be present, and cannot predicate an order in which this is not so. Realised 
eschatology is inadequate without this component. The observation of Scripture 
that the poor will always be with you (Deut. 15:11; John 12:8) should not lead to 
fatalism but is merely a warning against a naked utopianism: all schemes for 
poverty reduction can never be achieved fully this side of the eschaton. 
 
We need to consider the relation between ideals and realities, and particularly 
the link between theological concepts of the perfect state and the past, for often 
utopian thought represents a return to a primitive condition (Johnson, 1981: 120). 
This leads us in turn to a re-examination of the doctrine of creation and its 
paradoxical nature. Theology makes a clear distinction between the doctrines of 
creation and fall; this is unfortunate in the sense that it obscures the presence of 
ambiguity even in creation. Creation is good, but not perfect: the Garden of Eden 
contains the serpent, who is the responsible party for the sin that enters the world 
(Durkin, 1989: 86). The serpent preys on human beings’ susceptibility to 
disobedience, and shows the true nature of evil not as absence of good, but as 
its corruption. Without this reminder, a theology of creation emphasising God’s 
abundant provision can lead to erroneous assumptions about the way human 
institutions function, and an overly optimistic view of them. An example of this 
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would be the assertion that goods can be shared without diminishing utility cost 
and that competition for resources is unnecessary. It is not the nature of the ideal 
that is at fault here, rather the way in which it is juxtaposed with ethical 
considerations. 
 
The dangers of utopian thought are discussed by Gray (2007), who insists that 
we must understand human beings and institutions as inevitably flawed, and that 
the Fall is a better myth than that of progress. His aversion to the Enlightenment 
is excessive, but his rationale is nevertheless valuable: he argues that utopian 
thought is based on nostalgia, and that its obsession with establishing the ideal 
life on earth has ironically been the cause of much suffering in which misery and 
want would be removed. Therefore, he calls for the rejection of teleology in 
politics, the view that evil can be defeated or social, economic and political 
problems solved; in its place he advocates a realism about the human condition 
reminiscent in some ways of Reinhold Niebuhr.  Niebuhr would, I believe, have 
been cautious in his advocacy of debt cancellation. This is not to say that his 
instincts would not have been supportive, but that he would have been exercised 
over the way the arguments were framed. In particular, he would have been 
critical of any attempts to use biblical principles such as Jubilee, or the tradition 
on usury, in any prescriptive way. He would have drawn attention to the different 
interests represented in the complex Jubilee legislation itself. A Niebuhrian 
approach would warn that the solution to the debt crisis is more complex and 
intractable than a matter of simple debt cancellation, and would have had much 
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to offer on the critical issues of conditionality in debt rescheduling. His aphorism 
that ‘history makes the problems of man’s togetherness more, rather than less, 
complex’ (Rasmussen, 1989: 259), remains apposite. 
 
One of Niebuhr’s greatest insights is that Jesus’ frequent assertion of the 
eschatological demands of the kingdom cannot lead us directly into a practical 
social ethic for today. Yet Jesus’ teaching also contains realism: in his teaching 
on divorce and remarriage (Mark 10: 1-12) he reinforces the traditional view that 
remarriage following divorce is contrary to God’s will, but he does not explicitly 
prohibit (or permit) such remarriage. He acknowledges its occurrence, but warns 
that interpersonal relations such as marriage cannot be obviated by legal means 
such as divorce. Here the purposes of God are clear and undiluted, and remain 
as a challenge to the world, yet there is also a recognition of the reality that often 
these purposes are unrealised. In the light of this, Jesus’ response is a reminder 
of the ultimate, but significantly contains neither sanction nor release. He uses 
the ultimate goal not as ethical imposition but as eschatological reminder; he 
does not get drawn into the detail of the argument, perhaps because the matter 
is so complex. 
 
Niebuhr also acts as a helpful resource on the issue of the ambiguity of the 
human condition. He states that the process of Christian ethics is not, ultimately, 
a rational matter, but one which must address fundamentally the soul: 
 
326 
 
 
‘The wisdom by which we deal with our fellow men... is not so much an 
intellectual achievement as the fruit of a humility which is gained by 
prayer. The faith through which we understand the meaning of our 
existence and the fulfilment of that meaning in the divine mercy is, 
ultimately, a gift of grace and not the consequence of a sophisticated 
analysis of the signs of the times. We are not merely minds, but total 
personalities. We can deal with immediate issues as minds. But we deal 
with all ultimate issues as personalities. And we deal with them truly only 
if, not the ignorance of the mind, but the pride of the heart has been 
vanquished.’ (Niebuhr, 1946: 24-5) 
 
 
 
Idealism and realism  
 
I have suggested that one requirement for satisfactory theological reflection on 
debt is a more pessimistic aspect of human beings and programmes, but one 
which does not allow such negativity to dominate, and thereby clings to the 
hopefulness of change. Its view of humanity needs ever to be cognisant of the 
prevalence of sin amid the worlds of finance and creativity; yet it also needs to be 
committed to the belief that improvements can be made. Gray’s analysis is 
unduly gloomy, however, and his pessimism needs to be countered by the hope 
that is derived from Christ’s resurrection, where God’s victory over sin and evil is 
displayed. Indeed, the task of Christian realism today is as much about 
expanding the horizons of our imagination as it is to remind ourselves of practical 
constraints (Lovin, 1995: 246). Jubilee 2000 showed that it is possible to combine 
idealism and realism in productive synergy. Its idealism was used to spur the 
imagination and galvanise support for a campaign devoted not only to a dramatic 
one-off debt cancellation but also to changing financial structures for the future, 
aware that one tremendous act of debt relief would be quite insufficient. In this 
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sense Linden’s assessment that Jubilee 2000 is unrepresentative of the Church’s 
social engagement may be regarded as inadequate. Future theological reflection 
upon debt will need to develop a greater synthesis between utopian ideals and 
more realistic possibilities, for the shift towards a more self-consciously 
theological economics contains dangers if it does not also embrace a dialogical, 
realistic stance; conversely, without the ‘prophetic’ (ideal) dimension, no 
movement can garner support and enthusiasm, nor can the imagination be 
opened up. 
 
Jubilee 2000 successfully dispelled the myth that economic conventions such as 
the repayment of debts were inviolable, and showed that debt cancellation was 
both necessary and possible. The campaign was right to view this issue as a 
political one rather than a purely economic one, even if one could argue that the 
campaign neglected some of the finer points of economic analysis. The Jubilee 
2000 campaign owed much to the jubilee theme, though this was not 
investigated in detail and used primarily for inspirational rather than theological 
purposes. Jubilee 2000 showed how Christian imagery can continue to be a 
powerful resource for social mobilisation and theological inspiration. Christian 
reflection upon debt must continue to embrace such inspiration, but must also be 
engaged in the world of limitations, constraints, conflicts and possibilities that are 
present in economics. Attempts to formulate such an engagement have not been 
entirely successful, and are rarely dialogical. The Church’s witness has been 
more confined to particular campaigns than to the deeper, wider arguments 
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concerning debt. One cannot leave the matter of debt to jubilees or acts of 
cancellations. Because a more satisfactory ethics must concern the contingent 
as well as the ultimate, we require more a robust critique that provides guidance 
on debts that are enabling and those that are damaging. In particular, our focus 
must not be on the goal of a world without debt but on the more contingent one of 
how debt may be less damaging and more productive of human flourishing. Yet 
we also need a focus for our engagement, for the goal of the jubilee, the 
Kingdom of God, and the divine promise of life in all its fullness continue to 
stimulate and inspire Christian people. The biblical jubilee embraces great 
idealism yet is embedded in earthy realism. We need that alternative vision which 
stands as a constant reminder of the ultimate goals to which we aspire, and 
which also act as judgement on our world, preventing us from ever being 
satisfied with our present condition. 
 
A key component of that vision is devoted not only to the vision of the ideal 
society, but also to the role of the ties that people share together. Selby’s 
insistence on coming to an appreciation that debts and obligations can be 
servants for good (debts that ‘delight’) is surely right, though he does not explore 
its paradoxical nature sufficiently. A fruitful line of enquiry here might be aided by 
theological reflection on the nature of liberty and the role obligations play in this. 
True freedom is denied by obligations that deny access to basic services, but is 
found not in the absence of all obligations but through those that give cause for 
prosperity, creativity, enable relationships and develop potential. Freedom 
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through bondage to Christ is a common Pauline theme; Christian liberty is not 
found in complete independence to pursue one’s own selfish, natural instincts 
and desires, for these will inevitably enslave oneself, but is found in obedience, 
and in love. Even obligation becomes an aspect of freedom.  
 
It is to be hoped that the legacy of Jubilee 2000 will not be confined to a dramatic 
and largely successful campaign for debt relief for the poorest nations on earth, 
but might indicate a seminal moment, a paradigm shift that galvanised a 
burgeoning movement devoted to strive for fairer processes of credit and debt. 
So long as global capitalism remains the dominant mode of economic activity, 
development in poor countries will necessarily include financial assistance to 
improve state infrastructure and enable agricultural and industrial enterprise to 
flourish. The lending of money will continue to be both necessary and fraught 
with danger.  The Christian contribution in such matters will therefore continue to 
be critical. 
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Appendix I 
 
Nations identified by Jubilee 2000 as in need of debt cancellation  
(taken from Hanson and Travis (1999: 41)
 
Angola 
Bangladesh* 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia* 
Cameroon 
Central African 
Republic 
Chad 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
Republic of Congo 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Equatorial Guinea 
Ethiopia 
Gambia* 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti* 
 
Honduras 
Jamaica* 
Kenya 
People’s Democratic 
Republic of Lao 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi* 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Morocco* 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Nepal* 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria* 
Peru* 
Philippines* 
Rwanda 
São Tome & Principe 
Senegal 
 
 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Vietnam 
Republic of Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe* 
 
 
* countries ineligible for 
HIPC relief 
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Appendix II 
 
 
The Jubilee 2000 Charter1 
 
 
The Jubilee 2000 Charter suggests a solution to the problem of Third 
World debt which is attractive to both debtors and creditors. It proposes 
the remission – by 31 December 2000 – of the unpayable debts owed by 
highly indebted poor countries to commercial banks, creditor governments 
and multilateral bodies (such as the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank and Regional Development Banks.) 
 
The Jubilee 2000 Charter proposes that: 
 
 There is an overwhelming need to remission of the backlog of 
unpayable debts owed by highly indebted poor countries. Debt 
remission should relate to commercial, government and IMF/World 
Bank debts, and debt reduction should comprehensively include all 
three forms of debt. 
 Creditors as well as debtors must accept responsibility for these 
high levels of indebtedness. 
 The remission should be a one-off, unrepeatable act, tied to the 
celebration of the new millennium. It would set no precedents for 
future loans. 
 The precise details of remission should be worked out in 
consultation with both creditors and debtors for each debtor 
country. 
 These details should be agreed by arbitrators nominated in equal 
numbers by both creditor and debtor, under the aegis of the UN. 
 Their deliberations should be transparent and well-publicised, 
taking into account for each debtor country, that country’s probity, 
economic management, social policies and human rights record. 
 Funds available after the remission of debt should be channelled 
into policies which benefit the poor, in line with UNICEF’s 
recommendations for investment in social development. 
 Low income countries – with an annual income per person of less 
than US $700 – should receive full remission of all unpayable debt. 
 Higher income countries – with an annual income per person 
between US $700 and US $2,000 – should receive partial 
remission. 
  
                                            
1
 Taken from Hanson (1996: 25) 
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Appendix III 
 
Selected Statistics for Zambia 
 
 Two thirds of Zambians live on less than $1/ day;1 about 90% live 
on less than $2/ day.2 
 One of the highest levels of debt-per-capita in the world 
($500/person) compared to GNI of $340 / person. 3 
 For every dollar received in aid, Zambia pays back $3.4 
 Life expectancy in 1988 was 54; in 1998 it had fallen to 44.5 
 Infant mortality is 112 per 1000 live births; life expectancy is 
estimated to be at 33-34 years.6 
 Electricity Consumption per capita in 1980 was 1125 kWhrs; in 
2002 it was just 603.7 
 Daily calorie intake per capita in 1965 was 73; in 1992 it was 62.8 
 In 2006 there were 845, 546 AIDS orphans9 
 One of the highest levels of HIV/AIDS in the world, yet $20 has 
been spent in debt service repayments for every $1 spent on health 
sector spending.10 
 
 
Year  Total Debt ($m)
11
 HDI
12
 HDI rank Life Expectancy  
 
1970         49.7  
1975     0.470    
1980  3244   0.478 
1985  4576   0.489 
1990  6916   0.477 118/160  54.4   
1994  6804       
1995     0.439 146/174  42.7   
1998  6865    153/174  40.5   
2000     0.420 
2001  7270
13
       33.4
14
  
2005     0.434 165/177  40.5  
                                            
1
 UNICEFfigure quoted in McIntyre (2004: 17): Jubilee 2000 Coalition (undated) gives this as 
72.6% 
2
 McIntyre (2004: 17); Jubilee 2000 Coalition (undated) states 91.7% 
3
 McIntyre (2004: 17-18) 
4
 McIntyre (2004: 18) 
5
 Henriot (1998) 
6
 World Development Movement (2004: 17) 
7
 United Nations Development Programme (2006)  
8
 United Nations Development Programme (2006) 
9
 United Nations Development Programme (2008)   
10
 United Nations Development Programme (2006: 89)  
11
 Jubilee 2000 Coalition (undated) 
12
 taken from United Nations Development Programme (2008) 
13
 Zambia’s debt stock (US$million – taken from AFRODAD (undated: 4) 
14
 Taken from World Development Movement (2004: 38) 
